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Jaclyn Stanke
Introduction
The origins of this volume are rooted in the many discussions and meetings that 
took place between Maryna Bessonova, Spasimir Domaradzki, and Rob Verhofstad 
over the past several years. In the summer of 2004, Bessonova and Verhofstad met 
as Fulbright scholars studying American foreign policy in the United States. In the 
course of that summer, the two discussed the many different and varying views that 
existed within Europe concerning America’s foreign policy past and present. Their 
conversations continued when they returned home and began visiting each other’s 
universities in Ukraine and the Netherlands as guest lecturers. In the process, they 
discovered how little their students knew about the Cold War period, not having 
lived through it or having experienced it themselves. Consequently, their students 
had a difficult time grasping just what the Cold War was, why it was one of the most 
significant phenomenons of the twentieth century, and how it affected the daily 
lives of individuals around the world, including those from their own countries. 
In the summer of 2005, Domaradzki met Bessonova and Verhofstad at a con-
ference in Croatia. He shared their concern regarding students’ difficulty in com-
prehending the Cold War, and as a result a project to explore the Cold War from 
comparative national perspectives officially began. Over the course of the next few 
years, the three traveled to each other’s universities to deliver lectures on the Soviet, 
Dutch, and Polish perspectives. In 2009, Jaclyn Stanke and Lee Trepanier joined the 
endeavor, providing American perspectives at the conference, “Multilateral Com-
parison of Cold War Perspectives,” organized by Verhofstad at his home institu-
tion, Radboud University. The proceedings from the conference were published as 
Comparative Perspectives on the Cold War: National and Sub-National Approaches 
(Krakow Society for Education: AFM Publishing House, 2010).
Given the success of the Radboud conference, the group agreed to meet again 
in March 2010 at Domaradzki’s institution, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow 
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University, in Poland. The selection of the location for the next conference was not 
accidental. Thirty years prior, the independent trade union, Solidarity, emerged in 
Poland to challenge the communist authorities. A conference dedicated to exam-
ining the Polish crisis of 1980-81 from multiple perspectives seemed appropriate 
given the fact that not only was it one of the last major events of the Cold War, but 
because today many consider the events of 1980-81 as instrumental in the eventual 
fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Though Solidarity was 
outlawed following the declaration of martial law in December 1981, it reemerged 
in 1988 to participate in the Round Table talks which helped bring an end to com-
munism in Poland. 
In part, then, the conference, “The Solidarity Movement and International 
Perspectives on the last Decade of the Cold War,” for which the articles in this 
volume were initially produced, was designed to commemorate the thirtieth anni-
versary of Solidarity’s birth. Indeed, Tadeusz Syryjczyk, a co-founder of Solidarity 
in Krakow (and former Minister of Industry, 1989-90, and Minister of Transpor-
tation, 1998-2000) as well as Allen S. Greenberg, Consul General of the United 
States in Krakow, helped open the conference. Conference participants also vis-
ited the Krakow branch office of the Institute of National Remembrance where 
many records and files from the communist period are kept. Among the other 
highlights of the conference were Mark Kramer’s lecture on European Security 
and the Polish–U.S.–Russian Triangle and the group presentations by Domar-
adzki’s students. The presentations illustrated the students’ findings on the events 
of 1980-81, which were gathered from period news items (print, visual, and aural, 
including both official sources of information as well as unofficial samizdat) and 
oral history interviews they conducted with individuals who lived through the 
events. In this way, the project’s objective to educate students more fully about the 
Cold War was advanced. The students who participated learned about the Cold 
War in general as well as about particular events from a very specific point in time 
that took place in their own country. The series of scholarly papers presented at 
the conference (now printed here in revised form) was another way in which the 
project worked towards its objectives. Overall, the purpose of the papers was to 
explore Solidarity and the events of the 1980s, but especially the Polish crisis of 
1980-81, from multiple perspectives – including several national perspectives as 
well as official and unofficial perspectives. 
The volume’s opening chapter by Domaradzki provides an overview of Solidari-
ty’s history, detailing its transition from an opposition movement to an integral part 
of the political system after 1989 and its continuing legacy for Polish politics today. 
In the course of the article, he raises the question of what exactly is/was Solidarity 
and is/was there only one Solidarity or many? Mark Kramer then examines the roles 
that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact played in the events of 1980-81. In par-
ticular, he focuses on the threat Solidarity posed to the alliance as well as the intense 
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pressure the Soviet Union placed upon Polish authorities to crush Solidarity with 
the eventual imposition of martial law. 
The next two articles further explore official and unofficial views from behind 
the Iron Curtain. Bessonova details the official Soviet position on Solidarity and 
its impact on domestic life in the Soviet Union, especially that of the Ukrainian 
republic. She notes that while the Soviet authorities viewed Solidarity as an anti-
socialist organization bent on counterrevolution, many Soviet citizens in Ukraine, 
particularly those already involved in opposition movements, saw the trade union 
as not only an example in the struggle against communism but also one for national 
liberation. Kostadin Grozev, a new addition to the project, provides information on 
the Bulgarian perspective. Like Bessonova, he makes a distinction between official 
and unofficial views of the Polish events. Likewise, he highlights the actions taken 
by Bulgarian officials to control information coming into the nation about what 
was happening in Poland. However, he also notes that the situation in Bulgaria was 
very different from that of Poland in 1980. While Poland was suffering under severe 
economic strain, Bulgarians were enjoying their highest standard of living to date 
and the nation was considered the closest ally of Moscow. By 1989, however, things 
had changed and Bulgarians established their own independent trade union à la 
Solidarity of 1980.
The next set of articles explores the Polish crisis from the Western angle. Ex-
amining the Dutch perspective, Verhofstad locates a response, both officially and 
unofficially, that was perhaps representative of other NATO members at the time. 
He finds that while the Dutch press and people were interested in what was happen-
ing in Poland, the events never dominated Dutch news or politics. Rather, the na-
tion was more concerned with the NATO double-track decision to deploy nuclear 
weapons in the Netherlands. Given that, the more pressing question for the Dutch 
when it came to Solidarity was whether the movement posed a threat to the process 
of détente since it embodied the possible risk of Soviet intervention or was it a lib-
eration movement that should be actively supported? Thus, the Dutch were primar-
ily concerned with how the events in Poland might develop and impact the debate 
taking place on the NATO missiles. 
The next two papers from the Western perspective treat official and unofficial 
American viewpoints. In the first, Trepanier explores how accurate were the percep-
tions of the American foreign policy establishment of the events in Poland from the 
birth of Solidarity to the declaration of martial law. He also briefly examines the 
role the U.S. government played in the domestic politics of Poland between 1986 
and 1989. With respect to the events of 1980-81, the United States recognized the 
need to balance its support for solidarity against the costs of antagonizing the So-
viet Union. However, it misjudged the declaration of martial law, failing to consider 
it a serious possibility. Nonetheless, the lessons learned during this period enabled 
the United States to support Poland’s transition towards a liberal democracy and 
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free-market economy in the late 1980s. In short, the American foreign policy es-
tablishment’s perceptions of Poland comported for the most part with the reality 
of events that were transpiring on the ground. In the final chapter, Stanke takes 
a look at the popular perspective of the Polish crisis through an examination of 
syndicated political cartoons which appeared in American newspapers. She tracks 
the dominant themes which emerged in the cartoons over the course of 1980-81 
and draws several conclusions. First, when it came to what was happening in Po-
land, the cartoons depicted a certain perception of the Cold War as an ideological 
struggle between liberty and tyranny. Secondly, the images and themes conveyed in 
the cartoons seemed to be either in sync or at least supportive of official American 
policy on the Polish crisis as very few if any cartoons indicated opposition to the 
American position.
Although the articles detail different perspectives and even different foci at 
times, they share some important commonalities. Whether approaching the events 
of 1980-81 from behind the Iron Curtain or from the so-called Free World, simi-
lar concerns emerged in nearly all the perspectives examined. In particular, every 
nation discussed within this volume were interested in knowing what exactly the 
reforms obtained by Solidarity meant – were they simply liberal measures of reform, 
or did they signal something more like revolution or counterrevolution? Thus, every 
nation attempted to discern the nature of the reforms as well as assess what might 
be the limits of acceptable change. Consequently, most of the essays in the volume 
brush up against the idea of Poland serving as an example to other eastern bloc 
nations. Ironically, while communist authorities were concerned with Solidarity 
acting as a virus that could spread to other communist countries, resulting in the 
possible destabilization or demise of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, commen-
tary in the West pondered the same prospect. Not surprisingly, then, viewpoints 
from all sides expressed the view that if things went too far, force might be used to 
reverse the changes (as indeed it was when martial law was imposed). In a similar 
fashion, then, both superpowers found themselves concerned with the reactions or 
responses of their respective allies to the events in Poland, and at times both had to 
“manage” or negotiate with them to get them in line. Finally, in most of the perspec-
tives studied here, prior moments of reform followed by repression behind the Iron 
Curtain – Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 – were 
repeatedly referenced as events unfolded in Poland during 1980-81. It seemed as if 
these events were the lens through which all sides viewed, compared, and assessed 
the Polish crisis, whether it was in terms of hope or expected repression.
Finally, an examination of various national perspectives, including both official 
and unofficial viewpoints, helps us not only to learn more fully about particular 
Cold War events like the Polish crisis of 1980-81, but also allows us to step back 
and make some comparisons and larger conclusions. For example, when comparing 
how government officials conveyed information to their publics, the distinctions 
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between Western and Soviet bloc systems become clearer. The communist regimes 
tried to control the information, while Western nations were more open in their 
reporting of the information known. Given that, the unofficial reactions in West-
ern nations were based upon more accurate information and tended to run along 
similar lines as the official government approaches. Despite this distinction, though, 
what also stands out in the case of the Polish crisis is the similarity of what Solidar-
ity’s actions signified to many – including communist authorities throughout the 
eastern bloc, the peoples living under them, and even Western observers. To many 
viewing the events of 1980-81, Solidarity presented a challenge to the survival of 
the communist system. Whether that was a challenge to be welcomed or feared, 
however, was another matter, but in this instance it appeared as if the Cold War was 
indeed an ideological struggle over freedom. These are but a few examples of the 
comparisons and conclusions which may be drawn from the articles in this volume. 
We hope the readers will find additional ones. 
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Spasimir Domaradzki
The Paradox of  Solidarity  
from a Thirty Years Perspective
After thirty years since it first came to existence, the Solidarity movement is not 
only a recognized symbol of the Cold War’s end, but it is also constitutive part of 
the Polish political system. The movement’s history went through remarkable evo-
lution and became a source of inspiration for peaceful resistance against the com-
munist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and tyrannies all over the world. 
After the end of the communism in Poland and the subsequent collapse of com-
munism in the Eastern bloc, the Solidarity movement produced mainstream politi-
cal parties in Poland. Until today, it remains a source of inspiration and provides 
political legitimacy to every political leader. It seems that in Poland, there is no po-
litical activist who, while searching for arguments strengthening his or her position, 
is not emphasizing former membership in the Solidarity movement (only those 
politicians with ties to the Polish United Workers Party – the Polska Zjednoczona 
Partia Robotnicza or PZPR – are not claiming Solidarity origin in their political ca-
reers). Of course, bearing in mind the massive support for the movement during the 
eighties, there is no doubt that those people were involved in the movement in one 
way or another.1 Remarkable is the fact that despite the considerable change in the 
popular support for the offspring of Solidarity during the last decade of the twenti-
eth century, politicians still refer to the idealist aura surrounding the movement.
It is remarkable that thirty years later I write about Solidarity in the midst of 
a unique presidential election campaign. Today, two days after the end of the first 
round it is clear that there will be a second one in which the leaders of the two par-
ties with Solidarity roots will confront each other in a decisive battle for the highest 
office. Although, this election campaign is in the shadow of the tragic loss of the 
1  The Solidarity Trade Union members were over 10,000,000.
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Polish president Lech Kaczynski and the debate is moderate in tones, a remarkable 
slogan appeared. Albeit this slogan is of secondary importance, I find it a remark-
able milestone of the Solidarity lifeline. The slogan, offered by one of the two politi-
cal parties that made it to the second round, concerned the need for change in the 
pattern of political behavior in Poland: a call to “end the Polish-Polish war.”
The sole understanding of the slogan requires long analysis of the Polish politi-
cal system. Although, it is not the main aim of this introduction to deliberate on 
the political meanders of the political system, it is important to provide at least 
a brief explanation of the slogan. The concept of the Polish-Polish war stems from 
the aggressiveness and brutality that was (and still is) inseparable part of the Pol-
ish political life for the last twenty years. In this particular aspect there is nothing 
unique in comparison to the political confrontation between the political parties at 
a national level in other democratic states. The extraordinary fact is that this slogan 
is based on the theoretical presumption of the existence of two confronting political 
powers, which at least until the changing rhetoric of this political campaign were 
assuming only confrontation. The slogan aims to search for replacing this trend and 
promote cooperation rather than conflict. Here comes the uniqueness of the slogan. 
It concerns two political parties (Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość or PiS) 
and Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska or PO) that claim the same political 
legitimization in the roots of the Solidarity movement. However, the virulence of 
the political confrontation between these two parties can sometimes be scary, even 
for people with an aggressive nature. This is why the slogan is a sort of political sum-
mary of the Solidarity history.
In order to understand the Polish political system today, it is not enough to sim-
plify the dilemma as a conflict between two political parties. First, because the Pol-
ish political system is multiparty, there are additional important players. Second, 
because the leaders of PO and PiS are willing to expose the clash not only as political 
but also as ideological one. One of the side-effects of this political confrontation 
is the usurpation of the ideological arguments of other political parties. Thus, the 
ideological division in Poland became something completely irrelevant since con-
servative party (Law and Justice) can claim strong state involvement in the social 
sphere and the so-called liberal party (Civic Platform) can easily cooperate with the 
Socialist Party (Sojusz Lweicy Democratycznej or SLD) on matters of free market 
approach, for example. In other words, the ultimate end (which is receiving the big-
gest possible popular support) justifies the means (that is a departure of most, if not 
all, ideological objectives in the political discourse).
It needs to be emphasized that the current political situation is a consequence of 
the political transformation through which Poland underwent in the course of the 
last thirty years. While preparing for writing this introduction, I decided to search 
on Google for a question, which popped up in my mind. The question was what 
happened with Solidarity. I was surprised to see that Google provided me not only 
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with editorials, papers, blogs comments and news, but also with songs and com-
ments from intellectuals, church representatives, and the youth. Therefore, it seems 
obvious that this is a question concerning not only the political scientists and politi-
cians in Poland, but it is also an issue of more general social importance.
This introduction does not pretend to cumulate and take into consideration all 
the various aspects of the Solidarity movement’s evaluation after thirty years. Fur-
thermore, it is not attempting even to create a substantial list of positive and nega-
tive arguments concerning the movement. It will rather review certain opinions, 
attempt to segregate the main attitudes towards the movement, and address some 
of the most visible aspects movement’s legacy. But first, there is a need to address the 
question what is Solidarity?
What is Solidarity
In the social sciences words play extremely important role. On one hand, words 
try to describe reality as accurately as possible; on the other hand, words are used to 
create ambiguity and uncertainty. This applies also to the meaning of Solidarity. 
First, it is of crucial importance to set up a Solidarity lifeline, which will pro-
vide the basis for a more clear analysis. In 2001 Antoni Dudek divided Solidarity’s 
history into three periods. Although, this division is based mainly on the political 
aspect and thus it is not encompassing of all the features of the Solidarity discourse, 
it is worth recalling it since it is based on logically coherent scholar observations.
The First Solidarity can be called the one that operated until 1989. Its distinc-
tive features were the strongest in human resources and finances as the underground 
Solidarity concentrated around Lech Wałęsa and the Provisional Coordination 
Committee (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna or TKK). 
The Second Solidarity (1989-1993) was partially recovered due to the Round 
Table talks and the first semi-free elections of June 4, 1989 in a hybrid union-com-
mittee’s form. It subsequently disintegrated quickly and abruptly.
The Third Solidarity (1996-present) is connected with the appearance of the 
Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność or AWS) and the rivalry 
between the activists of the political parties established in the early nineties and the 
union members, who became politicians after the 1997 parliamentary elections.2 
The Third Solidarity requires additional explanation, since it disappointed Pol-
ish society (despite the important political reforms it introduced) to such an extent 
that it could not pass the 4% threshold during the 2001 parliamentary elections. Af-
2  Dudek, Antoni. ”Rola »Solidarności« w procesie formowania elity politycznej III Rzeczypospolitej.” In Soli-
darność dwadzieścia lat później, Roman Bäcker, Antoni Dudek, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Jacek Kurczewski, Marek 
Latoszek, Jerzy Mikułowski Pomorski, Mariusz Muskat, eds. (Wydawnictwo Arcana, Kraków 2001), p. 120.
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ter this, it returned to the union roots and subsequently started providing political 
support for one of the two political parties that emerged out of the Solidarity Elec-
toral Action, namely the PiS. This trend became more and more visible since 2005 
and today the union is commonly recognized (despite its leader’s Janusz Śniadek’s 
statements) as openly supportive for Law and Justice.
Each of the Solidarities relies on its own achievements. Pawel Śpiewak mentions 
three undisputable moments in Solidarity’s lifeline: the protests which led to the 
legalization of and the concessions made by the communist authorities in August 
of 1980, the martial law which again revealed the real picture of the communist 
regime, and the peaceful transformation of itself in 1989.3 
A brief comparison of these two observations reveals the fact, that only in the 
case of the First and Second Solidarity, there are achievements, which does not re-
quire constant defense. Dariusz Gavin adds that August 1980 (the Solidarity strikes 
and the signature of the August agreements between Solidarity and the communist 
authorities) brought the association of the political action with action for com-
mon good. The conflict, discord and dispute were concepts outside the “Solidarity 
commonwealth.”4 Thus, the myth of Solidarity generates solely positive connota-
tions. However, it concerns the First and only to a certain extent, the Second Soli-
darity.
Definitions of  Solidarity
A short review of a few publications on the question “what is Solidarity” proves 
that it is almost impossible to find one common understanding of the term. The 
most dominant opinion is that Solidarity was a movement.5 Undoubtedly, the argu-
ments for this approach stems from the massive support for it in the early eighties. 
In late August 1981, according to Wojciech Roszkowski, Solidarity membership 
declared approximately nine and a half million Poles.6 Secondly, the movement was 
also recognizable through the wide social representation where physical workers and 
intellectuals were united by the same idea. Third, the spontaneous character of the 
activities in its early days needs to be emphasized. Finally, the concept of “Solidarity-
like” forms of unionism spread throughout all spheres of the Polish society. These 
3 Śpiewak, Paweł. Dziedzictwo ”Solidarności.” In Dlaczego wyszło to nam inaczej? Czyli Polska i „Solidarność” 
widziana po latach, Tomasz Olko, ed. (Fundacja Gazety Podlaskiej im. Prof. Tadeusza Kłopotowskiego, Siedlce 
2005), p. 11-14.
4  Gawin, Dariusz. ”»Solidarność« – republikańska ewolucja Polaków.” In Lekcja sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarno-
ści” po dwudziestu latach, Dariusz Gawin, eds. (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2002), p. 183.
5 It is also acceptable to call Solidarity a movement, since it reflects the widest consensus what Solidarity was in the 
early eighties.
6  Roszkowski, Wojciech. Najnowsza Historia Polski 1980-2006 (Świat Książki, Warszawa 2007), p. 39.
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trivial remarks are important starting point in order to understand at least a few of 
the remaining attempts to depict “Solidarity.”
The second most popular way to describe Solidarity is through calling it a “labor 
union”. In fact Solidarity was (and still is) a trade union from a technical and ad-
ministrative point of view. Furthermore, the Solidarity’s legacy produced more than 
one labor union, each of them claiming to be the continuance of the real Solidarity 
principles and the bearer of the true movement’s values. It is important to remem-
ber, that the registration of Solidarity as a trade union became the first and most 
important claim against the communist authorities.7 However, the notion of “labor 
union” brought unique demands. Unlike the “western” notion of trade unionism, in 
the Polish case, the main aim was completely different, because the most distinctive 
element of the union was its supposed independence from the authorities. The re-
quest for the formation of such entity was an unexpected and unwanted precedent 
for the communist authorities. As Dariusz Gawin promptly pointed out “a new gen-
eration of workers appeared – thoughtful, intelligent and conscious of their place in 
the society – ready to exploit the fact that according to the ideological principles of 
the system, their class was supposed to play a leading role in the society.8
However, the existence of trade unions per se was not inconsistent with the com-
munist propaganda. The communist led Labor Union Association was acting in 
accordance with the expectations of the political system and in case of workers con-
flict was supporting the communist authorities. But in the case of Solidarity, the 
movement used the slogans of the socialist rhetoric in order to establish an entity 
in complete opposition to the communist authorities. Therefore, it was difficult to 
explain to the majority of the population, why a trade union should be declared il-
legal. Furthermore, the fact that the main source of demand was the (blue-collar) 
representatives of the “working class,” which was the main pillar of communist pro-
paganda, weakened the communist arguments.
It should not be forgotten that the process of workers mobilization started due 
to the deteriorating economic situation; and the direct reason for the protests in 
various parts of Poland (Lublin, Gdańsk, Szczecin and others) were the government 
decisions for increase of the meat prices. Although this typically economic factor 
became the primary source of popular dissatisfaction, it generated also the feeling of 
solidarity among workers from different plants and branches of the industry.
7  Solidarity prepared 21 proposals which were negotiated with the communist authorities. The first one required 
that trade unions could be legally independent from the state. The subsequent proposals were concerned about the 
right to protest; the freedom of speech, press and publication; the rehabilitation of protesters from the previous 
protests in 1970 and 1976; the transmitting of information through the public media; wages increase that linked 
salaries to inflation; how to supply stores with goods and export only if a surplus existed; the introduction of clear 
professional criteria for professional advancement, etc. 
8 Gawin, Dariusz. ”»Solidarność« – republikańska ewolucja Polaków.” In Lekcja sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarno-
ści” po dwudziestu latach, Dariusz Gawin, eds. (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2002), p. 168. The quote itself 
is from Grażyna Pomian, Polska „Solidarności”, Instytut Literacki, Paryż 1982, p. 76.
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The uniqueness of the Solidarity as a trade union is exposed also in the mem-
bership content. The working class was supported by the intellectuals, thus creat-
ing broad representation of the society.9 In fact, this was the practical realization of 
the socialist ideals, with the “tiny” difference, that its main demands were de facto 
turned against the “socialist” authorities.
Undoubtedly, Solidarity was a trade union, but while evaluating its trade union-
ist nature, the political restraints, social conditions, and economic environment 
need to be taken into consideration. The trade union shape was encompassing both, 
the relative margin of tolerance of the communist authorities and the main source 
of dissatisfaction, which were the blue-collar workers. Being independent from the 
authorities and at the same time using the socialist rhetoric, Solidarity constituted 
a competitive source of authority. Simultaneously, Solidarity was not representing 
only the blue-collar workers interests, but it was ready to challenge the authorities 
in order to improve the situation of the nation as a whole. Solidarity brought the 
notion of self-government which is not necessarily the essence of unionism.
Another important distinction of Solidarity is the non-ideological or multi-
ideological outlook attitude of its roots. During the first National Congress of Del-
egates of Solidarity on September 26, 1981 the Solidarity program was accepted. 
According to the program, Solidarity was a multi-ideological organization, which 
main aim was the representation of workers and the protection of their rights, dig-
nity and interests.10 The widest possible ideological spectrum was possible because 
of the unacceptable reality in which, despite the differences concerning the ways 
of challenging the political system, the desire for change was stronger. In this way 
Solidarity liberal, conservative, national, Catholic, and Social Democrat attitudes 
could find a common ground. They were united by a common man’s philosophy of 
the blue-collar workers who was deprived of his or her ideological halo, and they 
were strengthened by practical and achievable claims such as clear procedures of 
higher management selection not based on party membership but on skills and 
competences. Along with them, claims of more general nature were included, like 
the establishment of workers self-governments, solving tensions between the com-
munist authorities and the society through dialogue, clear division of competences 
of the state institutions, and the democratization of the public life.11
Another attempt to describe Solidarity was undertaken by Jadwiga Staniszkis 
who, in her published in the United States in a 1984 book entitled Poland’s Self-Limiting 
Revolution addressed Solidarity as a self-limiting revolution.12 Undoubtedly, the 
9  In the course of events Solidarity-affiliated unions were established among farmers, scientific institutions and 
academic centers.
10  Roszkowski, W., op. cit., p. 24, 42.
11  Ibid.
12  Staniszkis, Jadwiga. Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984).
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word “revolution” required additional explanation, since the sole use of this term in 
the early eighties could have had dramatic consequences.  Such analysis was provid-
ed almost two decades later by Antoni Dudek who compared the former depiction 
with another attempt to describe the movement as “another national uprising.”13 
According to Dudek, the revolutionary nature of the movement was visible in the 
spontaneous nature of its developments, which could hardly be controlled even in 
a modest way. It also clearly identified itself with a proletarian identity and explicitly 
borrowed elements from the socialist ideology (in particular the egalitarianism and 
social utopia).14 In addition to Dudek’s argumentation, it needs to be mentioned 
that such strong “leftist” attitude was also a consequence of the awareness that too 
radical departure from the communist rhetoric used by the authorities could have 
brought much more decisive repressions. Thus, the “leftist” arguments were not only 
pragmatic claims but also ideological shield against the communist authorities.
Solidarity as a part of the Polish uprising tradition refers to the romantic and 
simultaneously extremely sad history of Poland’s history from the late eighteenth 
century until the end of communism, during which several uprisings aiming coun-
try’s independence were conducted. Unfortunately, most of them produced little, if 
any, result.15 If we were to accept revolution theory, from a thirty-years perspective, 
the “Solidarity uprising” deserves positive evaluation. The “revolutionary” attitude 
invokes the fact that a clear enemy existed, which fiercely defended the ancient re-
gime. Solidarity was led by charismatic leader who was able to unite the masses. 
The national solidarism appeared to be the reference point for actions taken in the 
early eighties.16 Antoni Dudek also quoted Jacek Kuroń’s opinion that the main 
aspiration of the Solidarity revolution was the destruction of the Polish United 
Workers Party monopoly in the field of organization (establishment of own hori-
zontal structures), information (establishing alternative sources of information to 
the official communist propaganda) and decisions (taking into account Solidarity’s 
existence).17 Dudek concludes that at the beginning Solidarity was more a revolu-
tionary movement and later it became more a national uprising that was relatively 
bloodless.
Through the lenses of time such theory seems relevant. Based on the experience 
and the revolutionary changes which embraced the whole world, one can claim that 
Solidarity was a revolution. However, during the early eighties, a much more concil-
13  Dudek, Antoni. ”Rewolucja robotnicza i ruch narodowowyzwoleńczy.” In Lekcja sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidar-
ności” po dwudziestu latach, Dariusz Gawin, eds. (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2002), p. 143.
14  Ibid., p. 146.
15  Of course, there are positive exemptions such as the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918-1919.
16  Dudek, Antoni. ”Rewolucja robotnicza i ruch narodowowyzwoleńczy.” In Lekcja sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidar-
ności” po dwudziestu latach, Dariusz Gawin, eds. (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2002), p. 150-51.
17  Ibid., p. 145.
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iatory approach was introduced and despite the various ideas that circulated among 
the Solidarity activists, it was the evolutionary approach that prevailed. Andrzej 
Paczkowski depicted Solidarity as a revolution, with the characteristic that it did 
not seek but resigned itself to use of force.
Another description of Solidarity perceives it as an “organization of Poles.” In 
this way the patriotic and nationalist attitude appeared. Despite the fact that this 
is definitely not a dominant way of perception, it requires certain attention since it 
illustrates the wide scope of ideas within the movement. The sole connotation was 
that those who were not members of Solidarity were not Poles. Furthermore, the 
“non-Poles” were traitors and deserved no respect. Thus, a more radical approach 
towards the communist authorities logically appeared. This line of thinking reached 
its zenith in the allegations which appeared already in 1980-1981 among the dif-
ferent fractions in the movement concerning the belonging to the group of “true 
Poles.”18 Later, especially at the end of communism, this argument will become 
more acute and will contribute to the divisions within Solidarity that became the 
new political elites.
It conclusion it is worth citing also Ryszard Bugaj, who while analyzing the lega-
cy of Solidarity in Rzeczpospolita, saw the essence of the movement in the “Round 
table talks” in 1989. “The Round table agreement reflected properly the dualistic 
nature of Solidarity: labor union and social movement. This was manifested in two 
features of the agreement: compromise in the matters of political matters and the 
consensus on the program of economic system’s reconstruction that was respectful 
of the workers’ interests.19
As one can see, there are numerous attempts to understand what Solidarity was 
(and still is). All these approaches include the objective historical development and 
the subjective memories of the participants. Furthermore, the usage of one, two, or 
even more descriptions simultaneously does not cause confusion. Instead it rather 
expresses the complexity of issues which Solidarity brought with its existence. The 
attempts to describe Solidarity include the highest ideals and the strongest disap-
pointments, the vision of the future and the existing reality. Solidarity was a formula 
embracing many (if not all) different visions concerning the desire for change. It 
was also a formula of relative acceptation by the omnipotent authorities, at least for 
certain period of time. 
18  Roszkowski, W. Op. cit., p. 41-42.
19  Bugaj, Ryszard. ”Odrzucona spuścizna Solidarności.” In Rzeczpospolita, August 27, 2010, A15.
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Solidarity and the Transformation Period
After thirty years the question of Solidarity and its legacy still attracts a lot of 
attention and emotions. Probably the most visible (and in the same time somehow 
ironic) aspect of this emotion was the Polish initiative to advertise in Germany in 
2009 on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Cold War’s end the Round Ta-
ble talks of 1989 as the competitor to symbolize communism’s collapse. Somehow 
logically, for the Germans, the most important symbol is the collapse of the Berlin 
wall. This, however, is considered in Poland as diminishment and marginalization 
of Poland’s contribution to the collapse of the East bloc. Therefore, the Polish au-
thorities decided to launch an advertising campaign in Berlin (with an enormous 
poster of the Round Table and the signature, “it started in Poland) placed at Unter 
den Linden Boulevard. 
This small issue in fact expresses many attitudes present in the contemporary 
Polish society. Among them are the feeling of underestimated devotion around the 
world; the feeling of still inappropriate position in the world’s affairs; the neces-
sity to convince the others in order to convince ourselves; the willingness to talk 
in one voice about events that have thousands versions; and last but not least, the 
willingness to strengthen the notion of Poland’s input in the European and world’s 
history.
Undoubtedly, the peaceful end of the communist regime reached after the 
Round Table talks in Warsaw from February to April 1989 is the most remark-
able achievement of Solidarity. It is a symbol not only well-recognized all over the 
world but it also has become a pattern used subsequently in many places (not only 
in Eastern Europe) during transformation from one political system to another. It 
is the turning point in the Polish, Eastern European, and even worlds’ history. If we 
recall Paweł Śpiewak’s words concerning the three undisputable Solidarity events, 
why then, there is a need to advertise these undisputable moments in Solidarity’s 
history?20 Is it in order to obtain the feeling that they are appropriately commemo-
rated?
Undoubtedly, there is a long list of virtues and achievements that were accumu-
lated in Solidarity. It was the strength of the activists, the determination of their 
actions, the conviction that the cause is righteous and the belief in a better future 
that led Solidarity to ultimately prevail. It was Solidarity, which for the first time in 
the communist bloc, managed to challenge the communist authorities and to force 
them to step back. It brought hope that the authorities are not omnipotent and 
required to respect individual’s rights. It was Solidarity that proved that the politi-
cal system is not as strong the communist propaganda was proclaiming. Solidarity 
exposed the falsity and hypocrisy of the communist regime. It was Solidarity that 
20  Refer to footnote 3.
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revealed the weakness of the socialist economy. Again Solidarity openly criticized 
the flaws of the communist system and the corruption of party patronized nepo-
tism. Solidarity in itself became the source of the most positive human values and 
generated the feeling of strength deeply hidden in each individual suppressed by the 
system. Why then Solidarity still raises so many tensions in the Polish society?
First, as it was already pointed out before, the movement consolidated enormous 
amount of differing and sometimes even conflicting ideas about how to communi-
cate with the communists. The only uniting element was the existence of the com-
munist apparatus, which was considered as the ultimate evil. Once the communists 
were defeated, there was no more unifying target among Solidarity members. It is 
worth mentioning that the process of movements’ partition was visible already dur-
ing the first Congress in 1981; and it was not only a result of tactical and strategic 
differences, but also a consequence of the communist secret services21. 
Second, after the introduction of the martial law, the movement was severely 
weakened and almost all the leaders were interned. The governments’ policy of simul-
taneous intimidation and willingness for cooperation also divided the movement. 
Lech Wałęsa’s policy of creating new political leadership, while omitting some of the 
previous leaders and the underground structures of Solidarity further weakened the 
movement. Other leaders left the country and were unable to return. Thus during the 
period between 1987 and 1989, new political elites were created, with much a more 
unanimous and mature approach towards the communist authorities.22 These elites 
not only conduct the negotiations around the Round Table, but they will later lead 
the country through the transformation. Those with Solidarity background, who will 
remain outside the new elites, will generate both the feeling of disappointment, frus-
tration and marginalization. Nevertheless, their importance should not be underesti-
mated. Since the early nineties these people will channel the popular disappointment 
from the transformation. The political elites of the late eighties will not remain mono-
lithic. The 1990 “war on the top” between the then prime minister Tadeusz Mazow-
iecki and the president Lech Wałęsa created new divisions in the post-Solidarity elites, 
thus starting the transformation period political scene. A scene, which due to the con-
stant modifications and lack of stable political parties, will additionally influence the 
feeling of insecurity and disappointment among the society. This brought a feeling of 
relativism and permissiveness, which Paweł Śpiewak calls “hunger for values.”23 
Today, twenty years after the end of communism, the “war on the top” evolved. 
During the late nineties the clash between the Solidarity elites was called a “Cold 
21  For example, the Secret Service operation “Sejmik” aimed at the confrontation of the Solidarity leaders Lech 
Wałęsa and Andrzej Gwiazda. Roszkowski, W., op. cit., p. 40.
22  Ibid., p. 89-90.
23  Śpiewak, Paweł. Dziedzictwo ”Solidarności.” In Dlaczego wyszło to nam inaczej? Czyli Polska i „Solidarność” 
widziana po latach, Tomasz Olko, ed. (Fundacja Gazety Podlaskiej im. Prof. Tadeusza Kłopotowskiego, Siedlce 
2005), p. 11-14.
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Home War” and expressed in the radicalization of the media language and the rela-
tive weakness of the political institutions.24 According to Cesary Michalski this war 
was dangerous, because it touched upon institutions and spheres, which determine 
the shape of contemporary liberalism and the language of the present-day Christi-
anity.25 As I have mentioned already at the beginning, this clash has transformed 
today in the “Polish-Polish war” between the liberal leftist wing of the Solidarity 
movement and the national-conservative opposition. The level of tension among 
the former members of Solidarity since the early nineties is best described by Dari-
usz Gawin, who states that “obviously, people of Solidarity are pushed towards each 
other by something strong enough, to be unable to break and simultaneously repels 
them something important enough, so that they are unable to restore the complete 
unity, the symbol of which for them is August 1980.”26 In other words, how to ad-
vertise a symbol, when all the heroes are defamed?
Another political slogan expresses the frustration among the disappointed 
representatives of the post-Solidarity elites. The concept of building a new fourth 
republic (challenging the political mechanisms and principles of the recent third 
republic), was introduced as necessity to break with the unacceptable practices of 
the ruling elites after 1989. This radical idea was the proposed solution during the 
elections in 2005 in order to improve the political system. Again (illogically) the 
proponents of this new political transformation were the so-called “conservatives”, 
which in itself is controversial.27
Solidarity is considered to be the starting point of the Polish transformation. 
Thus, it generates not only the positives of the system change but also the nega-
tives. As was mentioned, in the political sphere the transformation led to deep parti-
tion of the post-Solidarity elites, which were able to copy successfully the “western” 
democratic mechanisms, but unable to introduce the “western” habits of political 
culture. A brief analysis of the post-Solidarity elites will reveal the fact that for the 
last twenty years, the list of highest ranked politicians was (and still is) the same. 
What was changing were the names of the political parties represented by the same 
politicians. Therefore, the concept of political responsibility is considered (fortu-
nately not always) as something less important. A good example is the comparison 
of post-elections behavior in Poland with other western countries. The well known 
24  Michalski, Cezary. ”Desolidaryzacja, czyli wspólnota jako podmiot roszczeń.” In Lekcja sierpnia. Dziedzictwo 
„Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, Dariusz Gawin, eds. (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2002), p. 206.
25  Ibid.
26  Gawin, Dariusz. ”Solidarność – republikańska ewolucja Polaków.” In Lekcja sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” 
po dwudziestu latach, Dariusz Gawin, eds. (Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2002), p. 178.
27  It is worth recalling that all the previous Polish Republics ceased to exist as a result of national military defeat. 
Furthermore, even today, every political party in Poland to a certain point is ready to propose an introduction of 
changes to the constitution or even a brand new constitution as a political panacea (although nobody guarantees 
that it is really going to work better).
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practice is that after elections defeat the leader of a political party resigns for several 
prosaic reasons: firstly because he was unable to win the elections; secondly, because 
he was unable to convince the majority of voters to support his party; and thirdly, 
because the need for change in the party leadership is obvious. However, in Poland 
the leaders are either satisfied with the results (even when they lose) or instead of 
resigning, they dissolve the party and create a new one, which they lead again.28
The Polish political elites quickly forgot about the people’s daily problems. In 
the fight for power they drifted so far away that decency was forgotten. Those who 
left the politics did it only in exchange for lucrative positions in international orga-
nizations or as CEO’s of strong companies. Thus, the politics became a way not only 
“to make it for living,” but also to secure a decent living standard. This caused a natu-
ral social counter-reaction, which was a growing criticism of the political elites, elec-
tions marginalization, and constant distrust, which spread across the society.
Furthermore, the transformation process itself became a focal point for political 
criticism. The fact that Solidarity was unable to cover the whole political spectrum 
and had just enough space at the political scene for the former Polish United Workers 
Party to adjust to the new reality and organize its left side to be the heir of the Social 
Democracy of Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polski). As An-
toni Dudek promptly observed “nobody wanted to be called “leftist.”29 The partition 
of the Solidarity elites during the early nineties was a consequence of the particular 
leader’s political ambitions rather than the demand of the new political system.
In the economic sphere the transformation from planned to market economy led 
to drastic changes. The process of privatization went from a so-called “wild privati-
zation” when companies were sold irrationally behind closed doors  through a much 
more wise, modest and clear process which was later introduced. The burden of the 
economic transformation was carried by the ordinary people. Thus, enormous dif-
ferences in the living standard were created. This, according to Ryszard Bugaj, is the 
biggest fiasco of Solidarity. Among the voices of criticism concerning the last thirty 
years, often one can hear, that the today’s reality “is not what we were fighting for.” 
Undoubtedly, much more difficult question would be: what were you fighting for? 
The answers, which I have obtained through my students interviews with people 
involved in Solidarity refer to idealist and vague ideas such as liberty, prosperity and 
better life conditions. Although, there would be hardly a clear answer, it is obvious 
that the transformation reality caused dissatisfaction with the political elites. The 
strongest proof for that is the fact that during the last twenty years of democratic 
elections there was no political party to win reelection.
28  After an election defeat, the newest trend is to exclude lower rank party members which should create the feeling 
of change in the society.
29  Dudek, Antoni. ”Solidarność w procesie formowania elity politycznej III Rzeczypospolitej.” In Solidarność dwa-
dzieścia lat później, Roman Bäcker, Antoni Dudek, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Jacek Kurczewski, Marek Latoszek, 
Jerzy Mikułowski Pomorski, Mariusz Muskat, eds. (Wydawnictwo Arcana, Kraków, 2001), p. 122.
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In the social sphere the inequalities led to pathologies and moral deprivation. 
Poland needs years before the rule of law become obeyed. Nevertheless, it would 
be unfair to blame Solidarity for this. The communist regime treated the law in-
strumentally and time is needed to reestablish the feeling of a predictable and fair 
state. Despite the flaws and mistakes, in general the rule of law is a fundament of the 
present day society. 
Conclusion
This brief reflection on the reasons of dissatisfaction with Solidarity does not 
pretend to be exhaustive or complete. Nevertheless, it shows a certain trend which 
directly influences the question why we still need to promote Solidarity abroad. 
What we have today is the paradox of the necessity to advertise a self-advertising 
events and lack of possibility to unite the nation around a symbol, which once 
united the nation. In order to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of August 1980 in 
Gdansk, an exhibition was opened entitled “Solidarity is one.” It would be enough 
to allow all the individual visions of Solidarity to exist together instead of confront-
ing them in the pursuit of the only truth. Just like in August 1980 it was possible 
that all the political ideas were united by one common goal. 
The movement’s non-violence attitude together with the compromise led to the 
collapse of the communism. Even, if in 1980 few, if any believed in that, only nine 
years later this was a fact. Thus, the bravest dreams were satisfied, which doesn’t 
happen very often. Even if the evaluation of the situation from inside is depicted 
in more negative tones, it is because the people still retain the spirit of Solidarity 
and believe that the future can be better. From outside perspective the conclusions 
are much more promising. Poland is a member state of NATO, EU and a reliable 
partner in international relations. This is the legacy of the events that started thirty 
years ago.
Bearing in mind the above mentioned, the main reason for this volume becomes 
apparent. Taking into consideration all the doubts, emotions, dilemmas and myths 
on national level, which directly influence the perception of Solidarity, it is of ut-
most importance to confront our own myths with the external attitudes towards 
the developments of the early eighties. Thus, we as Poles will be able to recognize 
the truths and myths and hopefully this will be a small step towards a more unified 
perception of the glorious days of the First and Second Solidarity. When we are able 
to reach this point, we will find a Solidarity that still speaks to us and the world. 
When this occurs, advertisements will no longer be needed, since the story will be 
in itself convincing enough.
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Mark Kramer
The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the 
Polish Crisis of  1980–1981
The imposition of martial law in Poland on December 12-13, 1981, came after 
nearly eighteen months of sociopolitical turmoil at home and growing tension abroad. 
The crisis in Poland began modestly enough in early July 1980, when blue-collar 
workers at the PZL-Świdnik helicopter factory near Lublin embarked on a series of 
work stoppages to protest the government’s abrupt announcement of higher prices for 
meat. Strikes and demonstrations soon spread across the country, posing graver com-
plications for the Polish Communist regime and for the Soviet Union than any event 
had since the late 1940s. Faced with crippling strikes at major shipyards and factories 
in August 1980, the Polish authorities considered resorting to a full-scale crackdown, 
but after deliberating about the matter they decided to eschew the use of force and – 
with great reluctance – to sign three landmark accords that formally recognized the 
establishment of Solidarność (Solidarity), an independent and popularly-based trade 
union that soon rivaled the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia 
Robotnicza, or PZPR) for political power and that represented the interests of the very 
same working class in whose name the party had always purported to rule. The signing 
of these accords in Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Jastrzębie in late August and early Septem-
ber 1980 was followed less than a week later by the removal of the First Secretary of 
the PZPR, Edward Gierek, and the appointment of Stanisław Kania as the new party 
leader, a post he held for the next thirteen months.
The dynamic of the crisis in Poland in 1980-1981 was very different from the sit-
uation that arose twelve years earlier in Czechoslovakia during the so-called Prague 
Spring. In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the initial drive for political liberalization had 
come mainly “from above” (rather than from labor unrest), and the Prague Spring 
had become a “crisis” only when Soviet leaders defined it as such. By contrast, in 
solidarity domaradzki 2010.indb   27 2010-12-22   14:24:04
28
◀ Mark Kramer ▶
29
◀ The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis of 1980–1981 ▶
Poland in 1980-1981, the pressure for change came “from below,” and the crisis that 
engulfed Polish society affected every aspect of the country’s political and economic 
life. Unlike the leaders of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, who were willing 
to move ahead with far-reaching liberalization and a greatly relaxed form of Com-
munism, Kania and other senior officials in Poland tried to retain and restore as 
much of the orthodox Communist system as possible. Under growing popular pres-
sure, Kania and his colleagues in the PZPR, notably the defense minister, General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski (who became prime minister in February 1981 and replaced 
Kania as PZPR First Secretary eight months later), made many important conces-
sions to Solidarity and allowed much greater freedom of expression. At every stage, 
however, the Polish authorities sought to limit and eventually reverse these conces-
sions, and they did their best to undermine Solidarity’s efforts.
The standoff between the regime and Solidarity was further complicated by the 
emergence of sharp splits within the PZPR itself. From the outset, some members 
of the PZPR Politburo, such as Tadeusz Grabski, Stefan Olszowski, and Stanisław 
Kociołek, wanted to take a much more vigorous stance against Solidarity, using vio-
lent repression to crush the new trade union and restore conformity. Although the 
hardline members of the Politburo never commanded a large following at lower 
levels of the party, they did enjoy enough support to pose a clear challenge to Kania 
and Jaruzelski. A potentially more serious problem for the PZPR leadership arose 
when reform-minded officials gained strength within the party. Over time, roughly 
35 percent of PZPR members joined Solidarity. Although some of them merely 
wanted to infiltrate the new organization on behalf of the Polish security apparatus, 
many who joined were genuinely supportive of Solidarity’s goals. The spread of re-
formist sentiment within the PZPR made the position of Kania and Jaruzelski all 
the more precarious. The rivalries and divisions throughout the party meant that 
almost any action taken by Kania and Jaruzelski would antagonize some key group. 
The lack of unity within the party greatly impeded efforts to resolve the crisis either 
by force or through a political compromise.
This chapter provides a reassessment of the Polish crisis of 1980-1981, focusing 
in particular on the role of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The chapter be-
gins by explaining why leaders in Moscow immediately and unanimously concluded 
that Solidarity must be crushed as soon as possible. The chapter then looks at the 
elaborate preparations made by the Polish authorities, under close Soviet supervi-
sion, for the imposition of martial law. The chapter also discusses the extensive plan-
ning and concrete steps taken by the USSR to send its own military forces into 
Poland either to help Jaruzelski with the introduction of martial law or to quell 
widespread violence that could not be handled by the Polish regime itself. The 
elaborate military measures adopted by the Soviet Union were not simply a bluff, 
an act of brinkmanship, or an exercise in coercive diplomacy; rather, they reflected 
the genuine willingness of Soviet leaders to rely on military force in extremis. The 
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chapter then traces the further preparations carried out in Poland for martial law 
and shows how the extraordinarily tense situation facing Jaruzelski as the climactic 
moment approached in December 1981, prompted him to urge the Soviet Union 
to send its own troops to help him impose martial law. Soviet officials turned down 
these proposals and exhorted Jaruzelski to take decisive action on his own, but the 
desperate nature of the Polish leader’s pleas was indicative of the gravity of the crisis. 
The final section stresses the analytical significance of Soviet-Polish interactions in 
1980-1981. Not only did these interactions underscore the inherent ambiguity of 
deterrence and “compellence” (the term coined by Thomas Schelling) and the im-
practicality of neatly distinguishing between the two, but they also highlighted the 
crucial role of stress and emotion in crisis decision-making. Moreover, the discus-
sion here makes clear that the Soviet Union’s underlying approach in this case was 
not fundamentally different from its responses to earlier political crises in Eastern 
Europe. The only thing different was the circumstances on the ground.
The chapter draws extensively on declassified documents from eleven countries 
in the former Soviet bloc as well as declassified Western materials, including the 
top-secret assessments produced by U.S. intelligence agencies as they closely moni-
tored Soviet and Warsaw Pact military preparations and deployments. The declas-
sified materials from former Communist countries include transcripts of Politburo 
meetings, records of conversations, documents produced by high-level Communist 
Party bodies and officials, military planning materials, reports from foreign intelli-
gence and state security organs (including dispatches to Soviet intelligence officials 
from agents in Poland), foreign ministry cables, planning documents for martial law 
in Poland, and other important items that until recently were highly classified. First-
hand accounts (memoirs and interviews) by former participants in the crisis can, if 
used with caution and cross-checked against other sources (especially contempora-
neous documents), also provide valuable evidence. At a minimum, the first-hand 
accounts are useful in tying together loose ends and filling in gaps in the record.
Soviet Reactions
From the start, the highest-ranking officials in the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union (CPSU) were convinced that the rise of Solidarity posed a fundamental 
threat to Poland’s Communist system. On August 25, 1980, the CPSU Politburo 
set up a special “Commission on Poland” headed by one of the most influential 
Politburo members and CPSU Secretaries, Mikhail Suslov.1 
1 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polo-
zhenii v Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respublike,” No. P210/II (Top Secret), August 25, 1980, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), Fond (F.) 89, Op. (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 1, List (L.) 1.
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The formation of this commission (known informally as the Suslov Commis-
sion) was a sign of the high priority that Soviet leaders knew they would have to 
devote to the crisis. The Soviet Politburo had long been wont to establish high-level 
commissions whenever crises or urgent issues arose either abroad or at home. (For 
example, the Politburo formed a Commission on Afghanistan prior to the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of that country in late December 1979.)
The Commission on Poland initially consisted of nine officials and was then ex-
panded to include Konstantin Rusakov, the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-
bloc relations, who had earlier been represented on the Commission by his chief 
deputy, Oleg Rakhmanin. The key members of the Commission – Suslov, State 
Security Committee (KGB) Chairman Yurii Andropov, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko, and Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov – became a core 
decision-making group along with Leonid Brezhnev, the CPSU General Secretary 
(who, despite his many physical ailments, continued to chair nearly all Politburo 
meetings). These core members of the Commission conferred on a daily basis with 
one another and with senior aides about the latest developments in Poland, and they 
dominated the CPSU Politburo’s deliberations about the crisis. The full Commis-
sion convened at least twice a month and more regularly when needed.2 The con-
solidation of decision-making authority within this core group enabled the USSR 
to respond expeditiously to the crisis. Several other members of the Commission, 
notably Rusakov, Konstantin Chernenko, Ivan Arkhipov, and Leonid Zamyatin, 
also figured prominently during Politburo meetings, and the two remaining Com-
mission members, Oleg Rakhmanin and Mikhail Zimyanin, played important roles 
in obtaining information, providing advice, and drafting key documents.
The members of the Suslov Commission differed occasionally on tactical issues, 
but their views of the situation overall were remarkably uniform. All of them were 
alarmed by the rise of Solidarity and by the growing political influence of Poland’s 
Catholic church, which they regarded as “one of the most dangerous forces in Polish 
society” and a fount of “anti-socialist,” “hostile,” and “reactionary” elements.3 As the 
crisis intensified and Solidarity’s strength continued to grow, Soviet condemnations 
of the Polish trade union became more strident, both publicly and in behind-the-
scenes deliberations. Brezhnev and his colleagues claimed that Solidarity and the 
church had joined forces with “like-minded counterrevolutionary forces” to wage 
2 Information provided to the author by Georgii Shakhnazarov, the chief staff analyst of the Suslov Commission in 
1980-1982, in an interview in Jachranka, Poland, November 8, 1997.
3 “O prazdnovanii pervogo maya i godovshchiny so dnya prinyatiya konstitutsii 3 maya (Politicheskaya zapiska),” 
Cable No. 68 (Secret), May 4, 1981, from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 
84, D. 597, Ll. 6-12; “Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis’mo),” July 9, 1981, Cable No. 595 
(Top Secret) from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34; and “Ob 
ideino-politicheskikh kontseptsiyakh ‘reformatorskogo kryla’ v PORP (Spravka),” Cable No. 531 (Secret) June 
22, 1981, from V. Mutskii, first counselor at the Soviet embassy in Poland, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 
116-121.
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“an openly counterrevolutionary struggle for the liquidation of socialism” in Po-
land.4 Soviet officials also accused Solidarity of attempting to “seize power from the 
PZPR” by fomenting “economic chaos” in the country and by embarking on a wide 
range of other “provocative and counterrevolutionary actions” that would “attack 
the foundations of the political order in Poland.” The whole course of events, they 
warned, was leading toward “the outright collapse of Polish socialism and the head-
long disintegration of the PZPR,” an outcome that would leave “Solidarity extrem-
ists in full control of the country.”
Throughout the crisis, Soviet leaders were concerned not only about the inter-
nal situation in Poland, but also about the effects the turmoil was having on Polish 
foreign policy and Poland’s role in the Warsaw Pact. Brezhnev and his colleagues 
repeatedly condemned Solidarity for allegedly “inflaming malevolent nationalist 
passions” and spurring a “dangerous rise in anti-Sovietism in Poland.”5 A report 
prepared for the CPSU Politburo in mid-1981 by the Soviet ambassador in War-
saw, Boris Aristov, warned that the “powerful streams of anti-Soviet rhetoric” in 
Poland and the “increasing efforts by the West to subvert Polish socialism” would 
inevitably induce a sweeping reorientation of Poland’s foreign alignments.6 Aristov 
acknowledged that “the anti-socialist forces backing Solidarity claim they do not 
want to alter Poland’s international obligations and alliances,” but he insisted that 
such changes were bound to occur, albeit “subtly, without a frontal attack.” He em-
phasized that “the mood of anti-Sovietism in Polish society is growing, especially 
in the ranks of Solidarity,” and that the “hostile, anti-Soviet forces” both inside and 
outside Solidarity “are arguing that ‘true democratization’ in Poland is incompat-
ible with membership in the Warsaw Pact.”7 Aristov’s prediction that the crisis in 
Poland would bring “fundamental changes in Polish-Soviet relations” gained wider 
and wider acceptance among Soviet leaders as time wore on.
The turmoil in Poland also sparked apprehension in Moscow about the reli-
ability of the Polish armed forces. Soviet leaders realized that the longer the cri-
sis dragged on, the greater the likelihood that conscripts entering the Polish army 
would have been exposed to Solidarity’s influence for extended periods. As early as 
November 1980, a few senior PZPR officials warned that “some 60 to 70 percent of 
4 “Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S”ezda,” Cable No. 596 (Top Secret), November 4, 1981, from B. I. Aristov, So-
viet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin Rusakov, head of the CPSU CC Department for intra-bloc affairs, in 
RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53.
5 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda: O prieme v SSSR 
partiino-gosudarstvennoi delegatsii PNR i ustnom poslanii t. Brezhneva L. I. t. V. Yaruzel’skomu,” No. P37/21 
(Top Secret), November 21, 1981, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 27, L. 3.
6 “Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 595 (Top Secret), July 9, 1991, from B. 
I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34.
7 Ibid., l. 27. See also “Voprosy vneshnei politiki na IX S”ezde PORP (Informatsiya),” Cable No. 652 (Secret), 
August 10, 1981, from Yu. Ivanov, counselor at the Soviet embassy in Poland, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 
170-176.
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the army is leaning toward Solidarity.”8 This estimate, which was conveyed orally to 
a member of the CPSU Politburo Commission on Poland, Oleg Rakhmanin, may 
have overstated the problem, but Kania himself acknowledged in early December 
1980, that
the adverse situation has also taken its toll in the army… 
Among the new recruits are people who have taken part in strikes 
or whose parents have taken part in strikes. This means that po-
litical indoctrination and discipline in the armed forces are of the 
utmost importance. We must bear in mind the influence that the 
families of [new] troops in the army and security forces have on 
them.9
Despite Kania’s awareness of the problem, reports from Soviet diplomatic and 
intelligence officials in Poland continued to highlight “shortcomings” in the “mili-
tary-political preparation of [Polish] soldiers.” Just a month before martial law was 
imposed, a lengthy diplomatic cable assessing the mood among Polish soldiers pre-
sented “disturbing evidence that the political training of [Polish] officers has been 
increasingly deficient.”10 
Because of Poland’s location in the heart of Europe, its communications and 
logistical links with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, its projected contribu-
tions to the “first strategic echelon” of the Warsaw Pact, and its numerous storage 
sites for Soviet tactical nuclear warheads, the prospect of having a non-Communist 
government come to power in Warsaw or of a drastic change in Polish foreign policy 
was anathema in Moscow. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko spoke for all 
his colleagues when he declared at a CPSU Politburo meeting in October 1980, 
that “we simply cannot lose Poland” under any circumstances.11 Although Nikita 
Khrushchev had been willing in October 1956 to reach a modus vivendi with the 
8 Quoted from “Informatsiya o nekotorykh vyskazaniyakh pol’skikh grazhdan sovetskim turistam v PNR iz Vin-
nitskoi oblasti,” Report No. 03/284 (Top Secret), November 26, 1980, from A. V. Merkulov, head of the UkrCP 
CC Department on Foreign Ties, in Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kykh Ob’ednan Ukrainy (TsDA-
HOU), F. 1, Op. 25, Spravka (Spr.) 2138, Ll. 46-49.
9 Quoted from “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Reprasentänten der Teilnehmerstaaten des 
Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,” December 5, 1980 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der 
Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA), J IV, 2/2 A-2368; 
reproduced in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen”: die SED contra 
Polen – Geheimakten der SED Führung über die Unterdrückung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin: Akad-
emie Verlag, 1995), p. 150.
10 See “O politicheskoi situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo regiona PNR (Politpis’mo),” Cable No. 
179 (Secret), November 12, 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Kraków, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 
597, Ll. 13-22.
11 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1980 goda: Materialy k druzhestvennomu rabochemu vizitu 
v SSSR pol’skikh rukovoditelei,” October 29, 1980 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 31, L. 3.
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maverick Polish leader Władysław Gomułka, the situation in 1980-1981 was totally 
different. Gomułka, despite all his heterodoxies, was a devoted Communist, and 
Khrushchev could be confident that socialism in Poland and the Polish-Soviet “fra-
ternal relationship” would continue and even thrive under Gomułka’s leadership 
of the PZPR. Brezhnev and his colleagues had no such assurances about Poland in 
1980-1981.
Moreover, quite apart from the situation in Poland itself, Soviet officials sus-
pected – with good reason – that the crisis would have destabilizing repercussions 
in other Warsaw Pact countries. Soon after the historic Gdańsk and Szczecin ac-
cords were signed in August 1980, senior commentators in Moscow began asserting 
that Solidarity’s “strategy of permanent chaos” would inspire similar developments 
elsewhere that would “threaten not just Poland but the whole of peace and stability 
in Europe.”12 Their pronouncements were echoed by Suslov and other top leaders, 
who claimed that “any deviation from our revolutionary teachings” in one socialist 
country “will entail ruinous consequences for the whole socialist world.”13 Suslov’s 
comments were reinforced by Soviet intelligence reports, diplomatic cables, and 
contacts with East-bloc leaders, all of which suggested that the unrest in Poland was 
causing havoc in other East European countries.
The Soviet ambassador in East Germany, Pyotr Abrasimov, reported that “some 
officials from the Polish trade union Solidarity and other anti-socialist elements 
from the PPR [Polish People’s Republic] have been trying to propagate their ideas 
among the 23,000 Poles who are permanently employed at enterprises in the GDR, 
and also in the GDR’s own work collectives.”14 Although Abrasimov claimed that 
“these efforts were decisively suppressed and [that] numerous Poles were expelled 
from the GDR,” the very fact that Solidarity activists were present in East Germany 
was bound to spark disquiet in Moscow. The unease was compounded by frequent 
complaints from the East German leader, Erich Honecker, who periodically warned 
Brezhnev about the increasing spillover into the GDR: “Our citizens can watch the 
Polish events on Western television… Revisionist forces [in the GDR] often refer to 
the new Polish model of socialism that can be transferred to other countries. We can 
no longer discount the possibility that the Polish disease will spread.”15
This same point was stressed by the leaders of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, 
Gustáv Husák and Todor Zhivkov, who were just as alarmed as Honecker about 
12 Vladimir Lomeiko, “Kto zhe dolbit dyry v pol’skoi lodke,” Literaturnaya gazeta (Moscow) No. 3 ( January 21, 
1981), p. 14.
13 “Rech’ tovarishcha M. A. Suslova,” Pravda (Moscow), April 13, 1981, p. 4.
14 “Informatisya o prebyvanii v GDR,” Memorandum No. 160-s (Secret), July 17, 1981, from V. P. Osnach, chair-
man of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Friendship Society, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2298, Ll. 15-18.
15 “Niederschrift über das Treffen zwischen Genossen L. I. Breznev und Genossen E. Honecker am 3. August 1981 
auf der Krim,” notes by Bruno Mahlow, deputy head of the SED CC International Department, August 3, 1981 
(Top Secret), in SAPMO, ZPA, J IV 2/2/A-2419, Bl. 336.
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the events in Poland and were worried that the unrest would spill over. As soon as 
the crisis began, the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) 
warned regional police administrations around the country that “imperialist special 
services” were trying to incite Czechoslovak workers to emulate their counterparts 
in Poland.16 The Presidium ordered police commanders to work with the State Se-
curity (StB) organs in cracking down swiftly on any labor protests and in bolstering 
security along Czechoslovakia’s border with Poland. Husák also directed the StB to 
step up surveillance of “hostile elements” (i.e., suspected dissidents) and to pay spe-
cial attention to residents who were of Polish origin or descent.17 Despite all these 
preventive measures, Czechoslovak leaders received reports that graffiti was appear-
ing on buildings in Prague and other cities proclaiming “Solidarity with Solidarity!” 
and “Wałęsa is a hero!”18 Although Husák expressed confidence that “the masses [in 
Czechoslovakia] will not support” Solidarity and will not engage in protests, Soviet 
leaders were far more doubtful that the political situation in Czechoslovakia would 
remain under control indefinitely.19
Even more worrisome from Moscow’s perspective was the growing evidence that 
turmoil in Poland was spilling over into the Soviet Union itself, especially into the 
three Baltic states, western Belorussia, and western Ukraine. From late July 1980 on, 
the Soviet Politburo took a number of steps to propitiate Soviet industrial workers 
and to bolster labor discipline. These actions were motivated by an acute fear that 
the emergence of a free trade union in Poland would spur workers and miners in 
adjoining regions of the Soviet Union to press for improved living conditions, 
greater freedom, and an independent trade union of their own. Even in the more 
distant parts of the Russian Republic, the prospect of worker unrest loomed large. 
The KGB had harshly suppressed three separate attempts by labor activists to set 
up an independent trade union in Russia in the late 1970s, and ever since then the 
Soviet leadership had reacted with inordinate hostility to anything that might give 
renewed impetus to an unofficial workers’ movement.20
16 “Bezpečnostní situace v Polsku,” September 3, 1980, in Archiv Ministerstva Vnitra (AMV) ČR, Kanice, F. KS 
SNB Hradec Králové, Svazek (Sv.) 15, Archivní jednotka (A.j.) 9.
17 “Záznam o rozhovoru najvyšších predstaviteľov, súdruha G. Husáka a J. Kádára v Bratislave,” Notes of Conversa-
tion (Top Secret), November 12, 1980, in Národní Archiv České Republiky (NAČR), Archiv ústředního výboru 
Komunistické strany Československa (Arch. úV KSČ), F. 02-1, Sv. 158, A.j. 155.
18 “Informační bulletin úV KSČ,” No. 2/1981 (Top Secret), January 9, 1981, in NAČR, Arch. úV KSČ, F. D-1, 
Sv. 11, VI 31, L. 5.
19 “Vermerk über das Treffen der Genossen Leonid Il’ič Brežnev, Erich Honecker und Gustáv Husák am 16. Mai 
1981 im Kreml in Moskau,“ May 18, 1981 (Top Secret), in SAPMO, ZPA, vorl.SED 41599; transcribed in Kubina 
and Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen,” p. 270-285, especially p. 282-283.
20 “K voprosu o t.n. ‘nezavisimom profsoyuze,’” Memorandum No. 655-L (Secret), April 5, 1978, from Yu. V. An-
dropov to the CPSU Politburo, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 18, D. 73, L. 1. The first attempt, in January 1978, was 
made by a long-time activist and mining engineer, Vladimir Klebanov, whose “Association of Free Trade Unions 
of Workers” was forcefully disbanded less than two weeks after it was founded. The second attempt, in April 1978, 
was by Vsevolod Kuvakin, who set up a short-lived “Independent Trade Union of Workers.” The third attempt, by 
solidarity domaradzki 2010.indb   34 2010-12-22   14:24:05
34
◀ Mark Kramer ▶
35
◀ The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis of 1980–1981 ▶
Newly declassified documents reveal that high-level concerns in Moscow about 
labor unrest were well-founded. A report approved by the CPSU Secretariat in 
October 1980, acknowledged that strikes and mass labor disputes in the Soviet 
Union had “significantly increased” over the previous few months, in large part 
because of the Polish crisis.21 This trend, according to the report, “is evoking grave 
consternation.” The incidence of labor protests in the Soviet Union had been 
surprisingly high even before the emergence of Solidarity – secret data indicated 
that in 1979 alone, there were more than 300 work stoppages involving some 
9,000 workers – and Soviet leaders were apprehensive that strikes, large-scale work 
disruptions, and other “negative incidents” would sharply escalate. To forestall 
a surge of labor unrest, the CPSU Politburo in September 1980 ordered all party 
and state organizations in the Soviet Union to “take urgent, immediate steps to 
ensure that the everyday needs and requirements of the Soviet people are more fully 
satisfied.” The Politburo explicitly linked this directive with the “current situation 
in Poland.”22 
Soviet leaders also tried to erect a number of barriers and safeguards against 
Solidarity’s influence. In early October 1980, at Moscow’s behest, Lithuanian 
Communist Party officials ordered “the republic press, radio, and television to 
allocate more coverage to the role of [Communist-sponsored] trade unions in 
our country.” 23 In a separate directive, the Lithuanian authorities ordered local 
officials throughout the republic to “intensify their ideological work.” This notion 
of tightening discipline and strengthening ideological controls was emphasized 
constantly over the next several months. Carefully controlled meetings were held 
every week, and sometimes more than once a week, at factories and other worksites 
all around the Soviet Union.24
a group known as the “Free Interprofessional Amalgamation of Workers,” lasted longer than the other two, from 
October 1978 until it was crushed in the spring of 1980. For further details, see Betty Gidwitz, “Labor Unrest in 
the Soviet Union,” Problems of Communism 31, no. 6 (November-December 1982), p. 25-42; “The Independent 
Trade-Union Movement in the Soviet Union,” Radio Liberty Research, RL 304/79 (October 11, 1979); and Karl 
Schögel, Opposition sowjetischer Arbeiter heute (Köln: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale 
Studien, 1981).
21 “Ob otdel’nykh negativnykh proyavleniyakh, svyazannykh s narusheniyami uslovii organizatsii i oplaty truda 
rabochikh i sluzhashchikh,” Memorandum No. 27833 (Top Secret), October 15, 1980, from I. Kapitonov and 
V. Dolgikh to the CPSU Secretariat, attachment to “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii 
Sovetskogo Soyuza: O nekotorykh negativnykh proyavleniyakh, svyazannykh s nedostatkami v organizatsii i oplate 
truda rabochikh i sluzhashchikh,” St-233/8s (Top Secret), October 24, 1980, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 13, D. 37, Ll. 
1-12.
22 Ibid., L. 9.
23 “TsK KPSS: Informatsiya o rabote, provodimoi v Litovskoi SSR v svyazi s sobytiyami v PNR,” Memorandum 
No. 1074s (Secret), October 1, 1980, from P. Griškivicius, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, in 
Lietuvos Visuomenės Organizacijų Archyvas (LVOA), Fondas (F.) 1771, Apyrašas (Apy.) 257, Byla (B.) 193, Lapai 
(La.) 135.
24 See, for examples, the large number of documents in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, Dd. 76, 85, and 86, and Op. 77, Dd. 
86, 105, and 106.
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As a further preventive step, the CPSU Secretariat adopted a resolution on 
October 4,1980, providing for “certain measures to regulate the circulation of the 
Polish press in the USSR.”25 The resolution authorized the USSR’s Main Directorate 
for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press (Glavlit) to screen and, if necessary, 
confiscate and destroy nearly all Polish newspapers and periodicals distributed 
within the Soviet Union. It also authorized the KGB to “sift out Polish publications 
sent through the mail to private individuals, libraries, and educational institutions 
in order to prevent the dissemination of potentially unsavory items.”26 The KGB’s 
border guards were instructed to “adopt tighter controls at border checkpoints in 
order to uncover and prevent attempts to smuggle into the country any politically 
harmful literature and other unacceptable materials about the events in Poland.” 
In December 1980, the CPSU Secretariat adopted “supplementary measures to 
control the circulation of the Polish press in the USSR.” 27 This new resolution was 
approved after two members of the Suslov Commission, Leonid Zamyatin and Oleg 
Rakhmanin, determined that “the overwhelming majority of Polish periodicals 
[and newspapers] contain anti-socialist and anti-Soviet information, and are no 
longer controlled by the PZPR CC.”28
In addition to clamping down on Polish publications, the Soviet Politburo sought 
to limit all personal contact between Soviet and Polish citizens. In August 1980, the 
Politburo instructed KGB and Communist Party officials in the Soviet republics 
bordering Poland (Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine) to keep stricter control over 
Polish tourists and to monitor the comments of Soviet tourists who visited Poland. 
The reports transmitted by these officials back to Moscow were often disconcerting. 
In a typical case, a senior official in Ukraine reported that “when Soviet tour groups 
have recently been in the PPR, the group leaders have detected unfriendly behavior 
toward the Soviet tourists as well as anti-Soviet sentiments on the part of wide seg-
ments of the local population.”29 The official noted that food shortages and other 
25 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O nekotorykh merakh po up-
oryadocheniyu rasprostraneniyu pol’skoi pechati v SSSR,” St-231/8s (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 
81, L. 8.
26 For a valuable description of how the KGB handled these activities in Ukraine, see “O nekotorykh merakh po 
uporyadocheniyu rasprostraneniya pol’skoi periodicheskoi pechati i literatury v respublike,” Memorandum No. 
4339/42 (Top Secret), October 25, 1980, from I. Sokolov, V. Fedorchuk, and Ya. Pogrebnyak, in TsDAHOU, F. 
1, Op. 25, Spr. 2129, Ll. 60-61.
27 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 242/61gs Sekretariata TsK: O nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po kontrolyu za 
rasprostraneniem pol’skoi pechati v SSSR,” No. St-242/61gs (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 81, Ll. 
1-2.
28 “O nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po kontrolyu za rasprostraneniem pol’skoi pechati v SSSR,” Memoran-
dum No. 7D-199 (Top Secret), December 5, 1980, from L. Zamyatin, O. Rakhmanin, and E. Tyazhel’nikov, head 
of the CPSU CC Propaganda Department, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 81, L. 6.
29 Quoted from “Informatsiya o nekotorykh vyskazivaniyakh, imeyushchikh mesto so storony pol’skikh grazhdan 
pri vstrechakh s sovetskimi turistami, a takzhe vo vremya prebyvaniya v Ukrainskoi SSR po linii Byuro mezhdun-
arodnogo molodezhnogo turizma ‘Sputnik’,” Report No. 24-s (Secret), September 3, 1980, from G. Naumenko, 
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problems in Poland were being blamed on the Soviet Union, and that many Poles 
were voicing “hostile and anti-Soviet slogans” and claiming that the Polish Com-
munist regime was “maintained only through Russian bayonets.”
Similar reports continued to flow into Moscow over the next two months, 
prompting the CPSU leadership to order a sharp reduction in tourism both to and 
from Poland.30 This cutback, imposed in early November 1980, came just a few days 
after the East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian authorities had adopted re-
strictive measures of their own. The Soviet Union worked closely with these other 
Warsaw Pact countries throughout the crisis to develop a coordinated policy on 
tourism and cultural and scientific exchanges. The four governments collected and 
shared information not only about Polish tourists and exchange participants, but 
also about the views expressed by East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian citi-
zens.31
The Soviet Union’s persisting concerns about tourism reflected the general 
inefficacy of the measures adopted by Soviet leaders to prevent a “contagion” from 
Poland. The measures at best only slowed, rather than averted, a spillover. Yurii 
Andropov acknowledged as much at a CPSU Politburo meeting on April 2, 1981:
The Polish events are influencing the situation in the western provinces 
of our country, particularly in Belorussia. Many villages there are listen-
ing to Polish-language radio and television. I might add that in certain 
other regions, especially in Georgia, we have had wild demonstrations. In 
Tbilisi not long ago, groups of loudmouths have been gathering on the 
streets, proclaiming anti-Soviet slogans, and so forth. In this respect, we, 
too, must adopt severe measures internally.32
The situation, as Andropov noted, was especially turbulent in the westernmost 
Soviet republics, where large communities of ethnic Poles still lived. Soon after the 
crisis began, the head of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Patras Griškiavičius, had 
warned that “18 percent of the residents in Vilnius are of Polish nationality, and 
chairman of the “Sputnik” Bureau of International Youth Tourism of the Ukrainian Komsomol, in TsDAHOU, 
F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2138, Ll. 138-142.
30 “Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” No. St-239/36gs (Top Secret), 
November 28, 1980, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 46, D. 67, Ll. 1-8. 
31 See, for example, “O vyskazivaniyakh inostrannykh turistov po povodu sobytii v PNR,” Memorandum No. 318-s 
(Top Secret), August 26, 1980, from Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, first secretary of the UkrCP Transcarpathian oblast committee, 
in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2138, Ll. 51-53, as well as Il’nyts’kyi’s follow-up report, “O prodolzhayushchikh-
sya vyskazivaniyakh inostrannykh turistov po povodu sobytii v Pol’she,” Memorandum No. 330-s (Top Secret), 
September 5, 1980, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 2138, Ll. 60-63. 
32 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 2 aprelya 1981 goda,” April 2, 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, 
D. 39, L. 3.
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they are following the situation in Poland with enormous interest.”33 He expressed 
dismay that Polish television was broadcasting religious programs, Catholic masses, 
and “invidious films from Western countries,” which were “giving impetus to anti-
socialist forces in Lithuania” and having “an unsalutary influence on the [Lithuanian] 
population, especially young people.” Griškiavičius said he was “particularly worried 
about this matter because the regions of Lithuania adjacent to Poland can receive 
these television broadcasts.”34 He continued to send periodic warnings to Moscow 
during the remainder of the crisis.
Officials in Belorussia, Ukraine, and even some of the more distant Soviet re-
publics warned of similar problems. The first secretary of the Belorussian Commu-
nist Party committee in Brest oblast, Efrem Sokolov, later described how the “events 
in Poland” and the “slanderous fabrications of Western short-wave radio stations 
targeted against Poland and against our country” had “aggravated the internal situ-
ation” in Belorussia:
Not a single resident of the oblast was indifferent to the events in Poland… 
Many Brest residents are linked by familial ties with citizens of the Pol-
ish People’s Republic. We have to remember that large segments of the 
oblast’s population can receive broadcasts on Polish television. Until 
martial law was introduced in Poland, many of these broadcasts were 
anti-Communist in nature. The programs crippled the Poles’ efforts to 
struggle for the ideals of the working class and failed to provide a class-
based evaluation of the activities of the right-wing leaders of the Solidar-
ity trade union and their KOS-KOR advisers. They distorted historical 
reality and featured vicious attacks against our country. The lack of politi-
cal vigilance and the insouciance that characterized some Polish leaders 
could not help but upset the oblast’s inhabitants.”35
As reports continued to flow into Moscow from Belorussian, Ukrainian, and 
Lithuanian officials expressing “alarm and an increasing sense of urgency” about the 
“deleterious political and social consequences” of the Polish crisis in their republics, 
the Soviet government’s efforts to prevent a spillover seemed increasingly futile.36
33 “TsK KPSS: Informatsiya ob otklikakh sekretarei partiinykh komitetov Kompartii Litvy na itogi krymskikh 
vstrech General’nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS, Predsedatelya Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSR tov. Brezhnev 
L. I. s rukovoditelyami bratskikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran v 1980 godu,” Memorandum No. 949s (Secret), 
27 August 1980, in LVOA, F. 1771, Apa. 257, B. 193, La. 113-117.
34 Ibid., La. 114.
35 E. Sokolov, “Za klassovuyu zorkost’,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 4 (April 1984), p. 31.
36 See, for example, “O provodimoi v Belorussii rabote v svyazi s sobytiyami v PNR,” Memorandum No. 01065 
(Secret), September 30, 1980, from P. Masherov, First Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party, in RGANI, 
F. 5, Op. 77, D. 105, Ll. 20-27; and “Informatsiya o reagirovanii trudyashchikhsya Ukrainskoi SSR na sobytiya v 
Pol’she i rabote, provodimoi partiinymi organizatsiyami,” Memorandum No. 3/73 (Secret), October 2, 1980, from 
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Perhaps most troubling of all for the Soviet Politburo, was the mounting evi-
dence that events in Poland were taking their toll on the Soviet Army. Andropov 
reported that “mass subversive ideological actions had been aimed at the personnel 
of Soviet military units in Poland.”37 The KGB’s military counterintelligence units 
had to adopt extra safeguards to defeat those actions. The KGB also had to take 
special steps to thwart what Andropov described as “a number of attempts to form 
groups of servicemen around politically hostile aims.”
The adverse effect of the Polish crisis on Soviet troops was especially pronounced 
in the USSR’s Baltic Military District (MD), adjoining eastern Poland. Reports 
about the “grave problems” there had proliferated in late 1980 and 1981, as sum-
marized in a lengthy memorandum from Major-General Ya. L. Zhuk, the head of 
the KGB’s military counterintelligence units in the Baltic MD. In assessing the fall-
out from the crisis, Zhuk claimed that many Soviet troops in the district, especially 
those of Lithuanian origin,
are indulging in politically hostile and nationalistic actions and, on this 
basis, are forming treacherous, malevolent, and anti-Soviet intentions… 
[These soldiers] express anti-Russian sentiments and disparaging com-
ments about Soviet realit… They approve the subversive actions of Soli-
darity in the PPR and view anti-Soviet forces [in the USSR] as national 
heroes.38
Zhuk emphasized that his “analysis of materials about the politically hostile acts 
committed by certain soldiers leaves no doubt that… the events in Poland and the an-
ti-Soviet subversive actions of Solidarity have had a major detrimental impact” on So-
viet troops in the region.39 The emergence of “treacherous, anti-Soviet, and nationalist 
sentiments among certain categories of soldiers” in the Baltic Military District was all 
the more worrisome from Moscow’s perspective because of the high state of readiness 
at which Soviet troops in the district had been maintained since the crisis began. If, as 
the KGB reported, events in Poland were steadily eroding the troops’ morale, Soviet 
military options vis-à-vis Poland necessarily would be limited.
In light of all these developments, it comes as little surprise that high-ranking 
Soviet officials portrayed the events in Poland both publicly and privately as 
I. Sokolov, UkrCP CC Secretary, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 77, D. 105, Ll. 49-53.
37 “Otchet o rabote Komiteta Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR za 1981 god,” No. 289-op (Top Secret/Of 
Special Importance/Special Dossier), April 13, 1982, from Yu. V. Andropov to L. I. Brezhnev, in Arkhiv Prezidenta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 81, Op. 3, D. 2556, No. 289-op, L. 3.
38 “Spravka o faktakh i prichinakh politicheski vrednykh proyavlenii so storony otdel’nykh voennosluzhashchikh, 
prizvannykh voenkomatami Litovskoi SSR,” Memorandum No. 02670 (Top Secret), from Major-General Ya. 
L. Zhuk, August 7, 1982, in LVOA, F. 1771, Apy. 260, B. 182, La. 87-95.
39 Ibid., La. 92.
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“counterrevolution and anarchy” that not only “threatened the destruction of the 
country’s socialist order and alliance obligations,” but also posed “a direct threat 
to the security of the USSR and its allies.”40 Any delay in crushing Solidarity, they 
warned, would “give victory to the anti-Soviet forces.” Soviet leaders were intent on 
defusing the crisis as soon as possible.
Planning for a Crackdown
By stirring Soviet anxieties about the potential loss of a key member of the War-
saw Pact and about the spread of political instability throughout Eastern Europe 
and into the USSR, the Polish crisis demonstrated, as the events of 1953, 1956, 
and 1968 had previously, the degree of “acceptable” change in the Soviet bloc. The 
crisis in Poland was more protracted than those earlier upheavals, but the leeway for 
genuine change was, if anything, narrower than before. From Moscow’s perspective, 
the existence of a powerful, independent trade union in Poland could not be toler-
ated; the only question was how best to get rid of Solidarity.
With Soviet backing, the Polish authorities began planning in the first few 
weeks of the crisis for the eventual imposition of martial law. Preparations for a vio-
lent crackdown by Polish internal security commandos, led by General Bogusław 
Stachura, were launched in mid-August 1980, under the codename Lato-80 (Sum-
mer ‘80). Those plans were swiftly refined, and preparations for a crackdown were 
initiated, but they were put on hold two weeks later amid deepening rifts within 
the PZPR Politburo.41 Athough a few hardline members of the Polish Politburo 
wanted to press ahead with a full-scale crackdown, the other members realized that, 
as Kania argued, it was a “fantasy” to expect that martial law could be introduced 
so soon.42
40 See, for example, Dmitrii Ustinov, “Protiv gonki vooruzhenii i ugrozy voiny,” Pravda (Moscow), July 25, 1981, 
p. 4; “Soveshchanie sekretarei tsentral’nykh komitetov kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii sotsialisticheskikh 
stran,” Pravda (Moscow), November 5, 1981, p. 4; and “Vysokoe prizvanie i otvetsvennost’: Rech’ tovarishcha M. 
A. Suslova,” Pravda (Moscow), October 15, 1981, p. 2.
41 For thorough documentation of the proposed Lato-80 operation, see Peter Raina and Marcin Zbrożek, eds., Ope-
racja “Lato-80”: Preludium stanu wojennego – Dokumenty MSW, 1980-1981 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Diecezji Pel-
plińskiej Bernardinum 2003), as well as several documents published in Bogusław Kopko and Grzegorz Majchrzak, 
Stan wojenny w dokumentach władz PRL (1980-1983) (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej 2001), p. 35-50; and 
Jan Draus and Zbigniew Nawrocki, eds., Przeciw Solidarności 1980-1989: Rzeszowska opozycja w tajnych archiwach 
Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych (Rzeszów: Zarząd Regionu NSZZ “Solidarność” w Rzeszowie, 2000), p. 9-24. For 
an overview of Lato-80, see Mark Kramer, Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981, Special Working 
Paper No. 1 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, 1999), p. 37-38.
42 “Protokół Nr 28 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 29 sierpnia 1980 r.,” August 29, 1980 (Secret), 
transcribed in Zbigniew Włodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarność” 1980-1981 
(London: Aneks, 1992), p. 84-90.
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Much more elaborate planning for martial law was launched in October 1980 
by the Polish General Staff and the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry (MSW).43 The 
combined effort was overseen by the chief of the Polish General Staff, General Flo-
rian Siwicki, who had long been a close friend of Jaruzelski. The planning was also 
closely supervised at every stage by high-ranking Soviet KGB and military officials, 
who frequently traveled to Warsaw and reported back to the Soviet Politburo. The 
head of the Soviet KGB’s foreign intelligence directorate, Vladimir Kryuchkov, the 
commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact’s joint armed forces, Marshal Viktor Kulik-
ov, and the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Boris Aristov, played especially important 
roles as envoys for the Soviet Politburo and coordinators of the martial law planning 
in Poland. Another key envoy was Konstantin Rusakov, who, in addition to being 
a member of the Suslov Commission, oversaw Soviet relations with Poland and the 
other Warsaw Pact countries on behalf of the CPSU.
The constant pressure that Soviet political and military leaders exerted on top Pol-
ish officials thwarted any hope that Kania, who remained in charge of the PZPR until 
mid-October 1981, might have had of reaching a genuine compromise or “social com-
pact” with Solidarity and the Catholic church.44 From the Soviet Politburo’s perspec-
tive, any such compromise would have been, at best, a useless diversion or, at worst, 
a form of outright “capitulation to hostile and reactionary forces” and a “sell-out to the 
mortal enemies of socialism.”45 As Brezhnev emphasized to Kania’s successor, General 
Jaruzelski, in late November 1981, the only thing the Soviet Union wanted was for 
“decisive measures” to be implemented in Poland as soon as possible against the “bla-
tantly anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary opposition” in Poland:
It is now absolutely clear that without a vigorous struggle against the class 
enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in Poland. The question is 
not whether there will be a confrontation, but who will start it, what 
means will be used to wage it, and who will gain the initiative… The lead-
ers of the anti-socialist forces, who long ago emerged from underground 
into full public view and are now openly preparing to launch a decisive 
onslaught, are hoping to delay their final push until they have achieved 
43 Kramer, Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981, p. 46, 49, 56. See also the lengthy interview with 
Ryszard Kukliński, “Wojna z narodem widziana od środka,” Kultura (Paris), No. 4/475 (April 1987), p. 6-7, 17-19. 
Colonel Kukliński was one of a small number of senior officers on the Polish General Staff drafting the plans for 
martial law. He had been working secretly for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency since the early 1970s.
44 For ample first-hand evidence of this pressure, see “O nekotorykh momentakh po vnutripoliticheskoi i ekonomi-
cheskoi obstanovke v Pil’skom voevodstve (Politicheskaya zapiska),” Cable No. 18 (Top Secret), January 20, 1981, 
from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 1-5; Army-General 
A. I. Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), 
No. 9 (September 1992), p. 46-57, especially p. 53-55; Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 102- 
-107, 317-318, 451-454, and 497-511; and Kania, Zatrzymać konfrontację, especially p. 73-118, 231-243.
45 “Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda,” L. 5.
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overwhelming preponderance… This means that if you fail to take tough 
measures right away against the counterrevolution, you will lose the only 
opportunity you still have.46
The extent of the Soviet Union’s determination to crush Solidarity via the imposition 
of martial law is just as evident from the declassified transcripts of some fifteen CPSU 
Politburo meetings held in 1980-1981. At those sessions, Brezhnev and other senior 
officials repeatedly complained that Kania and Jaruzelski were proving to be “weak,” “in-
decisive,” “insufficiently bold,” “untrustworthy,” and “unwilling to resort to extraordinary 
measures despite our recommendations.”47 The same theme emerges from other recently 
declassified Soviet documents, which castigated the Polish authorities for their “uncon-
scionable vacillations and indecisiveness” in the face of “an open struggle for power by 
forces hostile to the PZPR.”48 Soviet officials were convinced that “the backers of Soli-
darity simply do not believe that the PZPR leadership will adopt harsh measures to put 
an end to their anti-socialist activity,” and that this was enabling “the counterrevolution-
ary forces to operate with impunity in their plans to liquidate socialism in Poland.”
Brezhnev and his colleagues sought to reinforce this message whenever they met 
privately with Polish leaders in bilateral or Warsaw Pact forums. Their aim was to 
keep up a relentless campaign of pressure that would spur the Poles into action. Al-
though Soviet leaders realized that the plans for martial law had to be devised and 
refined with care, their main concern was to ensure that either Kania or a successor 
would eventually implement those plans with ruthless determination. Using every 
available channel, Brezhnev and his colleagues demanded that Kania and Jaruzelski 
“put an end to the strikes and disorder once and for all,” “crush the anti-socialist op-
position,” and “rebuff the counterrevolutionary elements with deeds, not j ust with 
words.”49 The pressure exerted by Moscow throughout the crisis was extraordinary.
Early Soviet Military Options
To give the two Polish leaders greater incentive to proceed with a martial law 
crackdown before events spun out of control, the Soviet Politburo offered direct 
military support. One of the first actions taken by the Suslov Commission, just 
46 Ibid., Ll. 5-6.
47 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 9 aprelya 1981 goda: 3. Ob itogakh vstrechi t.t. Andropova, Yu. V. i Ustinova, 
D. F. s pol’skimi druz’yami,” April 9, 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 40, Ll. 2-9.
48 “Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S”ezda,” Cable No. 857 (Top Secret), November 4, 1981, from B. I. Aristov, 
Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin Rusakov of the CPSU Secretariat, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, 
Ll. 35-53.
49 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhneva L. I. s Pervym Sekretarem 
TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu),” April 16, 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 2-3.
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three days after it was formed, was to authorize a two-stage mobilization of “up to 
100,000 [Soviet] military reservists and 15,000 vehicles” to bring a “large group” of 
Soviet tank and infantry units up to “full combat readiness… in case military assis-
tance is provided to Poland.”50 The first stage of the mobilization, involving 25,000 
military reservists and 6,000 military vehicles, was approved that same day by the 
Soviet Politburo. From late August 1980 through at least the summer of 1981, the 
Soviet Politburo was ready to dispatch a sizable contingent of Soviet combat troops 
(several divisions or more) and thousands of military vehicles to Poland to help the 
Polish authorities implement a full-scale crackdown.
If Kania and Jaruzelski had accepted these offers of military support, the incom-
ing Soviet troops would have been performing a function very different from the 
one they carried out in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The 1968 operation in-
volved hundreds of thousands of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops and was directed 
against the existing Czechoslovak leader, Alexander Dubček. At no point before 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia were the military plans ever disclosed to Dubček or 
to the other Czechoslovak reformers. Nor did Soviet commanders in 1968 enlist 
Czechoslovak troops before the invasion to help pinpoint entry routes and deploy-
ment sites for incoming Soviet forces. By contrast, in 1980-1981 the idea was to use 
a relatively limited number of Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak troops to as-
sist the Polish regime in its battle against Solidarity. Plans for the entry of Soviet and 
East European troops into Poland were coordinated very carefully with the Polish 
authorities, and Polish officers were assigned to help Soviet and Warsaw Pact recon-
naissance units.51 Brezhnev and the other members of the Soviet Politburo seemed 
remarkably obtuse about the likely effect of introducing even a limited number of 
Soviet and East German troops into Poland to crack down on Solidarity. In Poland, 
however, the two top leaders were well aware of the pitfalls of receiving Soviet (and 
East German) military assistance. Whenever Kania and Jaruzelski were faced with 
the prospect of clamping down in late 1980 and early 1981, they warned that the 
entry of Soviet troops into Poland would cause a “disaster.” Both of them sought 
more time to work out a solution on their own.
On at least two occasions, however – in December 1980 and April 1981 – 
Soviet leaders tried to bring the matter to a head by organizing joint Warsaw Pact 
military “exercises” that would serve as a catalyst for the introduction of mar-
tial law. The first such effort involved the Soyuz-80 exercises, which were hastily 
50 “TsK KPSS,” No. 682-op (Top Secret/Special Dossier), August 28, 1980, from Suslov, Gromyko, Andropov, 
Ustinov, and Konstantin Chernenko, in APRF, F. 83-op, Op. 20, D. 5, L. 1. 
51 Wesentlicher Inhalt der Meldung des Chefs des Militärbezirkes V, General-major Gehmert, über die Ergebnisse 
der Rekognoszierung auf dem Territorium der Volksrepublik Polen zur Durchführung der gemeinsamen Übung,” 
Report No. A-575-702 (Top Secret), December 16, 1980, from Colonel-General Fritz Streletz, chief-of-staff of the 
East German National People’s Army, in Militärisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam (MZA-P), VA-01/40593, Blatt 
(Bl.) 23-27.
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planned in the latter half of November 1980 to be held in Poland the following 
month. Preparations for the exercises occurred as tensions were steadily increas-
ing in Poland, culminating in a two-hour warning strike on November 25 by Pol-
ish railway workers, who threatened to call a general strike unless their demands 
were met. These developments provoked alarm in Moscow about the security of 
the USSR’s lines of communication through Poland with the nearly 400,000 So-
viet troops based in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Brezhnev point-
edly raised these concerns at a meeting with his Warsaw Pact counterparts on 
December 5, 1980:
The situation with the lines of communication [in Poland], especially 
with the railroads and harbors, deserves urgent attention. Poland would 
experience an economic catastrophe if transportation facilities were para-
lyzed. This would also be a great blow to the economic interests of other 
socialist states. Let me reiterate: Under no circumstances can we tolerate 
it if the security interests of the Warsaw Pact countries are endangered 
by difficulties with the transportation system. An elaborate plan must be 
devised to use the [Polish] army and security forces to assert control over 
the transportation facilities and the main lines of communication [in 
Poland], and this plan must be implemented. Even before martial law is 
declared, it would be worthwhile to set up military command posts and 
to arrange military patrols along the railroads.52
Unease about Poland was even more acute in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
and Bulgaria, where the media in late November 1980 had stepped up their con-
demnations of the “counterrevolutionary forces that are endangering Poland’s so-
cialist order.”53 On November 26, the East German leader, Erich Honecker, wrote 
a secret letter to Brezhnev urging the immediate adoption of “collective [military] 
measures to help the Polish friends overcome the crisis.”54 Honecker emphasized his 
“extraordinary fears” about what would happen in Poland if the Soviet Union and 
its allies failed to send in troops right away. “Any delay in acting against the counter-
revolutionaries,” he warned, “would mean death – the death of socialist Poland.” 
Honecker’s perspective was fully shared in Sofia and Prague. The Bulgarian leader, 
52 “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens führender Reprasentänten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Ver-
trages am 5. Dezember 1980 in Moskau,” December 5, 1980 (Top Secret), in SAPMO, ZPA, J IV, 2/2 A-2368; 
transcribed in Kubina and Wilke, eds., “Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen”, p. 173.
53 See, among many examples, “Unüberwindliche Barriere gegen imperialistischen Feind,” Neues Deutschland (East 
Berlin), December 1, 1980, p. 3; “Walesa über Zusammenarbeit mit KOR,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), No-
vember 27, 1980, p. 5; Jan Lipavský, “Konfrontace: Od našého varšavského zprávodaje,” Rudé právo (Prague), De-
cember 2, 1980, p. 7; “V bojí o socialistický charakter obnovy zěme,” Rudé právo (Prague), December 2, 1980, p. 7; 
and “Strana se upevnuje v akcjí,” Rudé Právo (Prague), December 1, 1980, p. 6.
54 “Anlage Nr. 2,” November 26, 1980 (Secret), in SAPMO, ZPA, J IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5.
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Todor Zhivkov, and the Czechoslovak leader, Gustáv Husák, repeatedly urged Ka-
nia and Jaruzelski to take “immediate action.”
The pressure on the Polish authorities increased still further on November 29, 
when the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Army-
General Evgenii Ivanovskii, suddenly informed members of the Western Military 
Liaison Missions in East Germany that they would be prohibited from traveling 
into territory along the GDR-Polish border until further notice.55 This was a stan-
dard procedure whenever large-scale maneuvers were about to begin. Documents 
from the former East German and Czechoslovak military archives reveal that the 
plans for Soyuz-80 called for four Soviet divisions, two Czechoslovak divisions, and 
one East German division to assist four Polish army divisions and the Polish se-
curity forces in introducing military rule56. If these operations proved insufficient, 
another fourteen Warsaw Pact tank and motorized infantry divisions (eleven Soviet 
and three East German) were supposed to move in as reinforcements, according to 
the documents. Although it is not clear when and how the second stage of Soyuz-80 
would have begun – or where the additional Soviet forces would have come from – 
the option of a second stage was clearly specified in the plans, which were disclosed 
to the Polish authorities.
If final approval had been given for the Soyuz-80 “maneuvers” to begin as 
scheduled on December 8, enough Soviet forces were in place to carry out the first 
stage of the operation. Three Soviet tank and mechanized divisions in the western 
USSR had been brought up to full combat readiness, and they were to be joined 
by a Soviet airborne division that would have moved into Poland from the Baltic 
Military District.57 (Soviet airborne divisions were always maintained at a state 
of full combat readiness.) The eleven additional Soviet tank and mechanized 
divisions needed for a follow-on phase of the operation had not yet been mobilized, 
but this does necessarily mean that a second stage was infeasible. Planning for 
the mobilization of these supplementary divisions had been under way since late 
August, and this presumably would have enabled Soviet military commanders to 
55 Ivanovskii was replaced as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in East Germany on December 4, 1980, by Ar-
my-General Mikhail Zaitsev. Ivanovskii was then appointed commander of the Belorussian Military District, the 
post that Zaitsev had held. See “Verdienste um Bruderbund UdSSR-DDR gewurdigt: Herzliche Begegnung mit 
Armeegeneral Iwanowski und Armeegeneral Saizew im Staatsrat,” Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), December 5, 
1980, p. 1-2.
56 See, for example, “Einweisung,” early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date 
is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on December 1 or 2. See also “Erlau-
terungen,” Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 
7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 
December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st).
57 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Foreign Assessment Center, “Polish Reaction to a Soviet In-
vasion,” June 30, 1981 (Top Secret), p. 1-5; and CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, “Approaching the 
Brink: Moscow and the Polish Crisis, November-December 1980,” Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), Janu-
ary 1981, p. 5.
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carry out the mobilization at very short notice if necessary. Previous Soviet military 
operations in Eastern Europe gave reason to believe that a second-stage mobilization 
could proceed expeditiously. When an emergency arose in Hungary in late October 
1956 after a limited intervention by Soviet troops proved counterproductive, the 
Soviet Union was able to mobilize a much larger contingent of Soviet forces within 
ten days for a full-scale invasion.58 A similar mobilization could probably have 
been undertaken in 1980-1981, if an emergency had arisen. Although the number 
of Soviet divisions actually available for immediate deployment into Poland in 
December 1980 was relatively limited, U.S. intelligence analysts estimated that 
some 30-40 additional divisions (numbering hundreds of thousands of troops) 
could have been mobilized rapidly for an interventionary force if circumstances 
had so warranted. The figures provided in highly classified CIA reports on Soviet 
military options vis-à-vis Poland suggest a mobilization timeframe similar to the 
one for the invasion of Hungary in November 1956.59
As it turned out, of course, the projected entry into Poland of an initial contin-
gent of four Soviet, one East German, and two Czechoslovak divisions did not take 
place. By early December, Brezhnev had decided to forgo the introduction of any 
troops for the time being. The Soviet leader’s aim in November-December 1980 was 
not to move against Kania and Jaruzelski, but to offer them concrete support. The 
Soviet Union did its best, using a mix of coercion and inducements, to ensure that 
the two Polish officials would seize this opportunity to crush Solidarity and impose 
martial law. Ultimately, though, the fate of Soyuz-80 depended on whether Kania 
and Jaruzelski themselves believed they could move forcefully against Solidarity 
without sparking a civil war. Once the two Polish leaders made clear to Brezhnev 
that the entry of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops into Poland would risk a “bloody 
confrontation that would roil the whole socialist world,” and once the Poles pledged 
to take “decisive action” against “hostile” and “anti-socialist” elements in the near 
future, the Soviet Politburo was willing to defer the provision of outside military 
assistance.60
The Soviet Union’s desire to stick with Kania and Jaruzelski came as 
a disappointment to East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian officials, who 
continued to espouse a more belligerent position. In the leadup to Soyuz-80, 
Honecker had authorized a hasty search for possible hardline alternatives to Kania 
58 Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Find-
ings,” Journal of Contemporary History 33, no. 2 (April 1998), p. 163-215.
59 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Estimates on Polish Intervention Forces,” Cable No. 14933 (Top Se-
cret), November 8, 1980, p. 2, in National Security Archive, Flashpoints Collection, Defense HUMINT Service, 
Folder 34.
60 The quoted passage is from Kania’s speech at the Warsaw Pact meeting on December 5, “Stenografische Nieder-
schrift des Treffens führender Reprasentänten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 5. Dezember 
1980 in Moskau,” p. 143.
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and Jaruzelski who could be brought in to act decisively. On November 30, the East 
German defense minister, Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, assured Honecker that 
certain “leading comrades from the PZPR have expressed the view that a [violent] 
confrontation with the counterrevolution can no longer be avoided and [that] they 
expect to receive help from outside.”61 Honecker clearly was hoping that if he could 
come up with alternative leaders in Warsaw who would be willing to crack down 
immediately (Hoffmann specifically mentioned Stefan Olszowski as one of the 
hardline PZPR officials who could be brought in), the Soviet Politburo and High 
Command would agree to install a new Polish regime at the start of Soyuz-80.
Up to the last moment, both Honecker and the Czechoslovak leader, Gustáv 
Husák, believed that the Soviet Union would press ahead with Soyuz-80. On De-
cember 6 and 7, General Hoffmann ordered the 9th Tank Division of the East Ger-
man National People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee, or NVA) to be ready to move 
into Poland at a moment’s notice.62 Clearly, Hoffmann would not have issued such 
an order unless he had still expected that East German, Czechoslovak, and Soviet 
troops would be intervening in Poland on December 8 or 9, as originally planned. 
The Czechoslovak defense minister, General Martin Dzúr, issued similar directives 
on December 6 and 7, to the commanders of the 1st and 9th Tank Divisions of the 
Czechoslovak People’s Army (ČLA), which were to be reinforced by two motorized 
rifle regiments and a number of support and logistical units on the march into Po-
land.63 The NVA and ČLA armored divisions took up positions at their designated 
sites and awaited “an order from the [Soviet] General Staff setting the precise date 
and time for crossing the state border into the Polish People’s Republic.”64 To Ho-
necker’s and Husák’s dismay, however, all these preparations were for naught. The 
61 “Brief von Verteidigungsminister Armeegeneral H. Hoffmann,” Memorandum from Heinz Hoffmann to Erich 
Honecker (Top Secret), November 30, 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 4-5.
62 “Befehl Nr. 118/80 des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung einer 
gemeinsamen Ausbildungsmassnahme der der Vereinten Streitkräfte vom 06.12.1980,” Nr. A-265-992 (Top Se-
cret), December 6, 1980, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 32-37; “Anord-
nung Nr. 54/80 des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Hauptstabes zur Gewahrleistung des Passierens 
der Staatsgrenze der DDR zur VR Polen mit Staben und Truppen der Nationalen Volksarmee zur Teilnahme 
an einer auf dem Territorium der VR Polen stattfindenden gemeinsamen Truppenübung vom 06.12.1980,” No. 
A-477-624 (Top Secret), December 6, 1980, from Colonel-General Fritz Streletz, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 
38-41; “Schreiben des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Chef des Haupstabes, Generalöberst Streletz, an den Chef 
Verwaltung Aufklärung,” No. A-575-704 (Top Secret), December 1980, from Colonel-General Fritz Streletz, in 
MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 149; and numerous other documents reproduced in Kubina and Wilke, eds., “Hart und 
kompromisslos durchgreifen,” p. 97-208.
63 See “Přikaz Ministra národní obrany ČSSR armádního generála Martina Dzúra,” Directive No. 0022534/1 
(Strictly Secret), from ČSSR National Defense Minister Martin Dzúr to Colonel-General František Veselý, com-
mander of the Western Military District, December 6, 1980, in Sbírka vyšetřovací komise Poslanecké sněmovny 
Parlamentu České Republiky pro vyšetření okolností souvisejících s akcemi ČSLA “Norbert, Zásah, Vlna” (hence-
forth cited as Sbírka komise), Sv. “Cvičení Krkonoše.”
64 “Zpráva Náčelníka generálního štábu ČSLA, první zástupce ministra národní obrany ČSSR generálplukovníka 
Miroslava Blahníka, 3.XII.1980,” Report No. 3-3-31 (Top Secret) from Colonel-General Miroslav Blahník to 
ČSSR National Defense Minister Martin Dzúr, December 3, 1980, in Sbírka komise, Sv. “Cvičení Krkonoše.”
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Soviet Politburo had firmly decided by then that no Soviet or East European troops 
should enter Poland until a more propitious opportunity arose.
None of this implies that Soviet leaders were merely leaving things to chance. On 
the contrary, by actively preparing for the “exercise” scenario, they were seeking to 
force Kania and Jaruzelski to act, giving the Polish leaders little option but to move 
ahead with a vigorous crackdown. The impending start of Soyuz-80, it was thought, 
would compel Kania and Jaruzelski to accelerate their preparations for martial law 
and to set a definite timetable, as Soviet leaders had been demanding. What the 
episode ended up showing, however, is that fierce pressure from outside could not 
in itself generate a workable plan for the imposition of military rule.
The Next Showdown
By the early spring of 1981, when the Soviet Union tried once again to force the 
Polish authorities to end the crisis, the planning for martial law was much more ad-
vanced. On March 27, Kania and Jaruzelski had signed three important planning doc-
uments that laid the groundwork for the imposition of martial law.65 Drafts of these 
planning documents had been thoroughly tested a month earlier by forty-five Polish 
General Staff officers and Internal Affairs Ministry officials (as well as two specialists 
from the PZPR Propaganda Department) who took part in staff games at a heavily 
guarded building operated by one of the country’s elite security branches, the Internal 
Defense Forces.66 On March 27, two high-level Soviet delegations – one consisting of 
top military officers led by Marshal Kulikov and his chief deputy, Army-General Ana-
tolii Gribkov, and the other comprising senior KGB officials led by Vladimir Kryuch-
kov – came to Warsaw to review the preparations and pore over the three initial 
planning documents. (A third group of Soviet officials, led by Nikolai Baibakov, the 
head of the State Planning Agency, arrived soon thereafter to discuss economic issues, 
including the economic aspects of martial law.) Once Kulikov, Gribkov, and Kryuch-
kov modified and endorsed the documents, Kania and Jaruzelski signed them.67 The 
adoption of the three items, along with another document completed in early April on 
a “Framework of Economic Measures” (Ramowy plan przedsięwzieć gospodarczych), 
brought an end to the conceptual stage of the martial law preparations.
65 “Myśl przewodnia wprowadzenia na terytorium PRL stanu wojennego ze względu na bezpieczeństwo państwa,” 
“Centralny plan działania organów politycznych władzy i administracji państwowej na wypadek konieczności 
wprowadzenia w PRL stanu wojennego,” and “Ramowy plan działania sił zbrojnych,” March 27, 1981 (Top Secret), 
all in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (CAW), 1813/92, Sygnatura (Sygn.) 2304/IV.
66 For more on this, see Kramer, Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, p. 92-93.
67 Ibid. 
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It was in this context that Soviet leaders raised anew the prospect of offering 
military support for a crackdown. The Warsaw Pact’s Soyuz-81 exercises, which had 
begun on March 17, 1981, and were scheduled to end on March 22, had been ex-
tended to April 7, at the request of the Polish authorities. Jaruzelski and Kania had 
secretly urged that the exercises be extended further – beyond April 7 – so that they 
could “strengthen their position, give inspiration to the progressive forces [i.e., or-
thodox Communists] in Poland, make Solidarity and KOR realize that the Warsaw 
Pact countries are ready to provide help of all kinds to Poland, and thereby exert 
pressure on the leaders of Solidarity.”68 Soviet military commanders turned down 
the request, arguing that it was merely “further proof that Polish leaders believe oth-
ers should do their work for them.”69 Although Brezhnev and his colleagues were 
willing to provide troops to support the imposition of martial law, they wanted to 
ensure that the Polish authorities themselves would take due responsibility for the 
operation and would act as forcefully as needed to dismantle Solidarity and quell 
public unrest. Marshal Kulikov conveyed this message to Kania and Jaruzelski while 
the Soyuz-81 exercises were still under way, telling them that “unless [they] used the 
Polish security organs and army [to impose martial law], external support would 
not be forthcoming because of the international complications that would arise.” 
Kulikov “emphasized to the Polish comrades that they must first seek to resolve 
their problems on their own,” but he was careful to add that “if [the Polish authori-
ties] tried to resolve these problems on their own and were unable to, and were then 
to ask [the Soviet Union] for assistance, this would be a very different situation from 
one in which [Soviet] troops had been deployed [to Poland] from the outset.”70
In addition to conferring with Kulikov, Kania and Jaruzelski met secretly in Brest 
with Andropov and Ustinov on April 3 and 4. The two Polish leaders were extremely 
apprehensive before the meeting, but they left with much greater confidence that 
they would be given more time to resolve the crisis on their own.71 A week after the 
Brest talks, Marshal Kulikov sought to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski to get them 
to sign the implementation directives for martial law (which would effectively set 
a date for the operation to begin), but the Polish leaders first postponed the meeting 
and then told Kulikov on April 13 that they would have to wait before signing 
68 “Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teil-
nehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der ge-
meinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsübung ‘SOJUS 81,’” Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), April 
9, 1981, in MZA-Potsdam, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., Bl. 55.
71 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 9 aprelya 1981 goda,” Transcript (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, 
D. 40, Ll. 1-8. For separate first-hand accounts that tally well with one another, see Stanisław Kania, Zatrzymać 
konfrontację (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), p. 121-122; Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny – dlaczego (Warsaw: Polska 
Oficyna Wydawnicza BGW, 1992), p. 95-101; and Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh 
godov,” p. 46-57.
solidarity domaradzki 2010.indb   49 2010-12-22   14:24:06
50
◀ Mark Kramer ▶
51
◀ The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the Polish Crisis of 1980–1981 ▶
the documents. For the time being, the Polish authorities had gained a further 
reprieve.
Soviet leaders, for their part, realized by mid-April that they would have to ease 
up a bit in their relentless pressure on Kania and Jaruzelski. Brezhnev summed up 
this view at a CPSU Politburo meeting on April 16 when he affirmed that “we should 
not badger [the Polish leaders], and we should avoid making them so nervous that 
they simply throw up their hands in despair.”72 After Suslov and another member of 
the Suslov Commission, Konstantin Rusakov, visited Warsaw on April 23-24, they 
reported to the Soviet Politburo that they had “attacked the [Polish leaders’] indeci-
siveness” and had “sharply criticized their actions,” but had also sought to “support 
and encourage them” and to ensure that “they will have a distinct degree of trust in 
us.”73 Although Brezhnev and his colleagues realized that “the current lull is only 
a temporary phenomenon” and although they were determined to “exert constant 
pressure” on Kania and Jaruzelski, they also were convinced that “we must now 
maintain a more equable tone in our relations with our [Polish] friends.”74
At the same time, Soviet and East European officials continued to search for alter-
native Polish leaders who would be willing to act far more resolutely. At a meeting in 
mid-May 1981, Brezhnev told Honecker and Husák that “the current leadership [in 
Poland] cannot be depended on” and that “some comrades believe that [the PZPR 
hardliners] Olszowski and Grabski are men on whom we can now rely.”75 Although 
he conceded that “a change of leadership [in Poland] could also have negative con-
sequences” and that “for the time being we have no option other than to strengthen 
the current leadership,” he said they “must consider how we will find suitable people 
and prepare them for extraordinary situations.” Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, 
who was also present, agreed that “we must all support the healthy forces” in the 
PZPR and prepare them to step in. Honecker went still further, arguing that it was 
best to remove Kania and Jaruzelski as soon as “we clarify who should take over” – 
preferably within the next week “before the current opportunity to effect a change 
of leadership has passed.” He expressed confidence that the three leading hardliners 
– Olszowski, Kociołek, and Grabski – “could assume the leadership of the state and 
party” and restore order relatively quickly. Husák concurred with Honecker and 
said that the Czechoslovak ambassador in Warsaw would be “expanding his efforts” 
to work with the hardliners and facilitate their rise to power.
72 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: O razgovore tov. L. I. Brezhneva s Pervym sekretarem 
TsK PORP S. Kanei (po telefonu),” in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 1-2.
73 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 30 aprelya 1981 goda: Ob itogakh peregovorov mezhdu delegatsiei KPSS 
i rukovodstvom PORP,” April 30, 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 42, Ll. 1-4.
74 Ibid., L. 5.
75 This paragraph is based on “Vermerk über das Treffen der Genossen Leonid Il’ič Brežnev, Erich Honecker und 
Gustáv Husák am 16. Mai 1981 im Kreml in Moskau“ (cited in footnote 19 supra), p. 270-285.
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Moving toward Martial Law
In June 1981, PZPR hardliners backed by the Soviet Union tried to get rid of 
Kania and Jaruzelski at a plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. The catalyst for 
this attempt was a letter sent on June 5, by the Soviet Politburo (in the name of the 
CPSU Central Committee) to the PZPR Central Committee. The letter, which was 
published in the Polish press the following day, claimed that “S. Kania, W. Jaruzelski, 
and other Polish comrades” were still pursuing a “policy of capitulation and compro-
mise” toward “anti-socialist and reactionary forces.”76 The letter warned that the Sovi-
et Union “will not leave fraternal, socialist Poland in the lurch.” The PZPR Politburo 
discussed the letter on June 6, and the PZPR Central Committee took it up three days 
later when convening for its final plenum before the Ninth PZPR Congress scheduled 
for mid-July.77 In a plan coordinated with Soviet and East German officials, Grabski 
sought to use the letter as a pretext to get rid of Kania. Grabski’s effort to orchestrate 
a vote of no-confidence in Kania was ultimately rebuffed, but Kania had to expend 
a good deal of political capital to survive.78 The failure to bring about a change of 
leadership was a clear disappointment for Soviet and East German leaders, but they 
remained in close touch with the PZPR hardliners and hoped that the next attempt 
to replace Kania with one of the PZPR’s “healthy forces” – either at the Polish party 
congress or in some other venue – would prove more successful.
After Kania and Jaruzelski narrowly held on to their posts, Brezhnev and his col-
leagues on the Soviet Politburo were more inclined to allow the Polish authorities 
to introduce martial law on their own, without “fraternal assistance.” From then on, 
the Soviet Politburo continued to exert fierce pressure, but made clear that the Pol-
ish government should use “its own forces” to handle the situation. When Brezhnev 
met with Kania in the Crimea in August 1981, he made little effort to conceal his 
growing doubts about the Polish leader’s willingness to act. Brezhnev emphasized 
that a crackdown should occur as soon as possible, but he acknowledged that Kania 
and Jaruzelski would have to choose the precise timing. Soon thereafter, on August 
25-26, 1981, the Polish government had secretly approved the printing of thousands 
of leaflets announcing the “introduction of martial law.” The leaflets were printed at 
a KGB printing press in Lithuania and transported to storage sites in Poland in early 
September, ready for distribution three months later.79
76 “List Komitetu Centralnego KPZR do Komitetu Centralnego PZPR,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), June 6-7, 1981, p. 1, 6.
77 “Protokół Nr 97 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 6 czerwca 1981 r.,” June 6, 1981 (Top Secret), 
transcribed in Włodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 381-396. See also Kania’s and Jaruzelski’s first-
hand retrospective accounts in Kania, Zatrzymać konfrontację, p. 154-169; and Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny – dlaczego, 
p. 381-396.
78 For more on this episode, see Kramer, Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, p. 120.
79 “Notatka z 27 VIII 1981 r.,” Notes of Discussion (Top Secret), August 27, 1981, in Centralne Archiwum Minis-
terstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych (CAMSW), Sygn. 2304/IV.
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Tensions escalated in early September 1981 when the Soviet Union launched its 
“Zapad-81” military exercises along Poland’s northern coast and eastern border – 
exercises that involved the largest movements of Soviet combat troops since 1968. 
“Zapad-81” began on September 4, the day before Solidarity opened its first nation-
wide congress in Gdańsk. Taking part were Soviet ground, air, naval, and missile 
forces throughout the northwestern USSR and the Baltic Sea, including a formida-
ble concentration of naval power in the Bay of Gdańsk. Although “Zapad-81” was 
partly intended to test recent changes in the Soviet Union’s military command-and-
control structure, the exercises were also useful in generating pressure on Solidar-
ity and the Polish authorities. Throughout the crisis, Brezhnev and his colleagues 
had sensed that “the powerful anti-Soviet currents [in Poland] are restrained only 
because of fear of Soviet military action.”80 This view was reflected in a top-secret 
report prepared by the Suslov Commission, which claimed that “the only reason 
the opposition forces [in Poland] have not yet seized power is that they fear that 
Soviet troops would be sent in.”81 “Zapad-81” was intended to reinforce Solidarity’s 
anxiety and self-restraint.
Moreover, Soviet leaders expected that the conspicuous Soviet troop move-
ments would have a salutary impact in the West as well as in Poland. The Suslov 
Commission in its report had urged that “as a deterrent to counterrevolution, [the 
USSR] should maximally exploit the fears of… international imperialism that the 
Soviet Union will send its troops into Poland.”82 The Soviet Politburo hoped that 
by fueling apprehension in the West about a Soviet invasion, “Zapad-81” would 
induce Western governments to urge greater caution upon Solidarity. The day after 
the maneuvers ended, Honecker emphasized this point:
Under no circumstances will Poland be given up… U.S. officials under-
stand this, which is the only reason they exert a restraining influence on 
Solidarity. They fear our military intervention… The current exercises in 
the Belorussian SSR, the Baltic states, and Ukraine… will enable leaders 
in the United States to see what they are confronting and the risks they 
are taking.83
80 “Vermerk über das Treffen der Genossen Leonid Il’ič Brežnev, Erich Honecker und Gustáv Husák,” p. 281.
81 “O razvitii obstanovki v Pol’she i nekotorykh shagakh s nashei storony,” April 16, 1981 (Top Secret/Special Dos-
sier), supplement to “Vypiska protokola No. 7 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 23 aprelya 1981 goda,” No. P7/
VII, April 23, 1981, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 3, L. 5.
82 Ibid., L. 6.
83 “Gespräch des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Genossen Erich 
Honecker, anlasslich seines Aufenthaltes in Kuba mit dem Ersten Sekretar des ZK der KP Kubas und Vorsitzenden 
des Staatsrates und des Ministerrates der Republik Kuba, Fidel Castro, am 13. September 1981 in Havanna,” notes 
by Joachim Hermann, September 15, 1981 (Top Secret), in SAPMO, ZPA, J IV 2/2/A-2426.
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The manipulation of perceptions in both Poland and the West remained a key 
part of Soviet strategy over the next few months.
The anxiety surrounding the “Zapad-81” exercises did not prevent Solidarity 
from opening its first nationwide congress on September 5.84 The delegates at the 
congress, far from being intimidated, adopted a number of steps that were bound to 
antagonize the Soviet Politburo. In particular, on September 8, they unanimously 
endorsed an “Appeal to the Working People of Eastern Europe,” which pledged 
Solidarity’s support for “workers in Eastern Europe” and “all the nations in the 
Soviet Union” that were seeking to form their own independent trade unions.85 
The reaction in Moscow was swift. At a Soviet Politburo meeting two days after 
Solidarity issued its appeal, Brezhnev described the statement as a “dangerous and 
inflammatory document… aimed at sowing confusion in all the socialist countries 
and establishing a ‘Fifth Column’” in the USSR.86 The CPSU Politburo ordered the 
Soviet press to feature articles denouncing the appeal as an “impudent provocation” 
that would “gladden the hearts of reactionary forces and imperialism.”
What the delegates at the Solidarity congress did not realize is that a turning 
point in the crisis was about to occur. On September 13, the day after “Zapad-81” 
ended, a highly secretive Polish political-military organ, the Homeland Defense 
Committee (KOK), chaired by Jaruzelski, reached a final decision to introduce 
martial law.87 This decision was promptly conveyed to the CPSU Politburo by 
Soviet KGB and military officials. Although the KOK did not set a precise date for 
84 For the proceedings and documents of the congress, see Maria Borowska, ed., I Zjazd Delegatów Niezależnego 
Samorządnego Związku Zawodowego “Solidarność,” 5-9 wrzesień 1981 r. (Gdańsk: Biuro Informacji Prasowej KKP 
NSZZ “Solidarność,” 1981), 2 vols.
85 “Posłanie do ludzi pracy w Europie Wschodniej,” Tygodnik Solidarność (Warsaw), No. 25 (September 18, 
1981), p. 6.
86 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 sentyabrya 1981 goda: 2. Obmen mnenii po pol’skomu voprosu,” Septem-
ber 10, 1981 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 42, D 46, Ll. 1-2.
87 For a complete record of the KOK meeting on September 13, 1981, see the handwritten notes by General Ta-
deusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, “Protokół No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia 13 
września 1981 r.,” September 13, 1981, now stored in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (CAW), Materiały z posie-
dzeń KOK, Teczka Sygn. 48. A translation of this document was published as an appendix in Andrzej Paczkowski 
and Andrzej Werblan, On The Decision To Introduce Martial Law In Poland In 1981: Two Historians Report to 
the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Cold War International History 
Project Working Paper 21 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). Tuczapski was the only one at the 
meeting who was permitted to take notes. Until his 10-page account was released at the Jachranka conference in 
November 1997, it was generally thought that no formal record of the meeting had been kept. The importance of 
the KOK meeting was first disclosed by Colonel Ryszard Kukliński in his lengthy interview, “Wojna z narodem 
widziana od środka,” p. 32-33. Several years after the interview with Kukliński appeared, Stanisław Kania briefly 
discussed the KOK meeting in his memoirs (after being asked about it by the interviewer who compiled the book). 
See Kania, Zatrzymać konfrontację, p. 110-111. Subsequently, additional evidence emerged indicating that Kukliń-
ski sent a long cable to the CIA on 15 September 1981 – two days after the KOK meeting – outlining the plans 
for martial law and warning that Operation “Wiosna” (the codename of the martial law crackdown) would soon 
follow. See Mark Kramer, “Colonel Kukliński and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981,” Cold War International History 
Project Bulletin, Issue No. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 48-59.
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the operation, the decision signaled a commitment to act. So long as Kania retained 
the top leadership post, the Soviet Politburo could not be fully confident that the 
KOK decision would actually be implemented in the end, but senior officials in 
Moscow were definitely more optimistic after September 13 that a crackdown in 
Poland was finally in the offing.
The crisis reached another turning point in mid-October 1981 when, at 
Moscow’s behest, the PZPR Central Committee removed Kania as party leader and 
replaced him with Jaruzelski. In a secret report to the CPSU Central Committee 
a month later, Suslov highlighted the Soviet Politburo’s role in Kania’s ouster: “The 
question of replacing S. Kania with another person came to the fore [last month]. 
In addition to the activity conducted along these lines by the healthy forces [pro-
Moscow hardliners] in the PZPR, a number of concrete measures were taken by us 
to facilitate an improvement in the Polish leadership.”88 The ascendance of Jaruzelski 
gave Soviet leaders greater confidence that martial law would soon be introduced in 
Poland. Although they continued to worry that Jaruzelski might waver as the time 
for martial law approached, they believed there was a much greater likelihood that 
he, unlike Kania, would eventually make good on the KOK’s pledge to crack down. 
As Suslov explained to the CPSU Central Committee:
At the start of the crisis, W. Jaruzelski and S. Kania held similar views. 
Then, under the influence of events, and in no small degree as a result of 
work carried out [by the USSR] with W. Jaruzelski, he began to support 
the adoption of stronger measures against the anti-socialist forces and to 
favor paying greater heed to the recommendations of the CPSU, an ap-
proach which S. Kania obstinately rejected.89
Jaruzelski, Suslov added, was “a more authoritative figure in Poland” who would 
halt “the endless concessions that S. Kania and his supporters made to the class en-
emy and anti-socialist forces… against all our advice.”
The Climax
In November and early December 1981, the plans for martial law had to be hast-
ily revised after a senior Polish military officer, Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, who had 
been one of a small group of officers on the Polish General Staff coordinating the 
planning and preparations, defected to the West on November 7, as he was on the 
88 “Plenum TsK KPSS – Noyabr’ 1981 g.: Zasedanie vtoroe, vechernee, 16 noyabrya,” November 16, 1981 (Top 
Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 568, L. 136.
89 Ibid.
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verge of being arrested in Poland for espionage. Soviet leaders realized, to their dis-
may, that Kukliński had been leaking details of the plans to the U.S. government, 
and they believed – wrongly, as it turned out – that American officials would tip 
off Solidarity about the precise timing and procedures for the imposition of martial 
law, allowing the union to take steps to thwart the crackdown. Hence, some key as-
pects of the martial law operation had to be altered in the final few weeks, as Army-
General Anatolii Gribkov, the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact 
in 1981, later recounted: “The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces had to act 
hurriedly to redo several components of the plans for the introduction of martial 
law and the implementation directives that were issued to the command staffs and 
troops.”90
When Suslov presented his detailed report about the Polish crisis to the CPSU 
Central Committee in mid-November, he outlined the final preparations for mar-
tial law and some of the steps the Soviet Union was taking to ensure the success 
of the operation.91 In particular; he stressed that the Soviet Politburo was “offer-
ing comprehensive support to the healthy forces in the PZPR,” including Polish 
army generals, who could, if necessary, step in and impose martial law if Jaruzelski 
failed to do so. Suslov described the hardline PZPR officials and pro-Soviet Polish 
military commanders as “our main reserve in the struggle to rejuvenate the [Polish] 
party and restore its combat capability,” and he noted that “we have taken them 
under our wing.” The clear implication was that if Jaruzelski tried to renege on his 
commitment to introduce martial law, the Soviet Politburo would turn to one of 
the hardliners as a replacement. Soviet leaders preferred to rely on Jaruzelski because 
they realized that he would carry greater credibility within Poland than the hardlin-
ers would, but until the last moment they were not fully certain that he would have 
the fortitude to follow through. Hence, the need for a “reserve” of “healthy forces” 
who could be brought in.
On December 5, the PZPR Politburo met for the final time before martial law 
was introduced. The lengthy discussion produced a consensus in favor of proceed-
ing with martial law, but Jaruzelski concluded the meeting by announcing that “at 
today’s session of the Politburo we will not make any final decisions” about the 
timing of the crackdown.92 The question of a timetable was discussed by the Polish 
Council of Ministers (which Jaruzelski chaired as prime minister) on December 7, 
but no final decision was taken there, either. The final timetable for martial law was 
unanimously approved by the Polish High Command, a military-political grouping 
led by Jaruzelski, late in the evening of December 9. The following day, the Soviet 
90 Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 49. 
91 “Plenum Tsk KPSS – Noyabr’ 1981 g.,” Ll. 125-145.
92 “Protokół Nr 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” in Włodek, ed., Tajne dokumen-
ty Biura Politycznego, p. 568.
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Politburo gathered and expressed satisfaction that Jaruzelski and his colleagues had 
“at long last” committed themselves to “introduce martial law and adopt more reso-
lute measures against extremist figures in Solidarity.”93
Soviet leaders remained apprehensive, however, in part because they knew 
that Jaruzelski in recent weeks had been increasingly doubtful about his ability to 
sustain martial law without external (i.e., Soviet) military support. From September 
1980 to October 1981, Jaruzelski and Kania had repeatedly assured Moscow that 
they would “resolve the crisis with our own means” and had repeatedly warned 
that the entry of Soviet troops into Poland would be “disastrous,” but they had said 
these things in the hope of somehow finding a political solution that would not 
require the opposition to be wiped out (or at least not all at once). The imposition 
of martial law, aimed at crushing the opposition in one fell swoop, was an entirely 
different matter. After Jaruzelski assumed the top post in the PZPR and took full 
responsibility into his own hands, his demeanor changed a good deal compared to 
the previous thirteen months in which he worked alongside Kania. The evidence 
from declassified Soviet and Polish documents, as well as from interviews and 
numerous memoirs, reveals that Jaruzelski in the lead-up to martial law abandoned 
his earlier opposition to the entry of Soviet forces and repeatedly urged the Soviet 
Politburo to send troops to Poland to help him in cracking down.94
Jaruzelski initially was discreet about raising this matter, but he became more 
insistent as time passed. His growing nervousness and lack of confidence about his 
ability to impose martial law without Soviet military assistance had undoubtedly 
been heightened by the defection of his closest aide, Colonel Kukliński. According 
to Kania, Jaruzelski had long feared that an attempt to introduce martial law would 
produce chaotic turmoil and that Polish units would be unable to cope with violent 
upheavals on their own.95 This concern was greatly magnified by Jaruzelski’s sudden 
realization that Kukliński, who was familiar with all the martial law planning, 
had been a spy. Although the planning was hurriedly revised in the latter half 
of November to compensate for Kukliński’s departure, Jaruzelski was sure that 
Solidarity would be fully apprised of the details and timing of the operation and 
would be ready to put up vigorous armed resistance. Soviet leaders shared some of 
Jaruzelski’s misgivings, but they believed that the reworked plans for the martial 
law operation (which Soviet KGB and military officials had supervised and helped 
93 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’she,” in RGANI, F. 89, 
Op. 42, D. 6, L. 4.
94 This evidence is presented in Mark Kramer, “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in 
Poland: New Light on the Mystery of December 1981,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 
11 (Winter 1998), p. 5-15.
95 Interview with Kania by the author, in Warsaw, September 6, 1999. Kania made this same point in a conversa-
tion with Thomas S. Blanton, the director of the National Security Archive, in Jachranka, Poland, on November 
10, 1997.
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prepare) would succeed so long as they were implemented forcefully enough.96 In 
retrospect, we know that Jaruzelski’s concerns about a tip-off to Solidarity were 
largely unfounded. (Even if the U.S. government had provided greater information 
to Solidarity, the precise timetable of the operation was not set until December 
9, some five weeks after Kukliński left.) But under the circumstances at the time, 
with severe pressure mounting on Jaruzelski, he was naturally inclined to expect the 
worst. His growing fear that the martial law operation would dissolve into violence 
lay behind his desperate pleas for a Soviet military guarantee.
Jaruzelski’s pleas for Soviet military intervention took on a new edge during 
the final few days before the scheduled start of the martial law operation, reflecting 
the enormous psychological pressure he was under. Marshal Kulikov had arrived 
in Warsaw on December 7 to oversee matters on behalf of the CPSU Politburo, 
and when he met with Jaruzelski the next day, the Polish leader pleaded for Soviet 
troops to be sent to Poland to help him introduce martial law. Jaruzelski repeated 
this request numerous times over the next few days, with ever greater urgency 
and emotion.97 Soviet leaders by this point did not want to offer any assistance to 
Jaruzelski, for fear that it might give him an excuse to avoid acting as forcefully as 
he needed to. They, unlike Jaruzelski, were fully confident that the proposed martial 
law operation would be successful provided that Jaruzelski implemented it without 
letting up. The last thing they wanted was to give him a crutch that might cause him, 
if only subconsciously, to refrain from cracking down as ruthlessly as possible.
When Jaruzelski sent cables to Moscow and placed phone calls to Brezhnev and 
other Soviet leaders on December 10-12, exhorting them to send troops to Poland, 
they tersely brushed aside his repeated pleas, much to his dismay. On December 11, 
after receiving the latest turndown of his requests, Jaruzelski voiced his frustration 
and distress to Kulikov: “This is terrible news for us!! A year-and-a-half of chattering 
about the sending of troops went on – and now everything has disappeared!”98 
Jaruzelski’s profound disappointment upon learning that he would not receive 
external military backing makes clear that his aim in broaching the matter was not 
simply to probe Soviet intentions. In the past, one might have argued that Jaruzelski 
raised the question of Soviet military intervention not because he wanted it to 
96 See esp. the comments of Konstantin Rusakov and Yurii Andropov in “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 
dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 5, 7.
97 See Kramer, “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland,” p. 5-15.
98 Jaruzelski, in his response to my article published in the same issue of the Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin (cited in footnote 93 supra), claims that he was not the one who uttered these lines, though he never in-
dicates who else might have said them. His disclaimer flies in the face of what I learned in November 1997, when 
I made a point of asking both Marshal Kulikov and General Anoshkin (in separate one-on-one conversations) 
whether Jaruzelski was the one who had voiced the words quoted here. Both of them immediately answered “of 
course,” and they were puzzled that I would think it was anyone else. The circumstances fully bear out their recol-
lections: The only participants in the December 11 discussion were Jaruzelski, Kulikov, and Anoshkin. Clearly, 
it would make no sense to attribute these lines to either Kulikov or Anoshkin. Jaruzelski’s denial therefore seems 
wholly implausible.
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occur but because he was trying to gauge what the Soviet Union would do. The first-
hand evidence we now have of Jaruzelski’s repeated pleas for outside intervention, 
and of his consternation when his pleas went unfulfilled, means that this argument 
can no longer be taken seriously. Although Jaruzelski earlier may have “counted on 
a miracle” (as he himself put it in a conversation with the chief of the Polish General 
Staff, Army-General Florian Siwicki) to help him get by without Soviet military 
assistance, he could no longer contain himself as the decisive moment approached 
for the imposition of martial law.99 Having led himself to believe that the crackdown 
would be unsuccessful and would generate chaotic violence unless he received Soviet 
military support, he desperately hoped that the Soviet Union would send troops to 
bail him out.
By the evening of December 11, after being repeatedly told that “the Poles will 
have to fend for themselves,” Jaruzelski still seemed at a loss about what to do. Rather 
than steeling himself for the impending martial law crackdown (which was slated 
to begin at midnight the next day), he continued to try to persuade Soviet leaders 
to change their minds. In addition to conveying his “great concern” to Kulikov that 
“no one from the political leadership of the USSR has arrived to consult with us 
about large-scale… military assistance,” Jaruzelski spoke by secure telephone with 
Yurii Andropov, warning him that Soviet military support was urgently needed. 
These overtures, like Jaruzelski’s earlier pleas, bore no fruit, as Andropov bluntly 
informed the Polish leader that “there can be no consideration at all of sending 
[Soviet] troops.”100
After this latest rebuff, Jaruzelski was more unnerved than ever. At a CPSU 
Politburo meeting the previous day, Soviet officials had already been complaining 
that Jaruzelski seemed “extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities” and 
was “back to his vacillations” and “lack of resolution.”101 Those qualities became 
even more pronounced after Jaruzelski’s renewed pleas on December 11 were 
turned down by both Kulikov and Andropov. At Jaruzelski’s behest, General 
Siwicki met with Kulikov late in the evening on 11 December and warned him 
that “we cannot embark on any adventurist actions [avantyura] if the Soviet 
comrades will not support us.” Siwicki told Kulikov that Jaruzelski seemed 
“very upset and very nervous” and that “psychologically… Jaruzelski has gone to 
pieces [rasstroen].” Siwicki emphasized that Jaruzelski would rather “postpone 
the introduction of [martial law] by a day” than proceed without Soviet military 
backing.102
99 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny, p. 379.
100 Quoted from Mark Kramer, “The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981,” Cold War Inter-
national History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 11 (Winter 1998), p. 21.
101 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” L. 5.
102 Quoted from Kramer, “The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis,” p. 21-22.
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Jaruzelski himself had broached the possibility of delaying the crackdown when 
he met with Kulikov a day or two earlier. Konstantin Rusakov, a member of the 
Suslov Commission, informed the Soviet Politburo on December 10 that Jaruzelski 
was “not presenting a clear, straightforward line” about the date of “Operation X,” 
the codename in Moscow for the martial law operation:
No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a con-
versation about “Operation X.” At first, they said it would be on the night 
of 11-12 December, and then this was changed to the night of the 12th 
and 13th. And now they’re already saying it won’t occur until around the 
20th.103
On 11 December, Siwicki was proposing to defer the martial law crackdown by 
only a day – indeed, he emphasized several times that a delay of more than a day 
would be infeasible – but the very fact that a delay was still under consideration 
bolstered the anxiety in Moscow about Jaruzelski’s apparent loss of nerve.  Kulikov’s 
discussion with Siwicki indicated that Jaruzelski’s motivation for a possible delay, 
of whatever length, was to persuade Soviet leaders to send troops to Poland.104 The 
implication was that if the Soviet Union failed to respond, the whole operation 
might have to be called off. Underscoring this point, Siwicki declared that “if there 
will be no… military support from the USSR, our country might be lost for the 
Warsaw Pact. Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this 
step [of imposing martial law].” In response, Kulikov argued that the martial law 
operation would be successful if Jaruzelski implemented it as planned, and he sought 
to disabuse Siwicki of the idea of postponing the operation. The Soviet marshal 
pointed out that Polish leaders had repeatedly “insisted that Poland is able to resolve 
its problems on its own,” and that Soviet officials had accepted and agreed with that 
view. Kulikov expressed dismay that Jaruzelski’s position had now changed: ”Why 
has this question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of 
the introduction of martial law.” Kulikov added that “you carried out a great deal 
of work in preparing for the introduction of martial law” and “you have enough 
strength” to succeed. ”It’s now time to act,” he argued. ”The date should not be 
postponed, and indeed a postponement is now impossible.” Kulikov also expressed 
concern that the talk about a postponement and about the need for Soviet military 
support might signify that Jaruzelski was backing away from the High Command’s 
“final decision” to impose martial law. ”If that is so,” Kulikov said, “we would like to 
know about it.”
103 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” L. 7.
104 All quotations in this paragraph and the next paragraph are from Kramer, “The Anoshkin Notebook on the 
Polish Crisis,” p. 21-24.
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Siwicki assured Kulikov that “the decision has been made,” and that Jaruzelski 
was not going to renege on his plans to introduce martial law. At the same time, he 
emphasized once again that “without [military] help from outside, it will be difficult 
for us, the Poles,” to sustain martial law. Siwicki said that both he and Jaruzelski 
hoped that Soviet leaders would “look upon these matters with understanding” and 
would “consider [our] requests,” but Kulikov displayed no inclination to consider 
any changes in the “final” arrangements, which stipulated that Polish units would 
introduce martial law on their own. By the time the meeting ended, Siwicki had 
pledged that he would embark on “a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution,” 
as Soviet leaders had long demanded. Even so, Kulikov’s chief aide, General Viktor 
Anoshkin, could tell that “Siwicki left here dissatisfied because he got nothing new 
and heard nothing new from [Kulikov].”
The extent of Jaruzelski’s (and Siwicki’s) continued nervousness and dissatisfaction 
became clear on December 12, as the hour approached for the introduction of 
martial law. Despite what had happened over the previous two days, Jaruzelski was 
still urging the Soviet Union to “provide military help.” So insistent were Jaruzelski’s 
pleas that Kulikov began to suspect that the Polish leader was trying to “make the 
introduction of martial law dependent on the fulfillment of [his demand for Soviet 
intervention].” With the fate of the martial law operation still very much in doubt 
just hours before it was due to begin, Soviet officials made arrangements for a high-
level Soviet delegation, led by Suslov, to fly to Warsaw for emergency consultations 
at Jaruzelski’s request.105 This visit turned out to be unnecessary after Jaruzelski 
placed an urgent phone call to Suslov, who sternly told the Polish leader that no 
Soviet troops would be sent to help him “under any circumstances” and that he 
should proceed as scheduled with the introduction of martial law.106
Although Jaruzelski was distraught at having been “left on [his] own,” he regained 
sufficient composure to launch the operation and oversee a forceful, comprehensive 
crackdown. At 6:00 a.m. on December 13, Jaruzelski appeared on Polish television 
announcing the imposition of martial law (stan wojenny) “to counter a threat to the 
vital interests of the state and of the nation.”107 The Polish security forces crushed 
Solidarity with remarkable speed and efficiency. Nearly 6,000 Solidarity leaders and 
activists around the country, including Lech Wałęsa, were arrested within the first 
105 Kramer, “The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis,” p. 25.
106 This phone call has been recounted by several former Soviet and Polish officials, who were well situated to know 
about it and who were unaware of the others’ accounts before offering their own. See, for example, “Gorbaczow 
o stanie wojennym w Polsce: Generał Jaruzelski postąpił prawidłowo,” Trybuna (Warsaw), November 9, 1992, 
p. 1, 2; Witold Bereś and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., Generał Kiszczak mowi… prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW 1991), 
p. 129-130; and Vitalii Pavlov, Byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, 1994), p. 129-130. The essentially 
identical descriptions of the phone call in these diverse recollections give a good sense of what Jaruzelski and Suslov 
said.
107 “Przemówienie gen. armii W. Jaruzelskiego,” Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), December 14, 1981, 1.
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few hours.108 With administrative and logistical support from the Polish army, the 
Polish security forces eliminated all remaining pockets of resistance over the next 
four days. The martial law operation in Poland was a model of its kind, illustrating 
as it did how an authoritarian regime could quell widespread social unrest with 
surprisingly little bloodshed. For the next nineteen months, the Military Council of 
National Salvation headed by Jaruzelski was the supreme governing body in Poland. 
Martial law was not fully lifted until July 22, 1983.
The Outcome in Retrospect
Until 1990, Jaruzelski staunchly denied that the Soviet Union had ever intended 
to invade Poland in 1981; and even as late as September 1991, in an interview with 
a Soviet newsweekly, he was evasive about the matter.109 No doubt, his discretion 
prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union was attributable to his desire not to 
antagonize his Soviet allies. Soon after the USSR collapsed, however, Jaruzelski 
sharply changed his position, arguing that he had reluctantly imposed martial law 
to forestall Soviet military intervention and restore order in Polish society. In two 
volumes of memoirs and countless interviews, Jaruzelski repeatedly claimed that he 
had viewed martial law as a “tragic necessity” and the “lesser of two evils.”110
This position has recently been challenged by a few Western analysts who have 
asserted that the Soviet Politburo by 1980-1981 had completely forsaken the op-
tion of using force in Eastern Europe.111 Brezhnev himself, the argument goes, had 
secretly renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine (the phrase coined in the West to de-
scribe the USSR’s public rationale for the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia), 
which essentially had given the Soviet Union both a right and a duty to preserve 
Communism in Eastern Europe through any means necessary, including the use of 
military force.112 If in fact Brezhnev had abandoned his eponymous doctrine soon 
108 For a first-rate account of the crackdown, see Andrzej Paczkowski, Droga do “mniejszego zła”: Strategia i taktyka 
obozu władzy, lipiec 1980 – styczeń 1982 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie 2001), p. 272-309. 
109 Interview transcribed in Novoe vremya (Moscow), No. 38 (September 21, 1991), p. 26-30.
110 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny; and Wojciech Jaruzelski, Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Lattes 1992).
111 See Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press 2003); Wilfried Loth, “Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev 
Doctrine,” Cold War History 1, No. 2 (2001), p. 103-118; and Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland 
and the End of the Cold War,” Europe-Asia Studies 51, No. 2 (1999), p. 189-211. The publications by Ouimet and 
Loth are especially fanciful.
112 On the origins and nature of the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Br-
ezhnev Doctrine,” in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., 1968: The World Transformed (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 111-174; and Karen Dawisha, “The 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 
Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for the Future,” in Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, eds., Soviet-East Euro-
pean Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Dissent (London: Heinemann, 1981), p. 9-25.
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after 1968, this would mean that the whole thrust of Soviet policy in Eastern Eu-
rope had changed. The implication is that even if the martial law operation in Po-
land in 1981 had gone awry and the Communist regime had collapsed amid chaotic 
violence, the Soviet Politburo would not have sent in troops.
Neither of these conflicting positions is tenable. To be sure, Jaruzelski’s claims 
about the Soviet Union do have considerable merit. As the discussion above shows, 
the CPSU Politburo and the Soviet High Command were exerting relentless pres-
sure on Polish leaders in 1980-1981. The Soviet Union deployed many divisions of 
combat-ready troops around Poland’s borders and in the western USSR, conducted 
a long series of conspicuous Warsaw Pact and bilateral military exercises, informed 
Polish officials that elaborate plans had been drawn up for a Soviet-led invasion, un-
dertook reconnaissance and other preparations to carry out those plans, and made 
repeated, vehement exhortations through bilateral and multilateral channels. These 
various actions, in combination, might well have caused Jaruzelski to fear that Soviet 
troops would invade Poland unless he imposed martial law. Whether Soviet lead-
ers actually intended to invade is a very different matter – a matter to be explored 
in greater detail below. But regardless of what Soviet intentions truly were, the key 
point to bear in mind is that Jaruzelski and other senior Polish officials in 1980 and 
1981 were not privy to the internal deliberations of the Soviet Politburo and could 
never be fully certain about Soviet intentions. Hence, Jaruzelski and Kania might 
have genuinely believed that an invasion would occur if a solution “from within” 
Poland (i.e., a martial law crackdown) did not materialize. Indeed, as the discussion 
above indicates, Soviet leaders at various points during the crisis deliberately sought 
to create the impression that the USSR would invade– even if they did not intend to 
follow up on it – because they hoped that this would induce the Polish authorities 
to take action. In that respect, the declassified materials are compatible with Jaruzel-
ski’s claims about his motives and behavior.
Nonetheless, even though Jaruzelski’s memoirs accurately depict the excruciat-
ing pressure he and Kania were facing from the Soviet Union, his account of the 
crisis omits a crucial matter. Jaruzelski fails to mention that as the decisive moment 
approached in 1981, he actually urged the Soviet Union to send troops to bail him 
out. The reason that Jaruzelski was appointed First Secretary of the PZPR in mid-
October 1981 is that Soviet leaders believed that he, unlike Kania, would be will-
ing to comply with their demands for a crackdown. Jaruzelski did promptly move 
ahead with the final preparations for the “lesser of two evils”– that is, martial law 
– but he also began considering the possibility of relying on the “greater of two 
evils,” Soviet military intervention. His overtures about this option evidently began 
in late October 1981 and continued, with ever greater urgency, until the day martial 
law was introduced. Apparently, Jaruzelski by late 1981 had come to believe that 
the martial law operation would be unsuccessful unless it went hand-in-hand with 
external military intervention. Ironically, the members of the Soviet Politburo had 
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held precisely the same view until Jaruzelski became party leader in October 1981. 
In the final weeks (and particularly the final few days) before the martial law opera-
tion began, Jaruzelski was pleading with Soviet leaders to send troops into Poland to 
assist him with the crackdown, and by all indications he was devastated when they 
turned down his requests. The newly available evidence on this matter from many 
independent sources casts serious doubt on Jaruzelski’s repeated assertions that his 
decision to introduce martial law in December 1981 was intended solely to spare 
Poland the trauma of Soviet military intervention. In the end, rather than seeking to 
avert that option (as he had on numerous occasions earlier in the crisis), he actually 
was promoting it.
But if Jaruzelski’s version of events is problematic, the notion that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was no longer in effect by 1980-1981 is even more dubious. This argument 
flies in the face of a vast amount of evidence. The first step the Soviet Politburo took 
in August 1980, after forming a special commission to deal with the Polish crisis, was 
to authorize the mobilization of a sizable number of Soviet tank and mechanized in-
fantry divisions “in case military assistance is provided to Poland.” From August 1980 
until the fall of 1981, Soviet leaders were fully prepared to send these divisions into 
Poland to help the Polish Communist regime introduce martial law. The only reason 
that the Soviet (and Czechoslovak and East German) divisions did not move into 
Poland is that whenever the Soviet Politburo stepped up its pressure and proposed 
the immediate deployment of Soviet troops to facilitate a vigorous crackdown on the 
Polish opposition, Kania and Jaruzelski warned that it would be better if Polish forces 
imposed martial law on their own. If the Polish leaders had instead been willing to 
receive external military support during this period, the Soviet divisions would have 
entered Poland to assist them in crushing Solidarity and restoring orthodox Commu-
nist rule. Although the scenario for the entry of Soviet troops into Poland in 1980 or 
1981 would have been different from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (when 
Soviet troops intervened en masse against the existing regime), the notion that the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was irrevocably dead by 1980 is fallacious.
Soviet leaders had ordered the use of military force in Afghanistan (a country 
of much less strategic significance than Poland) in late 1979 despite serious initial 
misgivings, and although they relied on an “internal” solution in Poland, this was no 
different from Soviet policy during earlier severe crises in Eastern Europe. In 1968, 
Brezhnev and his colleagues had repeatedly urged the KSČ First Secretary, Alexan-
der Dubček, to remove the most outspoken reformers and to reinstate censorship of 
the press. Only when Brezhnev finally realized that no amount of pressure would be 
sufficient to induce Dubček to crack down did he reluctantly agree to proceed with 
an invasion.113 In 1980-1981, as in 1968, military force was regarded as a last-ditch 
113 Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and De-
tlef Junker, eds., 1968: The World Transformed (New York: Cambridge University Press 1998), p. 111-174.
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option that would be pursued only after all other options had failed. But this in no 
way implies that the Soviet Union had renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine by 1981, 
any more than it had in 1968.
 The notion that the Brezhnev Doctrine was defunct by 1980-1981 implies that 
the Soviet Union would not have intervened in Poland in December 1981, even 
if the martial law operation had failed and widespread violence had erupted. This 
argument is wholly unconvincing. Admittedly, no one can say for sure what the 
Soviet Politburo would have done under these hypothetical circumstances. But it 
seems extremely unlikely – indeed inconceivable – that the Soviet Union would 
have stayed on the sidelines and allowed the Polish Communist regime and Soviet 
troops in Poland to come under deadly attack. At a crucial CPSU Politburo meeting 
on December 10, 1981, Yurii Andropov, warned that the Soviet military must 
“take steps to ensure that the lines of communication between the Soviet Union 
and the German Democratic Republic that run through Poland are safeguarded.”114 
Protecting the physical security of the USSR’s Northern Group of Forces (the 
roughly 58,000 soldiers deployed in Poland) was an even higher priority. The only 
way to accomplish either of these tasks in a dire emergency was by sending in Soviet 
troops.
There is no question that the Soviet Union could have sent troops into Poland if 
civil war had broken out there in December 1981. In the spring of 1981, Brezhnev 
had noted that the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Kulikov, 
“has worked out military plans for several options to be implemented in case of 
an emergency.”115 These plans, according to the memoirs of General Vitalii Pavlov, 
who was the KGB station chief in Warsaw during the Polish crisis, were an updated 
and expanded version of the preparations that had been made in the autumn of 
1980, after the Suslov Commission laid out a mobilization schedule (the schedule 
discussed above).116 Kulikov’s chief deputy, General Gribkov, who oversaw most 
of the military planning and preparations in 1980-1981, later confirmed that full-
fledged operational plans existed in December 1981 to send Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact troops to Poland if an emergency arose:
Was there a viable plan to send Soviet troops into Poland? Yes, there was 
such a plan. What is more, reconnaissance of entry routes and of con-
centration points for the allied forces was carried out [by Soviet, East 
German, and Czechoslovak specialists] with the active participation of 
Polish officials.117
114 “Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda.” 
115 “Gespräch des Generalsekretärs” (cited in note 82 supra), Bl. 2.
116 Pavlov, Byłem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 219.
117 Gribkov, “‘Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol’skii krizis,” p. 49.
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Gribkov denied “that any final decision on whether to send in troops” had been 
made by the time martial law was imposed, but he left no doubt that “allied troops 
would have entered Poland” if Soviet leaders had ordered them to.
Polish officials themselves certainly believed, as they stated in a top-secret 
document of November 25, 1981, that if martial law resulted in uncontrollable 
violence and bloodshed, “Warsaw Pact forces would intervene.”118 Suslov had touched 
on this same point a week earlier when he told the CPSU Central Committee 
that “extreme necessity [in Poland] would warrant extreme measures” – a term 
that invariably referred to external military intervention. He noted that the Soviet 
Politburo “during the entire crisis in Poland has been searching for political means of 
resolving the conflict,” but he echoed Brezhnev’s repeated statements that the Soviet 
Union would not – and could not – “leave Poland in the lurch.” Suslov assured the 
Central Committee that the Soviet Politburo would do “whatever is necessary to 
preserve and strengthen the Polish People’s Republic as a fundamental component 
of the socialist commonwealth and a vital, permanent member-state of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.”119
Even though there is every reason to believe that the Soviet Politburo would have 
sent troops into Poland to prevent all-out civil war and the violent collapse of the 
Communist regime, it is impossible to know with absolute certainty. The members 
of the Politburo, like almost any collective body, did not want to make a final decision 
about “extreme measures” unless a dire emergency forced them to. Because they were 
confident that the martial law operation would succeed if Jaruzelski cracked down 
vigorously, they believed they could avoid deciding in advance about an unlikely 
and unpalatable military contingency. This calculation was amply borne out. The 
striking success of Jaruzelski’s “internal solution” on December 12-13, 1981, spared 
Soviet leaders from having to make any final decision about the dispatch of Soviet 
troops to Poland.
The surprisingly smooth imposition of martial law in Poland also helped to 
prevent any further disruption in Soviet-East European relations during the final 
year of Brezhnev’s rule and the next two-and-a-half years under Yurii Andropov and 
Konstantin Chernenko. The lack of any major political turmoil in Eastern Europe 
from 1982 to 1985 seems especially surprising at first glance, for this was a period 
of great uncertainty not only because of the post-Brezhnev succession in Moscow, 
but also because of the impending successions in most of the other Warsaw Pact 
countries. The last time the Soviet Union had experienced a prolonged leadership 
transition, from 1953 to 1957, numerous crises had arisen in the Eastern bloc: large-
scale violent unrest in Plzeň and other Czechoslovak cities in June 1953, a rebellion 
118 “Załącznik Nr 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnętrznych,” attachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, 
“Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg. stanu na dzień 25 listopada br.,” November 25, 1981 (Secret/Special Dossier) 
in CAMSW, Sygn. 228/1B, Karta 19.
119 “Plenum Tsk KPSS – Noyabr’ 1981 g.,” Ll. 144-145.
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in East Germany in June 1953, a mass uprising in Poznań in June 1956, and severe 
crises in both Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. Moreover, during 
the 1953-1956 period, all the East European countries underwent one or more 
changes in their Communist party leadership, just as the Soviet Union did.
 By contrast, no such upheavals or leadership changes occurred in Eastern Europe 
in the interregnum from 1982 to 1985. This unusual placidity cannot be attributed 
to any single factor, but the martial law crackdown of December 1981 and the 
invasions of 1956 and 1968 are probably a large part of the explanation. After Stalin’s 
death in 1953, the limits of what could be changed in Eastern Europe were still 
unknown, but by the early 1980s the Soviet Union had evinced its willingness and 
ability to do what was necessary to prevent or reverse “deviations from socialism.” 
The Brezhnev Doctrine, far from having died an early death, outlived Brezhnev 
himself and remained in effect until Mikhail Gorbachev renounced it in 1989.
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Maryna Bessonova
Soviet Attitudes Towards Poland’s Solidarity 
Movement
Nowadays, the Polish Solidarity movement of the 1980s is often considered to 
be the first step in the downfall of the Soviet empire. Solidarity was not only a trade 
union, but above all, an opposition movement against communist totalitarianism. 
The bipolar world had a great impact on the whole system of international relations 
as well as on the domestic life of the people, who lived in the socialist countries. 
Now we have an opportunity to compare different approaches to those times. The 
main aim of this paper is to provide some generalizations about the Soviet official 
and unofficial points of view, as well as the current Ukrainian perspectives, on the 
events of the 1980s in Poland.
Historical background
According to the official Soviet picture of the world since 1945, the main result 
of World War II was not just the victory over fascism, but the formation of a new 
system of international relations between socialist countries. It was further pro-
claimed that the system was one based on the principles of democracy, freedom, and 
partnership. Consequently, relations among socialist countries aimed at strengthen-
ing the peace of the whole world and deepening the economic, cultural, and politi-
cal assistance and cooperation with each other. From 1945 to 1989, the history of 
Soviet foreign policy within the communist camp was portrayed as a partnership 
with brother-nations.
The following stages of the development of the relations within the socialist 
camp since 1945 can be marked out as such: (1) victory of the people’s democracy 
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in liberated countries and the foundation of socialist states in Eastern Europe; (2) 
the conversion of socialism into the world system; and (3) the emergence of a new 
type of international relations. The recovery of the economy and the formation of 
the infrastructure after the war closely tied socialist countries of Eastern Europe to 
the USSR. As a result, the Soviet planned economy became the basis not only for 
domestic development within the USSR, but for the mutual cooperation with the 
brother-nations as well. A number of international organizations were established 
and different agreements were signed in this sphere. The decades of the Soviet bloc’s 
existence were described by the Soviet Union as the years of progressive achieve-
ments. The attempts of East European countries to get rid of their Soviet “friend-
ship” were interpreted as “revanchist revolts” and “plots” by imperialist forces. The 
attitudes towards the events in Berlin in 1953, Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968, 
and Poland in the 1980s were great examples of such an approach. 
According to Soviet statistics from the 1980s, the country-members of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) had achieved many positive results in 
their economic development. This argument was widely spread throughout the social-
ist camp as an illustration of the progressive character of the socialist way of life.
Crisis in Poland: The Official Soviet Approach
Given the historic background, the Polish crisis at the end of the 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s seemed to be an extraordinary situation. In the summer of 
1980, many strikes had taken place in Polish industrial enterprises. In some places, 
they even transformed into incidents of civil disorder and disturbance. Walkouts in-
creased and spread all over the state, and even the possible “strike terror” unfolded in 
Poland. The authorities had to use force to stop it all. During these walkouts a num-
ber of strike committees were organized and formed by representatives of “illegal 
counterrevolutionary organizations,” such as the Committee of Civil Solidarity and 
the Confederation of Independent Poland, encouraging Polish workers to demand 
the formation of “free” trade-unions, while the already existing trade and profes-
sional unions were paralyzed. The trade union Solidarity, according to communist 
officials, was formed by anti-socialist circles, whose aim it was to deepen the crisis 
in Poland and to undermine the basis of socialism in the country. This anti-socialist 
activity, they further avowed, was fully supported by the Catholic Church. 
The crisis which emerged in the country, overtook the ruling Polish United 
Workers’ Party (PUWP). The Soviets saw this as the “weakening of the leadership 
of the Party” and “the violation of its ties with the masses.”1 On December 13, 1981, 
1 V. V. Aleksandrov, Noveishaya istoriya stran: Evropy i Ameriki (1945-1986 gg.). (Moscow: Vysshaya shkola, 1988), 
p. 70.
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in the face of a looming threat of a counter-revolutionary coup, Poland’s highest 
authorities imposed martial law in the country in accordance with the stipulations 
provided by the state’s constitution. The events of 1980-1981 were considered dan-
gerous and dramatic because the country was attacked by a sequence of “destructive 
waves of chaos and anarchy.”
For more than two years during the period of martial law, Poland faced a desper-
ate, persistent, and daily struggle with the anti-socialist underground before gradu-
ally overcoming the state crisis of the economy and public life and entering onto 
a path of political and economic stabilization. On July 22, 1983, with National Re-
vival Day, martial law was completely abolished. Thus, an additional impetus was 
given to the process of normalization in the further development of the institutions 
of socialist democracy.2 During these hard times for socialism in Poland, the Soviet 
government and the Soviet people, according to the official Soviet view, supported 
the Poles in their struggle for defending the socialist way of life.
The Soviet Interpretation of  the Polish Events and their 
Impact on the Soviet Union
According to the official Soviet point of view, the difficulties in Poland were 
caused by two main groups of reasons: subversive activities of imperialism and mis-
takes in domestic policy. The Polish events had a strong influence on the entire so-
cialist community, but for the Soviet Union, the leader of the communist world, 
they were considered “a violation of the laws of socialist construction” and a “distor-
tion of the principles of socialist democracy.”3
At the time of the crisis, the situation in Poland was under the total control of 
Moscow. The Polish question was the main point of discussion at a number of meet-
ings of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee’s 
Politburo. Most of the documents connected with the Polish events have now been 
declassified and opened for researchers, but a number of questions have been raised 
about their validity. This paper will not attempt to prove whether the documents 
we have are either true or false. Rather, we can only try to pay attention to the most 
important moments in order to follow the path of how events developed during the 
crisis.
As the crisis in Poland deepened in 1980, Soviet attention to that part of the 
socialist camp became more active. On August 25, 1980, a special commission was 
formed at the meeting of the Politburo to investigate the situation in Poland. It was 
2 V. P. Trubnikov, Krakh operatsii “Poloniya” 1980-81 gg: Dokumental’nyi ocherk (Moscow: Agentstvo pechati No-
vosti 1985), p. 5.
3 Aleksandrov, Noveishaya istoriya stran Evropy i Ameriki, p. 70.
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headed by the senior Communist Party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, and included 
KGB chairman Yurii Andropov, Minister of International Affairs Andrei Gromyko, 
and Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov. This commission was authorized to moni-
tor events in Poland, keep Politburo members informed, and take possible action 
from the Soviet side.4 The first recommendations of the commission were made in, 
“About the theses for discussion with representatives of the Polish leaders.” In that 
document, the agreement made previously with the united strike committees in 
Gdansk was evaluated as a defeat and as a legalization of the anti-socialist opposi-
tion. The commission advised the following: purge the ranks of the ruling PUWP; 
proclaim a new positive party program, which would weaken the demands of the 
strike committees in the eyes of the workers; implement a radical renewal of trade 
union activity and staff membership; take necessary measures to expose the plans 
of the opposition; pay special attention to the army; and strengthen censorship. 
For the mass media, it recommended: show that the events in Poland had not been 
caused by shortcomings of the socialist system, but by the mistakes and miscalcula-
tions of the Polish government as well as by such objective reasons like disasters; 
oppose the anti-Polish and anti-socialistic attacks of hostile propaganda; and cover 
objectively the economic benefits of broader cooperation with the USSR and other 
brother nations.5
The Polish ruling party and opposition trade-union were not the only ones un-
der Soviet watch. At the Politburo meeting on October 4, 1980, the Polish media 
were criticized for their publication of “discussions and doubtful materials, which 
did not lead to the stabilization of the situation.” Another criticism was its incom-
plete coverage of the efforts made by the USSR and other socialist countries in ren-
dering assistance to overcome the difficulties in Poland.6
Brezhnev characterized the situation in Poland as “the full revelry of the coun-
ter-revolution.”7 However, he did not seem to insist on armed intervention at the 
moment. An invasion was thus postponed indefinitely to allow the Polish leader-
ship time to suppress the opposition on its own. Possible Soviet intervention and 
a proclamation of martial law were discussed at several meetings of the Politburo. 
Among the points which were discussed, was the fact that the “Polish comrades said 
4 “K voprosy o polozhenii v Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respublike. Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK 
KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 g,” Sovetskii arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html 
(accessed March 10, 2010).
5 “O tezisakh dlya besedy s predstavitelyami pol’skogo rukovodstava. Vypiska iz protokola No. 213 zasedaniya 
Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 3 sentyabrya 1980,” Sovetskii Arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/
poland-rus.html (accessed March 10, 2010).
6 “O nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po organizatsii propagandy i kontrpropagandy v svyazi s sobytiyami 
v Pol’she. 04.10.1980,” Sovetskii arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html (ac-
cessed March 10, 2010).
7 “Materialy k druzhestvennomu rabochemu vizitu v SSSR pol’skikh rukovoditelei. October 29, 1980,” Sovetskii 
arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html (accessed March 10, 2010).
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that they had a situation, which couldn’t be evaluated as the same one in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia,” referring to the previous events of 1956 and 1968.8
The most decisive Politburo meeting relating to the Polish issue occurred on 
December 10, 1981, when it was decided that the Soviet Union would not inter-
vene in Poland. After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and international reac-
tion to it, everybody who took part in this meeting agreed that the situation in 
Poland must be treated as an internal Polish affair. For example, Andropov said: 
“We can’t risk such a step. We do not intend to send troops into Poland. That is 
the principle position, and we must keep to it until the end. I don’t know how 
things will go on in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control of Solidar-
ity, that’s the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet 
Union, and you know they have already reached an agreement on a variety of 
economic and political sanctions, which will be very burdensome for us. We must 
be concerned above all with our own country and with the strengthening of the 
Soviet Union. That is our main line.”9
After martial law was proclaimed in Poland, the Politburo of the CPSU’s 
Central Committee sent telegrams to the Soviet ambassadors in Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, East Germany, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos with 
instructions to meet the leaders of those countries and to inform them about 
the Soviet position, which assumed that “Polish friends should deal with their 
problems, using their inner measures” and that socialist countries with the Soviet 
Union would offer “political and moral support” as well as “additional economic 
help.”10 
Not only within the socialist camp was the Polish question an issue for Soviet 
diplomatic activity. Negotiations and meetings were held with brother nations 
as well as with representatives of leftist parties in capitalist states. For example, 
though Solidarity was a legal organization before martial law was introduced, its 
leaders’ visits abroad were under strong control of the CPSU. As a matter of fact, 
the Soviet ambassador in Italy was fully instructed what to do when Lech Wałęsa 
visited Rome on December 14-18, 1980. He was told “to neutralize Wałęsa’s at-
tempts to use his presence in Italy with the anti-communist, anti-socialist and 
anti-Soviet goals” and “to pass this attitude to the leaders of the Italian Commu-
nist party.”11
8 Ibid.
9 “К voprosy o polozhenii v Pol’she. Vypiska iz zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS. October 12, 1981,” Sovetskii ar-
chive, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html (accessed March 10, 2010).
10 “Ob informatsii rukovodstva bratskikh stran po pol’skomu voprosy. Vypiska iz protokola No. 40 zasedaniya Po-
litbyuro TsK KPSS ot 13.12.1981,” Sovetskii arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.
html (accessed March 10, 2010).
11 “Ob ukazaniyakh sovetskomu poslu v italii v svyazi s poezdkoi L. Valensy v Italiyu,” Sovetskii archiv, 2010, http://
bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html (accessed March 12, 2010).
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In general, the Polish economic and political crisis was used as a negative ex-
perience to show how it was important to strengthen the unity of the brother 
parties, to give a decisive rebuff to the anti-socialist forces, and to overcome im-
perialistic attacks.12 Such an attitude was emphasized in a number of newspaper 
articles, scientific studies, and books. The Polish crisis influenced not only the 
political life of the Soviet Union, but different sides of state life and domestic af-
fairs as well. We can give here a few examples. The editorial bodies of the Soviet 
newspapers Pravda, Novosti, Trud, Komsomolskaya Pravda, as well as the USSR 
State Committee on TV and radio, the Novosti news agency, and others were 
instructed on how to inform the Soviet people about events in Poland. They had 
to emphasize the role of the working class, the Marxist-Leninist party, and the 
trade-unions in the socialist building process. They were also instructed to eluci-
date Poland’s participation in the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. And finally, they 
were to expose the enemy’s propaganda intrigues by using materials from Polish 
periodicals. The Soviet trade-union organizations, the Young Communist League 
(Komsomol), the State Committee on publications, the Union of journalists, and 
other organizations were requested to prepare ideas on how to assist their “Polish 
friends in counter-propaganda.”13
At the end of November 1980, it was decided to cut back tourist exchanges be-
tween Poland and the USSR. Most of the reductions were connected with long-
term visits of Soviet tourists to Poland and was caused by the political situation 
in that country. In the first part of 1981, the plan was to cut Soviet tourism to Po-
land and Polish tourism to the USSR to 44 %. The Main Office of Foreign Tourism 
within the Council of Ministers of the USSR proposed the following: “For the pur-
pose of strengthening of ideological influence on the citizens of People’s Republic 
of Poland in terms of international tourism, let’s leave only those types of trips in the 
structure of tourism that are the most effective in the political sense like “trains of 
friendship,” “planes of friendship,” trips of the activists of the Polish-Soviet friend-
ship Society, veterans of the PUWP and World War II, trips to the sister-cities.”14 
In addition to these measures, visits by Soviet citizens to Poland were cancelled and 
then forbidden, even if they had relatives in Poland.
Special additional steps were made to control the Polish press which circulated 
in the USSR. The great majority of Polish journals and newspapers were divided 
into two lists. The editions from the first list were forbidden for sale and had to be 
kept only in the organizations and institutions which had “special conditions of 
12 Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR 1917-1985, v. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), p. 517.
13 “О nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po organizatsii propaandy i kontrpropagandy v svyazi s cobytiyami 
v Pol’she. 04.10.1980,” Sovetskii arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html (ac-
cessed March 10, 2010).
14 “O vremennom prekrashchenii turisticheskogo obmena mezhdu SSSR i PNP. November 28, 1980,” Sovetskii 
arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.html (accessed March 12, 2010).
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preservation of such editions.” The periodicals from the second list were permitted 
for sale only if they “didn’t have undesirable materials.”15 It was decided to create 
four additional special staff-positions – two editors and two inspectors – for censor-
ing the content of the Polish press and checking printed materials and parcels.
We can find a lot of other examples which show that events in Poland had a di-
rect and indirect impact on Soviet life. For instance, on the initiative of the USA, 
some economic sanctions against the USSR were enforced. Flights to the US by 
the Soviet airline “Aeroflot” were cancelled and access by Soviet ships to American 
seaports were limited. Furthermore, the Soviet trade agency in New York was closed 
and the export of high technologies to the USSR was blocked. American compa-
nies were also prohibited from selling oil and gas equipment to the USSR. Finally, 
a number of visas for Soviet citizens and official Soviet delegations for trips to the 
USA were denied.16
 Also, an infinite number of articles and books published in the USSR, stated 
that the events of 1956 in Hungary, the “Prague Spring” of 1968, and the mass 
movement in Poland in 1980-1981 were the result of the machinations of Amer-
ican imperialism in general, and the CIA in particular.17 The Soviet press gave 
a wide, but completely censored, coverage of the situation in Poland and of the 
reaction of the world community to events in Poland. In the Soviet media there 
were two main types of information about the Polish situation. The first group 
included “official” publications of the Polish government and party leaders that 
were reprinted from the Polish press, as well as the official Soviet notes about the 
situation in Poland. The second group comprised “news” in the form of different 
articles about Poland, the socialist community’s response to the situation in the 
brother nations, information about Soviet assistance to the Polish people, and 
attitudes of the Soviet people regarding the Polish events. The total character of 
such publications shows us three main features: the official Soviet approach to the 
Solidarity movement and the whole situation in Poland, the atmosphere of the 
1980s in the Soviet Union, and the main tools of the Soviet domestic propaganda 
machine. 
The Ukrainian mass-media of the time discussed the Polish events in the same 
way as the central Soviet press did. All news had an official ideological character 
and consisted of hackneyed phrases like “anti-socialist elements,” “extremists,” “un-
dermining forces,” “revanchists,” “enemies” etc. For the most part, the information 
was repeated and copied from the central Soviet press, and sometimes it was simply 
15 “O nekotorykh dopolnitel’nykh merakh po kontrolyu za rasprostraneniem pol’skoi pechati v SSSR. Vypiska iz 
protokola No. 242. 22.12.1980,” Sovetskii arkhiv, 2010, http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/poland/poland-rus.
html (accessed March 12, 2010).
16 “Diskriminatsionnii akt,” Trud, May 31, 1983, p. 3.
17 V. Nakaryanov, Diversii protiv Pol’shi (Moscow, 1985); Neob”yavlennaya voina protiv Pol’shi: podryvnaya 
deyatelnost’ zapadnykh spetssluzhb (po materialam pol’skoi pechati, ed. P. Ol’gin (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984).
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translated into the Ukrainian language. The key feature was to place emphasis on 
the Polish and Soviet authorities’ opinion of the Solidarity movement, but not to 
provide real information about the actual events.18
According to the Soviet press, the Soviet people fully supported the necessity 
of martial law and understood that imperialistic attacks on socialist Poland were 
one of the main reasons for the Polish crisis. For example, President Ronald Rea-
gan’s proposal to devote January 30, 1982, as “The Day of Solidarity with the Polish 
people” was widely discussed in the Soviet press, at protest meetings, and in the 
declarations of different working collectives, but was regarded as an imperialistic, 
anti-soviet, anti-Polish, and anti-socialistic action.19
Unofficial Attitudes
In Soviet Ukraine, as well as in other Soviet republics, an unofficial view of Soli-
darity existed at that time. It was an approach opposite from the official stance, and 
one which was widely spread among the representatives of the dissident movement. 
For this group of Soviet people, the Polish experience was an example of the effective 
struggle for freedom against communist power. The Solidarity movement was a good 
illustration for Soviet dissidents because it inspired the traditional opposition move-
ment to move away from its cultural and literary methods toward a more popular and 
active trend – creating independent trade-unions (although, the first attempt in the 
USSR was even earlier than in Poland, in 1978). Some new radical opposition groups 
in the Soviet Union (mostly Russian) interpreted the Polish experience as proof of the 
possibility of mass revolution that could overthrow the communist regime.20
It is difficult to draw a complete picture of unofficial attitudes towards Solidar-
ity and the events in Poland during the 1980s because at the time it was illegal to 
express dissenting views. Also, many materials from the period were later eliminated 
by the KGB. The facts which can help us reconstruct the opposition’s approach to 
the events of the 1980s in Poland are available due to the remaining records of dis-
sidents’ activities such as their samizdat publications, memoirs, letters, notes and 
diaries. In fact, the Polish events of the early 1980s were one of the vital topics in 
18 N. Denysyuk. “Podiyi v Pol’shchi na storinkakh ukrayins’koi presy 80-kh rr. XX st.,” Visnyk L’vivs’koho univer-
sytetu. Seriya zhurnalistyka. Vypusk 26, 2005 http://www.franko.lviv.ua/faculty/jur/publications/visnyk26/St-
atti_Denysjuk.htm (accessed March 10, 2010).
19 “Dnevnoe osuzhdenie. Zayavlenie rabochikh i sluzhashchikh Moskovskogo ordena trudovogo krasnogo zna-
meni zavoda avtomaticheskikh linii imeni 50-letiya SSSR, uchastnikov mitinga protesta protiv antisovetskoi 
i antipol’skoi kampanii, razvyazannoi administratseiei SShA,” Trud, January 28, 1982, 5; “Sovetskie lyudi osuzhd-
ayut nagluyu provokatsiyu Vashingtona,” Trud, January 29, 1982, p. 1.
20 A Vorob’ev and A. Shubin, “Pol’sha–Rossiya: oppozitsiya–dissidentstvo: Formirovanie demokraticheskoi oppos-
itsii v Pol’she i eye vliyanie na SSSR,” Novaya Pol’sha 3, 2010 http://www.novpol.ru/index.php?id=1288 (accessed 
May 25, 2010).
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several well-known Samizdat collections.21 We can observe numerous instances of 
the above in remaining Samizdat issues of Herald of Repressions in Ukraine, Contem-
porary, Chronicle of Current Events, Continent, and Memory, among others.
Ukrainian opposition existed within the movement of the Shestydesyat-
nyky (the Sixties activists), Ukrainian Samizdat, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group 
(UHG), and others. From a political point of view, UHG was the most active. 
Nevertheless, in 1981, this group was completely paralyzed by arrests. Almost all 
its members (39 of 41) were imprisoned. Among the charges brought before the 
representatives of the Ukrainian opposition in a preliminary investigation during 
1980-1981, were many that were connected to their activity during the Polish 
events. It was charged that they had “glorified the Polish Solidarity,” “supported 
Solidarity,” and “defended Solidarity.” Furthermore, those charged had tried to 
“organize an independent trade-union,” “kept anti-Soviet literature about the Pol-
ish trade-union with slanderous content,” and “kept/reproduced/spread/copied 
‘The Message from the delegates of the First Congress “Solidarity” to the workers 
of Eastern Europe.’” 
Soviet Russian and Ukrainian samizdat collections described many situations 
concerning arrested dissidents who had been accused of sympathy towards the Pol-
ish opposition movement. For example, one of the leaders of the national liberation 
movement of the 1960s–90s, Mykhailo Horyn’, was arrested on December 3, 1981. 
On June 25, 1982, he was sentenced by the Lviv Regional Court under Article 62 
§ 2 and Article 179 (“refusal to give an evidence”) of the Criminal Code of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to ten years of special regime camps and five 
years exile. He was declared a “particularly dangerous repeat offender.” One of the 
points in the accusation made against him was the following: “he approvingly spoke 
of and justified the hostile activity of Solidarity in Poland, naming these events as 
a powerful motion and a large force.”22 In January 1981, a few dissidents in Kiev 
were arrested for spreading opposition leaflets, among them was Larysa Lohvytska, 
who in June 1981 was given a sentence of three years in the general camps for “the 
support of Solidarity” and other actions.23 Joseph Zisels was sentenced to three 
years of strict regime camps for his “slanderous remarks” and for “praising the Pol-
ish Solidarity.”24 As dissidents recollected later, the KGB was monitoring the links 
21 Vypusk 65, Khronika tekushchikh sobytii, 2010, http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/index.htm (accessed 
March 10, 2010).
22 M. Horyn’, Zapalyty svichku (Vyrok im’yam Ukrayins’koyi Radyans’koyi Sotsialistychnoyi Respubliky 25 chervnya 
1982 r. po spravi No. 2-03 (Kharkiv: Vydavnytstvo Prava lyudyny, 2009), p. 287-307.
23 Visnyk represiy v Ukrayini Vypusk 7, Lypen’ 1981, N’yu-York, Prava lyudyny: onlayn biblioteka Kharkivs’koyi 
pravozakhysnoyi hrupy, 2010, http://library.khpg.org/files/docs/Visnuk1981_07.pdf (accessed May 10, 2010).
24 Visnyk represiy v Ukrayini Vypusk 4, Kviten’ 1985, N’yu-York, Prava lyudyny: onlayn biblioteka Kharkivs’koyi 
pravozakhysnoyi hrupy, 2009, http://library.khpg.org/files/docs/Visnuk1985_04.pdf (accessed May 10, 2010).
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between the Ukrainian opposition, Solidarity and other opposition movements.25 
For Ukrainian rebels, it was more difficult than for Russian dissidents to contact 
other opposition groups and to send their texts, open letters, messages, and notes 
for publishing abroad because there were hardly any foreign offices of Western mass 
media in Ukraine. However, there were a number of supporting publications for the 
Polish opposition movement and Solidarity leaders (For example: Joseph Terelya’s 
“To Lech Wałęsa. A letter from a believer,” April 1984; and Sergyi Kindzeryavyy-
Pastuhiv’s “Polish miracle,” March 1981). 
The point of view on the events in Poland, or any hint of it, opposite to the of-
ficial one was a reason for controlling the scientific, literary, and cultural spheres of 
life of Ukrainians, as well as all Soviet people from the other republics of the USSR. 
For example, the book of the Ukrainian linguist Ivan Denisyuk, The Development of 
Small Ukrainian Literature in XIX – early XX centuries (1981) was criticized for his 
“promotion of the Polish Solidarity” because he quoted a Polish author who died in 
1912.26 The work was also cut down in some chapters. Only in 1999 was a complete 
edition of this book permitted. These are only a few examples of how the Soviet 
machine of repression used the Solidarity movement and events in Poland as an ad-
ditional reason for its persecution of the opposition.
We can find a few peculiarities among different groups of dissidents in the USSR. 
For example, for the dissidents from Russia, Poland of the 1980s was an example of the 
struggle for human rights against totalitarian power, though for the dissidents from the 
national republics (like Ukraine or the Baltic states) it was not only the model of the 
fight for freedom and democracy but for national liberation as well. A famous Ukrai-
nian dissident, Vasyl Stus, wrote in his “Camp notes” (1982) that there was no other 
nation in the totalitarian world as the Polish people who were so faithfully defending 
their human and national rights. As he said, “Poland gives an example for Ukraine. 
It’s a pity that Ukraine is not ready to take lessons from the Polish teacher.”27 Stus was 
trying to evaluate the Polish Solidarity movement by comparing it with the Ukrainian 
opposition groups. In his opinion, the main strength of the Polish trade-union was 
the fact that it was based on the interests of all groups of the Polish population. As 
he said, the“Helsinki movement [an opposition group in Ukraine] is a Higher Math 
for this country, probably as well as the national-liberation movement. Though the 
movement for the accommodation and piece of bread, movement for the good wages 
is understandable and clear for everybody.”28
25 “Yaroslav Kendz’or: Oprylyudnenyya spysku ahentiv KDB vyklyche u suspil’stvi shok…,” Vysokiy zamok, 2010, 
http://www.wz.lviv.ua/pages.php?ac=arch&atid=68088 (accessed May 20, 2010).
26 "Scribeo, ergo sum." Interv’yu z Ivanom Denysyukom, Yaroslov, 2010, http://www.lnu.edu.ua/faculty/Philol/
jaroslov/2/intervju.html (accessed March 10, 2010).
27 V. Stus, “Z taborovoho zoshyta. Zapys 12, 1982,” Madslinger's, 2010, http://www.madslinger.com/stus/z-tabo-
rovoho-zoshyta (accessed March 11, 2010).
28 Ibid.
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Current Approaches to the Polish Solidarity Movement  
in Ukraine
After the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, attitudes towards the 
events of the communist epoch have changed. Now we have a lot of information 
about the world’s solidarity with Solidarity. The Polish trade union had great sup-
port all over Europe and the world. It was not only of interest to foreign journalists, 
trade unions, and European communist parties but it also garnered a great number 
of forms of support from many others, including strikes of solidarity with Polish 
workers in many countries around the world as well as technical assistance (in pub-
lishing and information activity).
Now we have an opportunity not only to learn more about the democratic 
movements and their role in the fall of communism. For those behind what was 
once the Iron Curtain, we have a chance to reread and rewrite our own history. By 
studying Ukrainian history from the Soviet period, we can compare it with the his-
tory of other countries that were inside the socialist system. Today, some of the most 
popular issues examined and analyzed are the opposition movements and organiza-
tions. For example, the Ukrainian dissident Bogdan Goryn has compared events in 
Poland from the 1980s with the Ukrainian situation at the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. He sees that the main difference as one located in the “state 
status” of Ukraine and Poland. While Poland was formally an independent state 
with its own national military force, Ukraine was in a different situation. It was a de 
facto semi-colony, a country under occupation.29 In Goryn’s opinion, this difference 
has played a negative role for the further democratic development of Ukraine. 
Finally, to generalize about former dissidents’ opinions about the events in Po-
land and Solidarity, we find mostly positive reactions. Many of the reactions run 
along the following lines: “it was a magic influence of the Solidarity,” “it gave us 
a Hope,” and “I had a belief that Solidarity would weaken the main links that con-
nected the countries of the socialist camp.” When the Solidarity movement was 
founded, no one believed that communism would fall in Eastern Europe. In other 
words, no one believed that the Soviet Union and the government of Poland would 
give up in front of the people’s peaceful movement that was against the violence. 
Given that, the Solidarity movement and the events in Poland during the 1980s will 
be a subject of deep scientific research for many years to come. Nowadays, we have 
access to different points of view, positions, and information from multiple sides 
and it is possible to consider Solidarity as one of the steps towards bringing an end 
to communism in Eastern Europe.
29 B. Goryn, “Ya evolyutsioner i nichoho z revolyutsioneramy ne mayu,” Vil’na Yevropa, 2010, http://vilnaevropa.
org/?p=74 (accessed March 10, 2010).
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Kostadin Grozev
Bulgarian Perspectives  
of  the Solidarity Movement
The Historical Background in the 1980-1981 Context:  
The Image of  Poland in Zhivkov’s Bulgaria
Bulgaria and Poland are two East European countries, populated with a Slavs’ 
majority which enjoy a historical tradition that is both similar and different in 
a number of aspects. Among the reasons that made Bulgarians and Poles quite close 
and sharing a common destiny we can enumerate the common ethnic background 
originating from the big thrust into Central and Eastern Europe of the Slavic tribes 
in the Early Middle Ages, the proto-Slavic language from which all Slavic languages 
of today derived, the common Christian roots which created a common bond cen-
turies later with the onslaught of the Islam of the invading Ottoman Empire that 
reached Vienna, and the turbulent European geopolitics of the last 150-200 years 
that influenced all nations in the region and infected them with the bacillus of na-
tionalist hatred. At the same time several factors and turnpikes of history gives us 
significant clues why those social, cultural and political ties have not been as rich 
as their potential suggested: both nations are Christian ones but one is Orthodox, 
the other is Catholic; they are Slavs but the Poles nowadays outnumber the Bulgar-
ians by a huge margin over a much larger territory although both nations suffered 
foreign domination, national losses and historical injustices; they were overtaken 
by foreign invaders but Poles experienced humiliation by Christians (Russians and 
Germans among others) while Bulgarians suffered an yoke by Muslims for much 
larger period of nearly five centuries. Moreover, in the twentieth century Poles and 
Bulgarians experienced the devastation of two world wars in quite different fash-
ions: the Poles gained their independence as a reborn, new state at the end of the 
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First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution that ended the Russian Empire’s and 
two decades later suffered much from the Nazi and Soviet aggression that actually 
started the Second World War, while Bulgarians ended both world wars in the camp 
of the losers (taking twice the side of Germany) fighting for national goals and suf-
fering the retributions of the victorious allies.
Nevertheless, in 1945 Bulgarians and Poles were destined to a similar fate in join-
ing the newly emerging empire of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe in the years of 
the global confrontation of the Cold War. That was the fulfilment of Stalin’s dream 
of guaranteeing the security of the first socialist state by expanding into Central and 
Eastern Europe and creating a shield of friendly states around Soviet Russia that 
reminded many experts of the ideas of Catherine the Great. Being in the same boat, 
Bulgaria and Poland went through all those quite familiar stages – the establish-
ment of one party rule, reforms targeted at a centralized planned economy, repres-
sions of political opponents, etc. Regardless of that, however, the image abroad in 
the Western world of Bulgarians and Poles was quite different. Until the late 1980’s 
Sofia was considered to be the closest to Moscow of all East European capitals with 
no major anti-Socialist popular movements there while Poland gained the prestige 
of being the naughty child in the Socialist camp (especially with the upheavals and 
strikes of 1956 and 1970). No matter how close or how distant domestic public 
opinion was to Moscow, both Sofia and Warsaw participated with troops in the 
crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 and thus proved the major logic of the Cold 
War that satellite states were able to have freedom of action and opinion only as 
much as it coincided with the perspective of its patron superpower. 
Any analysis of the Bulgarian perspectives to the Solidarity crisis of the late 
1970s should keep in mind the historical trends in the preceding decade1. The aim 
of this chapter is not to give a detailed picture of Bulgarian-Polish relations in the 
1970s and the early1980s. Rather, considering the students’ audience, it is to put the 
Solidarity crisis of 1980-1981 in the broader context of the Cold War by providing 
insights into the image ordinary Bulgarians had of Poles and their social environ-
ment and the line which the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) adopted in the 
public portrayal of the Polish events targeted at the domestic Bulgarian public. As 
we will see further on there was an attempt to keep the Bulgarians as much as pos-
sible away from the Poles at a time when the frequent lamenting cliché of any West-
ern journalist writing occasionally on Bulgaria was the one describing Sofia as “the 
closest ally of Moscow.” There was a lot of truth in that cliché: in the early 1960s 
the BCP had even discussed a proposal of Bulgaria joining the Soviet Union as its 
sixteenth republic. 
1 A very good analysis both in Polish and English of Bulgaria and the Polish crisis is the article of Iskra Baeva “The 
Role of the Solidarity in the demise of socialism in Bulgaria (1980-1989).” In Międzynarodowa konferencja Solidar-
ność i upadek komunizmu, Warszawa-Gdańsk, 3-4 czerwca 2009 (Warsaw: IPN, 2009), p. 20-28.
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The emergence of detente in European diplomacy and the aftermath of the Hel-
sinki Accords of 1975 created a new diplomatic and socio-political environment 
that further pushed the party apparatus in Sofia to dissociate itself from Warsaw 
– those became the years of intellectual and political dissent in Eastern Europe that 
frightened the aging political elite in the Communist countries.2 Due to the domes-
tic stability of the Bulgarian regime, the arms trade with the third world countries 
and the re-export of cheap Soviet oil and gas for hard currency at the world markets 
at a time of rising energy prices Bulgaria was relatively much better economically in 
the 1970s than Poland, enjoying in the late 1970s the highest living standard of its 
population in the whole Communist period. Thus the regime cultivated a particu-
lar image of Poland that would influence greatly the manner in which the birth of 
Solidarity – the independent trade-union of the Polish workers would be perceived 
by both the ordinary Bulgarians and the higher echelon of the party hierarchy. That 
image would help us discuss and explain better how did East European societies in 
general and the Bulgarian one in particular react to the Polish crisis (1980-1981) 
and the emerging economic and political difficulties of the 1980s that paved down 
the road to the crushing Berlin Wall. 
It might be stated with a great doze of confidence that in the late-1970s Poland 
was in the periphery of Bulgarian public mind. The explanation for that fact can be 
found in the much smaller traditions of cultural and political interactions between 
the two nations in comparison with ties with other “brother countries,” in the lack 
of significant Bulgarian communities living on Polish soil unlike in areas of Hun-
gary, Slovakia, Moldova, the fewer number of Bulgarian students and tourist going 
to study or visit Poland, etc. At the same time available statistics at the Ministry 
of Interior files show that there was a significant increase in the number of Polish 
tourists visiting Bulgaria – in the late-1970s they become the largest group after the 
Soviet tourists. Some of those Poles at the Black Sea coast came there not only to 
relax in the sunshine but also to make some money through some ‘gray economy’ 
means – selling NIVEA-licensed hand-cream and lotions and the Być może (May 
be) perfume which were much coveted by Bulgarian girls. On the more official side 
there was some increase in the number of academic exchanges between Sofia and 
Warsaw with Polish academics visiting Sofia leaving the impression of being much 
more open and critical towards the existing social environment than their Bulgar-
ian counterparts. Polish cinema in the 1970s was popular with the vast histori-
cal panoramas of Polish knights and glory and with many WW2 movies (among 
them captain Hans Kloss played by Stanisław Mikulski captured the imagination of 
young boys-teenagers with his James Bond style of espionage of the Nazis in Stawka 
2 An overview of the Bulgarian approach to the Helsinki process and the domestic implications of that can be 
found in Grozev, Kostadin and Jordan Baev “Bulgaria, Balkan Diplomacy and the Road to Helsinki.” In Helsinki 
1975 and the Transformation of Europe, Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds. (New York, Oxford: Berghan 
Books), p. 160-172 .
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większa niż życie) but even they were considered a bit more open-minded than the 
clichés of Soviet and Bulgarian cinema. Polish artistic photography had a tiny circle 
of devoted followers that longed for being that much popular and free in the artistic 
expression. Those existing images of Poland in Bulgaria (especially among the party 
leadership) created a strong impression that things in Poland were going in a dan-
gerous direction, that the Communist party there was weaker and that the existing 
political and ideological environment gave artists, intellectuals and the public at 
large a greater freedom of expression and relaxation of strict ideological control.
 
The Birth of  Solidarity and the Polish Crisis (1980–1981) 
Viewed from Sofia: Channels of  Information  
and Models of  Perception
The attempt to trace down the Bulgarian reaction to the birth of Solidarity and 
the evolving Polish crisis (1980-1981) naturally led us to outlining the various chan-
nels through which Bulgarians were informed about the unfolding events in Po-
land. Those channels were many and their information scope and reliability varied. 
They can be broadly systematized into two broader categories: official and unof-
ficial ones. Both channels gave plenty of opportunities to get information about 
the current events while at the same time were extensively used to form a distorted 
and ideologically shaped opinion, quite frequently at the expense of misinterpreted 
facts, half-truths and openly disguised falsification and lies. 
Further on both channels had different level of accessibility for the various au-
diences depending on the media they were disseminated. For example, the official 
channel had one level which was targeted at the top party leadership and was quite 
detailed, informative and based on wide variety of sources thus it was very objective 
although being at the same time quite ideologically coloured and often a product of 
wishful thinking. Contrary, the official information targeted at the general public 
was much more condensed, frequently just avoiding information on what was going 
on in Poland (especially in the early months of the late 1979 and early 1980) and 
being too propagandistic in its tone. 
Even more nuanced and dubious in their informative value was the information 
(frequently resembling gossips and rumours) circulating through the various unof-
ficial channels. For ordinary Bulgarians and even to some party leaders quite trust-
worthy was the content about Poland in the Bulgarian language broadcasts of the 
BBC, of Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle and the Voice of America. An evidence 
of that is the analysis of the listening audience made by the Bulgarian State Security 
units which definitely acknowledged the big increase in listening after 1980. More-
over, due to the good language competencies of the population, especially of young-
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er people many Bulgarian were listening to the original language broadcasts which 
were much more extensive in their content thus giving opportunities for making 
a well-considered opinion, Further unofficial channels were the TV-broadcasts of 
Yugoslavia television which were watched in Bulgaria and which gave a viewpoint 
that was different from the one in Sofia, as well as the stories and viewpoints given 
by Polish tourists visiting the Black Sea in summer.
The party leadership in Sofia had a much wider access to information coming 
from a wide spectrum of official and other special sources. The most trustworthy 
information was considered the one contained in the regular reports of the Foreign 
Policy Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) which usually was a filtered mirror of concrete information com-
ing through KGB channels. A parallel channel was the one from the Communist 
party leaders in Warsaw submitting irregularly some reviews of the current situa-
tion. On September 15, 1980 the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov met in Sofia with 
the Polish Vice Prime Minister Kazimierz Barcikowski who led the cabinet’s delega-
tion in the Gdansk negotiation and the account of that meeting cited by I. Baeva 
showed the attempt of the Polish side to belittle the ongoing trends and the efforts 
of Zhivkov to propose a tactical retreat in order the Polish communists to prepare 
for a better offensive in the near future.3 At the same time Zhivkov was confident 
that such a similar process was impossible to happen in Bulgaria: “All East European 
countries should make conclusions on their own situation… You should be aware 
that for the first time a socialist country such a retreat is taking place, and that is on 
the whole front, It is true that enormous power has been thrown upon you and your 
party should prepare and start a new offensive.”4
Additional information was provided in the next months of the crisis by PUWP 
leaders visiting Sofia, although the Bulgarian side was careful not to embarrass the 
high-ranking party guests too much with awkward questions or commentaries and 
preferred to wait for answers without asking the questions. The Bulgarian Embassy 
in the Polish capital was also a transmission of background reports and day-to-day 
information on current developments (often cross-checked with reports from Bul-
garian, Soviet and other intelligence sources) throughout 1980-1981. 
The content of the incoming information varied a lot, especially in the early 
phase. Until the fall 1980, a lot of attention was paid to the ideological evaluations 
of the positions, statements and actions of Polish Communist leaders, particularly at 
bilateral and multilateral meetings and joint Communist party’s forums. For exam-
ple, during the December 1980 meeting of military leaders in Bucharest, the Polish 
high-brass told the Bulgarian Defence Minister Dobri Dzhurov that Solidarity was 
3 Iskra Baeva, op.cit., p. 23-24.
4 Central State Archive, Fond 1 B, Record 60, File 272, p. 3.
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getting stronger while the party was inactive.5 In the BCP party report on the War-
saw Pact meeting in Moscow that followed shortly afterwards there was an extensive 
special transcript with comments on the statement on the Polish situation made 
by Stanisław Kania. Significant information was sought also through trade-union 
channels at a January 1981 trade-union meeting in Prague the polish representative 
delivered information on the strength of Solidarity which was widely reported and 
commented among Bulgarian party circles. Even writers meetings were not ignored: 
at Union of Bulgarian writers meeting in Sofia in November 1981 the Polish writer 
Jerzy Boleslawski was given the opportunity to deliver an extensive account of the 
situation presenting differences of opinion and possible action alternatives.
In order to get a sense of the prevailing opinions and suggested actions in Sofia 
we can use as examples two bulletins that were used for confidential, internal BCP 
channels information. The first one was from mid-October 1980 the second origi-
nated June 17th 1981. Two quite distinct phases in the official Sofia’s attitude to-
wards the Polish can be outlined. The original one in mid-1980 can be characterized 
as turned backwards to the past, criticizing the pre-August 1980 Polish leadership 
for not abolishing private property and collectivizing farms, for being dominated by 
capitalist ideology and for allowing the Catholic church a free hand in society and 
spreading its ideological influence. During internal party discussions of that report 
there were strong criticisms of the lack of information on the events provided in ad-
vance to Polish communists in order to prepare them for the opposition surge, criti-
cism of the Polish security services and the lack of proper actions by their apparatus, 
even strong voices and appeals for radical actions of the type of the 1968 Warsaw 
pact intervention against the Prague spring. On this background several parallels 
were made to the Bulgarian situation – pointing out that the preservation of private 
property in agriculture in Poland has been in the heart of the evil, encompassing 
Polish society in the late 1970s.6 
Half a year later in the second document a very hard and harsh language was 
used which was aimed at the party leadership in Warsaw for its inactivity and lack 
of initiative letting thus Solidarity enlarging its activities and getting wider ground 
in Polish society. Those two examples are very indicative of the level of impact of 
the Polish events on Bulgarian society and the ups and downs of their interpreta-
tions. As might have been expected the dynamics in the attitude of Bulgarian party 
leadership closely followed the CPSU’s one and personally that of Leonid Brezh-
nev. The Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov once again as in 1968 was eager for an 
intervention like the one in Czechoslovakia. The greatest criticism was targeted at 
5 See Document 90 in Cardboard Castle. Voitech mastny and Macolm Byrn, eds. An Inside History of the Warsaw 
Pact 1955-1991 (Budapest, New York: CEU Press 2005), p. 443-444.
6 Those were opinions targeted more at the Bulgarian public and party cadre than the Polish comrades. Later they wo-
uld appear in a special brochure “On the Situation in Poland” but it came first as personal opinions of Todor Zhivkov 
in a party plenum in mid-October 1980. See: Central State Archive, Fond 1 B, Record 66, File 2617, p. 118.
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the old leadership of Edward Gierek rather than on Gomułka for preserving private 
property, as well as harsh attacks on the current leadership of Stanisław Kania for 
‘not fighting the counter-revolution’ and letting the dissidents and church expand 
their activities.
An interesting dynamics was also seen through a content analysis of the Bulgar-
ian press and propaganda. Being a transmission of the official party line through 
numerous propaganda channels the main party newspaper Rabotnichesko delo had 
a clear editorial line on the Polish crisis. In the period August 1980–mid 1982 the 
newspaper hardly missed an issue in which to publish a material on Poland. The 
usual number of articles on a daily basis was 2-3 per issue and being the only Bulgar-
ian newspaper with a correspondent in Warsaw its articles were reprinted also in 
other dailies. Alongside at least one article by its correspondent, editorials or com-
mentaries were reprinted from the Soviet Pravda and the Polish Trybuna Ludu. 
Those were quite one-sided biased interpretations in which most attacks were tar-
geted at Solidarity and its intellectual circle, but very rarely (up to August 1981) to 
Lech Wałęsa. The escalations in the workers’ demands and the political role which 
Solidarity was playing stringer and stronger in the summer of 1981 were often cited 
and commented as the main reason for the growing crisis. In many articles some 
parallels were looked for with the Bulgarian situation with one of the suggestions 
calling for a greater role of the branch trade-unions and the need for increasing the 
so-called ‘workers’ democracy in Bulgaria.
Quite in contrast to this official, general public propaganda line was the tone 
and content in the intensive exchange of intelligence information between Sofia and 
Moscow and the “brother services” in general. The tone was one of genuine interest 
in the ideological ferment going on in Warsaw – mainly to avoid similar things hap-
pening in Bulgaria, although the idea was that the situations in the two countries 
were very different (due partially by the weakness of the Polish communists and the 
strength of their Bulgarian comrades). For example, there was a Bulgarian secret 
collaborator (a.k.a. Attila) who informed on a regular basis Sofia about the differ-
ences of opinion on Polish society and especially within Solidarity, reporting on the 
different layers of opposition and collective action within Solidarity etc. In other 
reports there were estimates on the popularity of Solidarity, on the organizational 
structure and types of actions taken as well as some hints that using the example of 
Solidarity similar type of dissidents might appear in Bulgaria as well. 
The intelligence officers in Sofia often gave the task of collecting information 
on public attitudes in Poland especially ones in regard to the strong-hand type of 
action. For instance, a Bulgarian intelligence officer who made a personal visit to 
Poland in January 1981 gave a lengthy 13-page report of his impressions, citing the 
economic difficulties, the organizational strength and transformation of Solidarity, 
the role of the church, certain changes in public perceptions and the radicalization 
of the political demands. He mentioned a meeting he had with Stanisław Kania 
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and some parallels made with Bulgaria by Polish officials. A Bulgarian agent a.k.a. 
Edy based in Prague informed in spring 1981 about the tactics of Lech Wałęsa and 
the desire to turn back to the economic base in the demands of Solidarity. Another 
moment in the analysis was the international implications of the Polish crisis7. An 
interesting element of the report was the local sources of the agent: two Catholic 
Church deans who had been known to the Bulgarian secret services and were used 
in a similar fashion in the past as well.
Throughout 1981 the party leadership in Sofia was quite nervous and urging for 
a strong mode of actions by the Polish comrades (as seen in the closing sentences of 
the document in Appendix A). Thus the appointment of gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski 
first as a Prime minister, and then his election as the chairman of the Polish United 
Workers Party on October 18, 1981 was met with enthusiasm in BCP circles in 
Sofia and soon the Bulgarian newspapers were full of stories accusing the Polish op-
position of extremism. As Zhivkov put it on November 5.
 The establishment of the military government in December 1981 was depicted 
in Bulgarian media as a full return to normal life in Poland. In the following year-
year and a half (1982-1983) that was the public message and the number of materi-
als on Poland diminished sharply. All criticism of the Polish Communist Party to-
tally disappeared from Bulgarian newspapers and the main information on the situ-
ation came through reprints of Trybuna Ludu editorials. At the same time the BCP 
leadership was very keen in following what the ordinary Bulgarians thought on the 
events in Poland and the secret service bulletins are full of reports on opinions and 
remarks made in that direction by Bulgarians in their private conversations. 
Conclusion
 
The establishment of military government in Poland in December 1981 and the 
ban on Solidarity marked the end of a certain phase in the development of Poland 
and the Communist system in Eastern Europe. For a short period it appeared that 
the struggle for freedom and independence was a lost cause and that the totalitarian 
system is invincible. The authorities in Sofia were pleased with the turn of events 
fulfilling the dream of Zhivkov from November 1980: “To put it briefly, we should 
be at the same time vigilant and sober, calm and resolute, so that to be precise in 
our estimates and to choose the most appropriate means for the achievements of 
our aims.”8 Soon however the structural economic, political, social and generational 
crisis would spread beyond the borders of Poland and would encompass the whole 
7 Information from a MoI Operative Group in Prague re: The Situation in Poland, April 14, 1981 - Archive of the 
Ministry of the Interior, Fond 1, Record 10a, File 748.
8 Cited in Iskra Baeva, op. cit., p. 25.
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of Eastern Europe in the course of the next decade. That would came to surface with 
the change of the first party-leaders faces in the Kremlin and the eventual perestroi-
ka of Gorbachev but the start of the whole transformation was given in Gdansk in 
August 1980. 
Our presentation and the documents published in the appendix give just one 
East European perspective to those complex events unfolding in Poland – that of 
Bulgarian society and the party leadership in Sofia. It showed the importance of the 
official channels of communication between the state and party leaders, of military 
and intelligence officials, but at the same time it proved one very important feature 
– that Solidarity was born out of the thrust for freedom and wellbeing of ordinary 
people and because of that it could not be crushed with force despite all the hopes 
to the contrary of aged and dogmatic leaders such as Zhivkov, Brezhnev and all their 
“comrades in arms.” Because of that Bulgarians were much interested in event in Po-
land and would establish its own “PODKREPA” independent trade-union in 1989 
as the backbone and radical branch of its anti-Communist opposition. 
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Rob Verhofstad
The Polish Crisis of  1981 as seen from the 
Netherlands
By imposing martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski shocked 
people in the Netherlands. It immediately dispelled hopes for more liberalization in 
Poland since it turned back the clock quite a bit. Reading Dutch government state-
ments, comments of politicians and articles in weeklies it strikes that no one seemed 
to be able to make a balanced judgment of what exactly was going on. Is Jaruzelski 
trying to keep the Soviets out by taking full control in Poland, or is he just using this 
as an excuse to stop all attempts towards détente and a more liberal society? Should 
Solidarity be fully supported by the West, or are they fighting a wrong battle by 
provoking the Soviet Union rather than seeking accommodation.
Despite the huge historical relevance of the developments in Poland in Decem-
ber 1981, it never dominated the Dutch news or Political agenda. However, the 
most important issue in the Netherlands at that time was in a way related to the 
Polish situation: the deployment of 48 nuclear weapons in the Netherlands as part 
of the NATO Double-Track decision of 1979. This issue dominated Dutch politics 
for many years. 
The Dutch Political System
In order to be able to understand the Dutch reaction to Polish situation one 
need to understand at least the most crucial characteristics of the Dutch politics. 
The Dutch political system is characterized by a multiparty system. Multiple parties 
represent the Dutch population in the two chambers of parliament. For example in 
1977 no fewer than eleven political parties were represented in the second chamber 
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of parliament which was not exceptional but rather average.1 In the Netherlands, 
a government is never formed by only one party, but by a coalition of parties prefer-
ably leaning on the majority of votes of the second chamber of parliament. 
Traditionally, foreign policy never really played an import role in Dutch politics. 
In most cases it is the political elite making decisions loose from active involvement 
of parliament, media or people in the streets. Until the 1960s foreign policy was 
completely run by meritocracy, a small elite of no more than 800 persons. Foreign 
policy was seen as a technical policy area that should be dealt with apart from do-
mestic political games by professional diplomats rather than politicians.2 During 
the 1970s, as part of a general political polarization, foreign policy increasingly be-
came a hot political issue. 
Dutch foreign policy since the Second World War 
The Netherlands had radically parted with their policy of neutrality after the 
Second World War. The Netherlands was a leading force behind European (eco-
nomic) integration, as well as a staunch partner of NATO. Throughout all Cold 
War years it was clear that the Netherlands perseveringly belonged to the western 
camp, with the United States as its hegemonic leader. Nevertheless, this did not 
mean that the Netherlands uncritically followed the United States in all cases. Es-
pecially in the period right after World War II until the beginning of the 50s there 
had been many serious disputes about the decolonization of Indonesia and New 
Guinea, and about the position the Dutch took in the Suez crisis.
However, these disputes were always overshadowed by a more serious hazard: 
the threat of a Red Army invasion. For the Dutch it was very clear that without the 
support of the United States, Europe would be defenseless against the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the Atlantic Alliance was indispensable. Additional to this, the good re-
lationship with the United States was also supportive for the power balance in Eu-
rope. Logically, a small nation like the Netherlands was afraid of domination by 
the great European powers. In respect of this, a powerful friend overseas was most 
instrumental. Lastly, the Dutch never forgot their gratitude towards the Americans 
for playing a pivotal role in liberating their country in World War II and for their 
Marshall Help. 
Throughout the years the fear of a Communist conquest increased and along 
with it the fundamental choice for the Western camp. However, the consensus 
about the Dutch foreign policy decreased over the years. Especially from the 1970s 
onwards the Dutch foreign policy became a domestic political issue. Discussion 
1  Andeweg, R.B. en G.A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009).
2  Hellema, D. Buitenlande politiek van Nederland  (Aula, Utrecht 1995), p. 301.
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about the Atlantic alliance mounted, and the discord split the public and it even 
split political parties. 
Nevertheless, even during the peak of protests in 1983 against the placement of 
missiles the public support to the Atlantic alliance was never fundamentally ques-
tioned by the majority of (the) population, not even by the sizeable minority. 
Shifts in Dutch foreign policy in de 70s 
Starting in the 70s, the public opinion became more and more critical towards the 
United States, especially because of the Vietnam War. The Dutch government officially 
backed the United States in their Vietnam strategy, but never gave in to requests by the 
United States to send Dutch troops to Vietnam. The Dutch popular protest grew; more 
people resented the Vietnam War and especially the role that the United States played 
in it. The protests against Vietnam coincided with the general protests by leftist people 
against the political establishment. A tide of political renewal changed the political land-
scape. New political parties appeared and the protest generation of the sixties made itself 
heard. The second wave of anti-Vietnam demonstrations occurred in 1972 as a reaction 
to the “Christmas Bombardments” as they were called. On that occasion more than 
50,000 people demonstrated against the Nixon Administration.3  This second wave of 
demonstrations coincided with a new generation of Foreign Ministers. Luns had been 
the Foreign Minister from 1956 until 1971. Throughout these years he embodied the 
ambivalence towards the United States. He had had fierce disputes with the United 
States about Indonesia, New Guinea and the Suez Crisis. At the same time however, he 
was always very clear in his position that the Netherlands need the United States as an 
ally. Despite the conflicts he had with the United States, he assured them that ultimately 
the Dutch would support them.4 Luns’ successors at Foreign Affairs Mr. Schmelzer and 
even more Mr. van der Stoel changed the Dutch relationship with the United States. 
These Ministers were not very hesitant in voicing the Dutch Parliament’s widespread 
disapproval about the United States’ foreign policy. 
Cabinet Den Uyl (1973–1977)
The 1972 Parliamentary elections were characterized by much political turmoil. 
The election outcome reflected the polarized atmosphere. The confessional parties 
(KVP, ARP, CHU) in the centre lost many seats, as the Labour Party (PvdA) and 
3  Some estimates even assume there were up to 100,000 protesters participating in the demonstrations.
4  Dijksman, D. “Nederland en de Nato – De keuze ligt tussen een beperkte, of helemaal geen invloed.” In Haagse 
Post, October 10, 1981.
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VVD grew considerably.5 For the first time ever, the Netherlands was governed by 
coalition dominated by progressive political parties.6
The leading party PvdA was split over the course of foreign policy. The more radi-
cal part within the party labeled itself as ‘New Left’ wanted to part with the pro-At-
lantic position and focused on détente with the Soviet Union, decreasing the defense 
budget, no nuclear weapons in the Netherlands and even considered terminating 
NATO-membership. Prime-minister den Uyl and Minister of Foreign Affairs van der 
Stoel however belonged to the more moderate minded within PvdA and advocated 
a foreign policy in continuance with previous cabinets. Despite the moderate foreign 
policy there were several frictions with NATO. It wasn’t well taken that the Nether-
lands decided to limit the growth of its defense spending. Especially Luns, NATO’s 
Secretary General at that time, but former minister of foreign affairs in the Nether-
lands, voiced clear criticism. Furthermore, Minister van der Stoel repeatedly criticized 
dictatorship in (candidate) NATO-members like Greece and Spain. In line with this 
position, van der Stoel focused on human rights as basis for international relations. As 
a result, the relationship with the Soviet Union and its satellite states became slightly 
more difficult. Frictions were noticeable during van der Stoel’s visit to the Soviet Union 
in 1974. While talking to his colleague Kosygin, van der Stoel focused on the difficult 
situation for dissidents in the Soviet Union.7 Van der Stoel stressed his position once 
more during his visit to Czechoslovakia in 1977. Withdrawing from the protocol he 
met with representatives from the opposition movement Charta’77. Consequently, 
president Husak cancelled his meeting with van der Stoel.8 
Cabinet van Agt I (1977–1981)
In the second half of the 1970s the political climate in the Netherlands changed. After 
a period of progressive politics and fueled by a worsening economical situation, the po-
litical climate swung back to a more conservative approach. Despite the fact that PvdA 
remained the biggest political party after the 1977 elections, they didn’t manage to form 
a cabinet and were excluded from the Cabinet. The Christian Democrats (CDA) formed 
a coalition with the Liberals (VVD; People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy). It was 
the first time that CDA participated in an election. For this, three confessional parties 
KVP, ARP and CHU merged into CDA. The foreign policy of Cabinet van Agt I can be 
5  Hellema, D. Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland (Aula, Utrecht 1995), p. 256.
6  The coalition (1973-1977) was led by the Labour Party (PvdA). Other coalition partners were: Catholic Peoples 
Party (KVP), Anti-Revolutionairy Party (ARP), Political Party of Radicals (PPR) and Democrats 66 (D’66).
7  Hellema, D. Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland (Aula, Utrecht 1995), p. 268.
8  Ibid., p. 269.
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described as conservative pragmatism.9 Minister of Foreign Affairs van der Klaauw (VVD) 
tried to restore the Dutch reputation as solid pro-American partner.10 Shortly after its start 
the van Agt government proclaimed a rise of the defense budget with 3 percent. A major 
issue, which determined Dutch Foreign policy for many years, was the NATO double-
track decision of 1979. In that year NATO agreed to modernize their nuclear weapons in 
Western Europe. In total 572 new medium-range missiles would be deployed in Belgium, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands. For the Netherlands this meant that 48 
cruise missiles would be placed in Airbase Volkel. NATO came to this decision in reaction 
to Moscow’s resolution to deploy SS-20 ballistic missiles aimed at Western Europe. At the 
same time NATO communicated that they would be willing to start new negotiations for 
arms-reduction. In case these negotiations would prove to be successful, NATO would 
decide to withhold the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe.11
The Dutch government didn’t make a clear decision right away, and decided to 
leave it to the following cabinet.
Cabinet van Agt II and Cabinet van Agt III (1981–1982)
The coalition CDA-VVD lost its majority after the parliamentary elections in 
1981. A new coalition was formed of CDA, VVD and D’66. Van Agt remained 
Prime-Minister. Van der Stoel returned as minister of Foreign Affairs. From the 
start it was clear that PvdA and CDA disagreed about the NATO-double decision. 
In order to avoid a clash within the Cabinet, real decisions about deployment of 
nuclear weapons were postponed. Nevertheless, Cabinet van Agt already dissolved 
in less than a year after it started. Cabinet van Agt III only embodied CDA and 
D’66 and could not rely on a majority in parliament.
Dutch reaction to the NATO double-track decision
“Nevertheless, solid, substantial, reliable Holland has become one of the weakest 
links in the Western alliance.”12
The NATO double-track decision led to enormous protests in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch Peace-Movement developed into a powerful player in Dutch politics, 
9  Ibid., p. 291.
10  Klaauw, C.A. van der, Een diplomatenleven (Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 1995), p. 227-230.
11  Diepen, R. van; Hollanditis, Nederland en het kernwapendebat 1977-1987, p. 9.
12  Laqueur, W. ”Hollanditis: A New Stage in European Neutralism.” In Commentary (August 1981) 72:2, p. 19.
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mobilizing people to demonstrate against the NATO-decision in massive numbers. 
In 1981 about 400,000 people demonstrated in Amsterdam. The demonstration in 
The Hague in 1983 drew more than 550,000 people, a magnitude that was never 
seen before or ever since. In 1985, no less than 3.75 million Dutch citizens, which at 
that time was more than 25 percent of the total population, signed a petition against 
the deployment of missiles. The protest had an effect on Dutch foreign policy. Al-
ready in 1979 – even before the massive demonstrations – the Dutch government 
made a restriction, the so-called footnote, to the Double Track decision; only after 
conclusions were drawn from the Soviet-American peace talks the Dutch would 
decide over placing missiles in the Netherlands. In 1981, and again in 1984 this 
decision was postponed, leading to enormous frustrations among NATO-partners. 
Finally in 1985, the Dutch gave the green light for placing 48 cruise missiles the 
Netherlands. 
The slow and intangible decision-making within the Netherlands led to incom-
prehension among the NATO-partners and was also topic for commentators trying 
to understand the Dutch position. Historian Laqueur introduced the term ‘Hol-
landitis’ in his article that was written in 1981.13 Laqueur stated that the Dutch were 
making a mistake of retreating into a policy of neutralism, partly linked to their 
aversion to spending sizeable amounts of money on defense. 
Political opinions about the Polish situation
Besides statements by the Dutch Government and Parliament, we must also look 
at the different political parties and their opinion about the polish situation. Most 
political parties did not have explicit positions in the case of the Polish develop-
ments in 1981. Although the persecution of Solidarity was condemned by everyone 
it did not mean that there was a consensus about active support for Solidarity. Most 
parties were ambivalent. They had to get used to the idea that apparently a continu-
ation of the earlier détente was not going to happen. Some doubted if the new phase 
of polarization was necessary or wise. There was also ambivalence about Jaruzelski. 
What to make of his statements that he needed to acts strong, in order to prevent an 
intervention from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there was also a lot of criti-
cism towards the United States who was blamed for hardening the relations with 
the Soviet Union. The public opinion, even more then the opinion of the political 
establishment was very critical towards Reagan’s politics of confrontation, since it 
seemed to take away chances for a European détente between East and West.14
13  Ibid.
14  Crockat, R. The Fifty Years War, The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (Routled-
gem London 1996), p. 276.
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On December 13, 1982, a year after inducement of the martial law in Poland, 
a political demonstration was organized in Amsterdam by CDA, CPN, D66, PPR, 
PSP, PvdA en VVD, so practically all political parties present at that time. The de-
mands were: immediate release of martial law in Poland, immediate release of all 
political prisoners, right of a free union, and observance of the treaty of Gdansk. 
Three political parties and the Peace Movement took an explicit stance, which 
is described below.
Dutch Communist Party (CPN)
The Dutch Communist Party underwent an important change in the 1970s. 
Until then, under leadership of Paul de Groot, CPN took a hard Communist line, 
supporting the Soviet Union in practically all occasions, condemning dissidents, 
and disapproving of attempts to liberalize Communism. Once ‘Stalinist’ de Groot 
was succeeded by Marcus Bakker, CPN took a more moderate course. Nevertheless 
CPN was still seen as an extreme political party outside the ruling establishment.
In 1979, CPN answered to Kremlin’s invitation to join the meeting on 13 De-
cember 1979 in Tihany in Hungary in order to discuss strategies to contest the 
NATO Double-Track decision.15 They concluded that it was best to seek temporar-
ily alliance with Social Democrats for undermining and even destroying NATO. 
Despite this act of support, their loyalty to the Soviet Union was certainly not un-
limited. In Spring 1981, CPN decided to call back Joop Visberg, their representa-
tive at the Congress of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia.16 Reason for this 
was the speech by Czechoslovakian President Gustav Husak. He stated that the sit-
uation in Poland might provoke an intervention by the Warsaw Pact, similar to the 
interventions in 1968 in Prague and in 1956 in Budapest. CPN strongly opposed to 
this strategy, and favored a political solution in Poland without foreign interference. 
This was a drastic change with the hard-line Communist position CPN used to take 
before. CPN was ambivalent with regard to Solidarity. On the one hand they sup-
ported the union and its aims, but they also felt connected to their colleagues in the 
Polish Communist Party. CPN feared that Solidarity would strangle the democrati-
zation process by wanting too much too fast. Once the polish crisis escalated, CPN 
unambiguously chose sides with Solidarity. They protested in front of the Polish 
embassy with a banner saying: within Socialism people decide, not generals!17
15  Wettig, G. „Origins of the Second Cold War, The last Soviet offensive in the Cold War: emergence and deve-
lopment of the campaign against NATO euro missiles, 1979-1983.” In Cold War History (2009) Vol. 9, No. 1, 
p. 79-100.
16  Koeneman, L. Jaarboek DNPP 1981, Het partijgebeuren (Rijksuniversiteit van Groningen, Groningen  1982).
17  Cornelissen, I. “Nog is Walesa niet verloren.” In Vrij Nederland, December 19, 1981, p. 2.
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Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)
PSP was established in 1957 by people who didn’t want to choose sides between 
either East (Soviet Union) or West (United States). The Labour Party (PvdA) had 
unambiguously chosen for NATO whereas Dutch Communist Party (CPN) chose 
sides with the Soviet Union.18 During the 1960s PSP turned more towards the so-
cialist direction caused by many former members of the CPN who parted with that 
party because of its rather Stalinistic approach.  
At the end of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s, when the relations 
between East and West hardened, PSP refused once more to choose sides. PSP ad-
vocated a so called Third Way, a Europe disengaging from both the United States 
and the Soviet Union, distancing from disrespecting human rights.19
Labour Party (PvdA)
In case of the Polish crisis, PvdA was ambivalent in its position. On the one 
hand they sympathized with Solidarity and its struggle for Polish workers, more 
freedom and democracy. On the other hand they also sympathized with the Pol-
ish government before December 1981 since it was seen as a hopeful example for 
détente in East-Europe. PvdA was afraid that if Solidarity would be too successful, 
the ponderous but hopeful process of liberalization that would be crushed by an 
intervention of either orthodox communist powers within Poland, or an interven-
tion by the Warsaw-Pact.
Although ambivalent PvdA seemed to chose for support for the Polish Commu-
nist Party over support for Solidarity.20 PvdA Member of Parliament Harry van den 
Bergh even summoned Solidarity to temper its position in order not to torpedo the 
process of détente. This led to a sharp protest by Korzec, a PvdA member of Polish 
origin who called van den Bergh’s position halfhearted, conservative and cowardly. 
Korzec’s protest indeed influenced PvdA’s position on Poland, and after the events 
of December 1981, PvdA supported Solidarity somewhat more explicitly financial-
ly as well as politically.21
 
18  Voerman, G. Jaarboek DNPP 1987, Een vat vol tegenstrijdigheden, De houding van de PSP ten opzicht van de 
Sovjet-Unie (Rijksuniversiteit van Groningen, Groningen 1988), p. 101.
19  Leijser, R. “Derde Weg, Christelijk anti-militarisme en pacifistisch-socialisme.” In: Divendal.J. (e.a.) Links en de 
Koude Oorlog, Breuken en bruggen (De Populier 1982, Amsterdam), p. 99-102.
20  Scheffer, P. “Polen.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, December 30, 1981, p. 2.
21  Koper, A. “Waar blijft die bestelauto?” In De Groene Amsterdammer, July 15, 1981, p. 17.
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Peace Movement
The Dutch peace movement had established a very strong position in the Neth-
erlands. The most important organizations were the Interchurch Peace Council 
(IKV) and the Catholic Pax Christi.22 The peace movement voiced a leftish, pro-
gressive opinion about the arms race, protesting against the NATO-double track 
decision.23 The peace movement proved to be able to organize a lot of support for 
their cause. In 1981 about 400.000 people demonstrated in Amsterdam against de-
ployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. The massiveness and perseverance 
had a great influence on the position of the political parties in this discussion.
When Jaruzelski introduced martial law in Poland, IKV-leader, Mient-Jan Faber 
was appalled. He had to admit that he had not really paid much attention to the 
Solidarity movement until that point.24 Before December 1981, the Dutch peace 
movement had been very optimistic about chances for a process of liberalization 
of Poland, especially if NATO would go back on their Double Track decision. Fur-
thermore, there always had been tensions between Solidarity and western Peace 
Movements like IKV because of their different attitude towards the hard line of 
Ronald Reagan. Solidarity was grateful for the hard line against both the Soviet 
Union and Poland, and they considered the European Peace Movement naive, and 
influenced, perhaps even sponsored by Moscow. The same criticism was heard by 
the more conservative parties in the Netherlands.25 
After the events in December 1981, Faber changed his attitude towards Poland 
and other satellite states. According to Faber, the only solution was to disengage 
Western-Europe from The United States, and Eastern Europe from the Soviet 
Union.   
Governmental reaction to political events in Poland
In the late 70s there was some optimism in the Netherlands about liberalization 
in some Soviet Union satellite states. When a general strike started in Gdansk (Po-
land) in 1980, this was seen as a very hopeful development, especially when some of 
the striker’s demands (recognition of Solidarity, release of some political prisoners) 
22  Andeweg, R and G. A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, (Palgrave, London 2009).
23  IKV: Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad.
24  Diepen, R.van; Hollanditis, Nederland en het kernwapendebat 1977-1987 (Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, Amsterdam 
2004), p. 193.
25  Heuvel, M. van den; Uit het leven van een anticommunist, Herinneringen aan Oost-Europa, (Gottmer/Becht, 
Bloemendaal 1997), p. 137-139.
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were met later that year.26 The leader of the Polish government General Jaruzelski 
was considered to be a reasonable leader, at least someone who deserved a chance 
to prove that he was willing to find a modus vivendi with the Solidarity movement. 
However, these quite optimistic thoughts rapidly disappeared when Jaruzelski im-
posed martial law in Poland in the nights of December 12-13, 1981. The Polish 
army took full control, Solidarity was banned again, and political prisoners were 
taken.27 
The President of the United States Reagan immediately reacted with economi-
cal sanctions for both Poland as well as for the Soviet Union.28 But like all Western 
allies, the Dutch did not support these sanctions. According to the Dutch, econom-
ical sanctions would surely end all hope for a renewal of the détente-developments 
of the period just before the martial law. Furthermore, the public opinion turned 
more and more against the United States. Reagan, even more then Brezhnev, was 
blamed for the renewed and hardened confrontation between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. 
Never before foreign policy was as politicized as in the period 1979-1985. The 
dominant issue was the deployment of nuclear weapons as was described above. 
This also means that the political discussion was drawn towards this issue, and other 
events were pushed aside. The events taking place in Poland at the end of the 1970s, 
the growing opposition by Wałęsa’s Solidarity movement, Jaruzelski’s decision to 
impose martial law in Poland, were only scarcely commented by official government 
statements.
Only in a few cases there were clear statements by the Dutch government or the 
parliament about the situation in Poland. The most important ones are described 
here.
Question to the minister of  Foreign Affairs, October 26, 1981
On October 26, 1981, two VVD-Members of Parliament asked Minister of 
Foreign Affairs van der Stoel if the Dutch government is willing to send humanitar-
ian support to Poland, more specifically medical and hygiene products.29 The two 
26  Allin, D. Cold War Illusions, America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969-1989, (St Martin’s Press, New York 1994), 
p. 167-169.
27  Diepen, R. van. Hollanditis, Nederland en het Kernwapendebat, 1977-1987 (Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, Amsterdam 
2004), p. 143-145.
28  Ambrose, S. and D. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy since 1938 (Penguin Books 1997, New 
York).
29  Zitting 1981-1982, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen, p.11, Vragen inzake humanitaire hulpverlening van de rege-
ring aan de bevolking van Polen. (ingezonden op oktober 26, 1981); Two members of the First Chamber of Parlia-
ment (1e Kamer der Staten Generaal); Mevr. Veder-Smit (VVD) and Dhr. Van der Werff (VVD).
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Members of Parliament refer to the radio-interview with Wałęsa on October 25, 
1981 in which Wałęsa asks for foreign aid to prevent outbreaks of epidemics in the 
upcoming winter. Van der Stoel answers that the Dutch government already sends 
aid in accordance with the Polish government. He states that he is not willing to by-
pass the Polish government in offering help directly to non-governmental bodies.
Session parliamentary committee on foreign affairs,  
December 16, 1981
On December 16, 1981, so only days after the martial law was imposed in Po-
land, the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs meets with Minister of For-
eign Affairs van der Stoel.30 Van der Stoel gives an update and answers questions 
from the Members of Parliament present at that meeting. During this meeting, van 
der Stoel emphasizes that the situation is still unclear. It is confirmed that Jaruzelski 
imposed martial law, and that the leadership of Solidarity is detained. However, van 
der Stoel cannot confirm pressure from the Soviet Union. The minister clarifies the 
statement of the European Community-ministers he endorsed during the summit 
in London on December 15, 1981. With this statement the EC-ministers articulate 
their concern about the latest developments in Poland, and express their opinion 
that Poland should solve these problems themselves without using force.31
NATO came with a similar statement, stating that NATO does not want to in-
terfere in domestic issues in Poland. NATO expresses their wish that other nations 
also refrain from interference in order to avoid increasing East-West tensions.32 Van 
der Stoel underlines that the Dutch government completely agrees with both the 
EC-ministers statement as well as the NATO message. During the meeting, van der 
30  Tweede Kamer, zitting 1981-1982, 17100 hoofdstuk V, nr.26; Rijksbegroting voor het jaar 1982, report mee-
ting of December 16, 1981.
31  The full statement was as follows:
The Foreign Ministers of the member States of the European Community are concerned at the development of the 
situation in Poland and the imposition of martial law and the detention of trade unionists. They have profound 
sympathy for the Polish people in this tense and difficult time. They look to all signatory States of the Helsinki Final 
Act to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic. They look to Poland to 
solve these problems herself and without the use of force, so that the process of reform and renewal can continue. 
Foreign Ministers of the Ten are continuing to follow events in Poland with particular attention and agreed to 
remain in close consultation on this question.
With regard to what has happened to the Solidarity leadership, our knowledge is incomplete. We believe that 
a large number of Solidarity leaders have been detained, including the leadership of the Warsaw region. Earlier re-
ports suggested that Mr. Walesa may not have been detained but may have had talks with the authorities in Warsaw. 
We have received no independent confirmation of that, nor have we any further reports. It is not easy to get accurate 
information out of Poland at the moment. (HC Deb December 15, 1981 vol. 15 cc149-52.
32  Baudet, F. “Vastberaden, maar soepel en met mate, Nicolaas Hendrik Biegman.” In Zwan, B. van der, ed. In dienst 
van Buitenlandse Zaken, achttien portretten van ambtenaren en diplomaten in de twintigste eeuw (Boom, Amster-
dam 2008), p. 231-33.
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Stoel states that he has not lost all confidence in Jaruzelki’s attempts to continue the 
course of reformation that was started in Poland prior to December 12.
Already on December 14, the Minister had a meeting with the Polish ambassa-
dor in the Netherlands. Van der Stoel voiced his grave concern about the situation in 
Poland and emphasized that the Netherlands would like to see continuation of the 
process of reformation that was taking place prior to the events on December 12-13.
PvdA Member of Parliament van den Bergh insists, even stronger then the other 
MP’s, that NATO should refrain as much as possible from the Polish situation. Ac-
cording to van den Bergh, a condemnation by NATO or acts directed against Jaru-
zelski’s government could easily lead to interference by the Soviet Union, already 
military present in Poland. For the same reasons, van den Berg urges not to take any 
sanctions against the Polish government.
Letter to the parliament by the minister of  Foreign Affairs 
as a reaction to a request dated January 7, 1982
In a reaction to a request done by the Second chamber of parliament, the Minis-
ter of Foreign affairs composed a document summarizing the position of the Dutch 
Government concerning the introduction of martial law in Poland. In comparison 
to the initial statements made by van der Stoel in December 1981, this position was 
stricter towards the Jaruzelski government.
In January 1982, the Dutch government terminates all financial economical aid 
to Poland until basis conditions are met again. These basic conditions entail; dis-
continuation of martial law in Poland; release of the detainees; and resume talks 
between government, church and Solidarity. Despite these measures, humanitarian 
aid would continue as long as it was secured that the Polish population could ben-
efit from this aid.
Compared to the initial reactions right after the events on December 12-13, 
1981, it strikes that the Dutch position hardened quit a bit. In the meeting of De-
cember 16, PvdA-Member of Parliament van den Bergh specifically asks Minister 
van der Stoel (PvdA as well) not to impose sanctions in order not to provoke Mos-
cow. It is unclear if the Dutch government was influenced by the United States or 
other NATO-members to harden its position on Poland.
Dutch Media coverage in 1981–1982
Despite the fact that it is hard to find many government or party-statements about 
the situation in Poland in 1981, much was written in Dutch news magazines about 
this issue. For this article a selection of news magazines were screened from the pe-
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riod January 1981 till August 1982. The selection of news magazines is: De Groene 
Amsterdammer, Vrij Nederland, Haagse Post, De Tijd and Elsevier. These news maga-
zines cover a broad spectrum of opinions present in the Netherlands at that time.
The Netherlands has a tradition of pillarization. Besides the multiparty system 
which characterizes the Dutch political system, the different minorities, like Cath-
olics, social democrats, liberals, Protestants, have always organized themselves in 
more fields then politics only. Political groups were organized in all elements of so-
ciety; in schools, unions, health care and media as well.33 The News magazines that 
were selected have their roots in this system of pillarization too. The background of 
the magazines is shortly described before outlining how they covered the events in 
Poland in the period January 1981 till August 1982.
De Groene Amsterdammer is a weekly news magazine. Especially during the 
1980s it was considered to be very progressive and left-wing, and even more progres-
sive than the weekly Vrij Nederland.34 These two news magazines were considered 
to be more progressive then the Labour Party (PvdA). News magazine Haagse Post 
was also considered to be progressive, but comparable to the position of PvdA. De 
Tijd was slighty more conservative, perhaps in line with CDA at that time, which 
would make sense since weekly De Tijd originally came into existence within the 
catholic pillar. Weekly Elsevier was clearly the most conservative of all weeklies at 
that time. On average it can be said that the journalists and other opinion leaders 
were more progressive and left-wing then the Dutch population. After screening 
these news magazines from the period mentioned, in total 65 articles, clearly deal-
ing with the Polish situation, were selected for further study.35 Most of the articles 
were aiming at interpretation of the developing crisis. In many cases people from 
Solidarity or other polish inhabitants were interviewed of portrayed. No interviews 
with representatives of the Polish government of the Polish Communist Party were 
found. In about 20 percent of the articles the journalist zoomed in on the Dutch 
reaction on the Polish crisis. It is especially this selection of articles that was used for 
this paragraph following a chronology of media coverage in Dutch news magazines 
concerning the Dutch reaction on the Polish crisis.
Solidarity with Poland (de Groene Amsterdammer) 36
Journalist Paul Scheffer wonders how long it will take before leftish political par-
ties and unions in the Netherlands will show solidarity with Solidarity, and organize 
33  Wijfjes, H. Journalistiek in Nederland 1850-2000, Beroep, Cultuur en Organisatie (Boom, Amsterdam 2004), p. 341.
34  Galen, J.J. van and H. Spiering, Rare Jaren, Nederland en de Haagse Post, 1914-1990, (Nijgh & van Ditmar 
Amsterdam 1993), p. 239.
35  In Appendix C, all articles are listed, divided over the various weeklies.
36  Scheffer, P. “Solidariteit met Polen.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, March 25, 1981, p. 2.
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active support for them. Scheffer states that active support is necessary to avoid dis-
appearance of opposition against the Jaruzelski government put under pressure by 
the Kremlin to end the developments towards liberalization. 
In another article in De Groene Amsterdammer on July 15, 1981, Journalist 
Koper explains why he thinks the West-European governments are keeping silent 
in this situation.37  In case the Polish crisis would escalate, a Soviet intervention 
seems to be unavoidable. This would certainly lead to a much harder position in the 
West with a renewed Cold War as a consequence. Kopers describes the dilemma for 
left-wing parties in West Europe and he concludes that they must actively support 
Solidarity. 
Unexpected Soviet visit to Prague Summit,  
April 5, 1981 
The Dutch media covered the Prague summit in detail. It was seen as an omi-
nous sign that Brezhnev, who at that point avoided travelling as much as possible, 
took the trouble to join the Communist conference organized by Czechoslovakian 
leader Husak. Much attention was paid to the clear reference by both Brezhnev 
and Husak to a possible intervention by the Warsaw-Pact in case the Polish Com-
munism needed to be defended against enemies of the Communist Revolution. In 
the Elsevier article on April 11, 1981, journalist Rijn describes the political tensions 
between Moscow and the leader of the Polish Communist Party Kania, who was 
considered to be too lenient towards the Solidarity. Rijn also describes the reac-
tion by Reagan, who while recovering from an attempted murder, sharply warns for 
grave consequences in case Moscow would decide to invade Poland.38 In the article 
Scheffer writes for the Groene Amsterdammer on April 8, 1981 he mentions that 
the representative of CPN who was present at the Prague Summit, was called back 
to the Netherlands to underline that CPN is not supporting the hardening of the 
conflict in Poland.39 Scheffer incited other leftish parties to speak out as well, in 
order not have protests by the American Government alone.
37  Koper, A. “Waar blijft die bestelauto?” In De Groene Amsterdammer, July 15, 1981, p. 17.
38  Rijn, M. van “Onverwacht Sowjet-bezoek aan Praagse top, Pressie op Polen.” In Elsevier, April 11, 1981, 
p. 30-31.
39  Scheffer, P. “Poolse Kommunisten over pratijdemokratie; ‘We moeten voorkomen dat allerleid funktionarissen 
privileges in de wacht slepen.’” In De Groene Amsterdammer, April 8, 1981, p. 5, 8.
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We are facing a hot autumn  
(De Groene Amsterdammer, August 26, 1981)
Berrie Heessen mad a cycle tour through Poland in the summer of 1981. De 
Groene Amsterdammer published his report on August 26, 1981.40 It focuses on 
the difficulties of everyday life in Poland, and the growing tensions between Soli-
darity and the Polish government. In an editorial comment, De Groene Amster-
dammer evidently chooses sides with Solidarity, and expresses hope for enough pa-
tience among the members of Solidarity to deal with the irreconcilable attitude of 
the Polish government. De Groene Amsterdammers states: the Polish government 
should finally leave its tough attitude, and allow Solidarity political participation 
they undoubtedly deserve, since it represents the mandate of the Polish people.41 In 
the same edition the Groene Amsterdammer calls on financial contributions from 
its readers to purchase printer ink, and duplicators for Solidarity. 
Relation Catholic Church and Solidarity  
(De Tijd, September 25, 1981)
Ton Crijnen, journalist for weekly De Tijd (with a Catholic background) wrote 
about the growing tensions between Solidarity and the Polish Catholic Church.42 Cri-
jnen focuses on the critical remarks by the newly appointed Polish Arch Bishop who 
calls for a less radical approach by Solidarity. At the same the more radical sections with-
in Solidarity seem to distance themselves from the Polish Catholic Church because they 
think the church identifies itself too much with the Polish government. Crijnen’s article 
is far more critical towards Solidarity then the average Dutch public opinion.  
Coverage after the inducement of  Martial Law in Poland
Scheffer, journalist for De Groene Amsterdammer is very pessimistic. In his ar-
ticle of December 16, 1981, he sees only two possible scenarios; either Solidarity 
loses the power struggle with the Polish government, and all what was won will be 
40  Heesen, B. “Het groeiende ongeduld in Solidariteit, ‘We krijgen een hete herfst.’” In De Groene Amsterdammer, 
August 26, 1981, p. 14, 15.
41  Editorial comment in De Groene Amsterdammer, August 26, 1981, p. 15. The original fragment in Dutch: “Het 
is daarom te hopen dat de regering Jaruzelski te elfder ure haar stoere houding zal laten varen en Solidariteit de 
politieke medezeggenschap zal toestaan, waarvoor deze volksbeweging zonder enige twijfel het mandaat van het 
Poolse volk heeft.”
42  Crijnen, T. “Poolse kerk: van de nood een deugd.” In De Tijd, September 25, 1981.
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lost, or the Polish government will prove to be unable to tame the opposition and 
the Soviet Union will intervene.43  Both alternatives rule out a return to the peaceful 
coexistence from before.
Journalist Igor Cornelissen who wrote for Vrij Nederland, was more optimistic 
than his colleague of De Tijd. In his article of December 19, 1981, he states that one 
way or the other Solidarity must be included in finding a solution for Poland since 
almost ten million people cannot be disaffirmed.44 Cornelissen seems to have more 
understanding for the more extreme parts of Solidarity then for Wałęsa who is too 
moderate and orthodox catholic. Cornelissen described Jaruzelski as a puppet from 
the Soviet Union.
Elsevier journalist Onno Reitsma, who interviewed Wałęsa only hours before 
his arrest, choses unequivocally sides with Wałęsa in his article from December 19.45 
Reitsma calls Wałęsa a freedom fighter, and he calls Jaruzelski spineless. In the same 
edition of Elsevier, commentator Daan van Rosmalen states that the events in Po-
land prove the serious faults of Communism, which can only survive by means of 
military suppression against its people and had never led to a level of welfare even 
close to that of the Capitalist world.46 Van Rosmalen criticizes the position of West 
European governments not intervene, but to consider the Polish crisis as an domes-
tic conflict that must be solved by the Polish themselves. Van Rosmalen finds this 
utterly naïve since it is clear that Jaruzelski acts under pressure from Moscow.
Michel van der Plas, wrote another comment in Elsevier of December 19 in 
which he criticizes his colleagues from the other (left-wing) media.47 He reproaches 
their double standard since left-wing journalists protest loudly against disobeying 
of human rights of freedom fighters in countries with a right-wing regime, but fail 
to do the same when it is about an opposition against a Communist state. Van der 
Plas suspects that left-wing journalist cannot get used to the idea that Communist 
leaders can be just as cruel and illegitimate as others.
Ton Crijnen, in his article in De Tijd from December 18 calls the imposing mar-
tial law in Poland was inescapable, the only way out of the desperate situation. Cri-
jnen points at the shrinking public support for Solidarity.48 According to Crijnen, 
no less then one third of  Solidarity supporters lost confidence in their organization. 
Now another institution was needed to bring about order, enough food and other 
43  Scheffer, P. Tegen “’kontrarevolutionairen’ en ‘antisocialisten’, Het geenpartijenstelsel van Jaruzelski.” In De 
Groene Amsterdammer, December 16, 1981, p. 3.
44  Cornelissen, I. “Nog is Walesa niet verloren.” In Vrij Nederland,  December 19, 1981, p. 1-2.
45  Reitsma, I. “Poolse junta contra solidariteit, Een laffe overval in de holst van de nacht.”  In Elsevier, December 
19, 1981, p. 12-17.
46  Rosmalen, D. van. “Poolse Winter.” In Elsevier, December 19, 1981.
47  Plas, M. van der. “Maar…” In Elsevier, December 19, 1981, p. 11.
48  Crijnen, T. “De wanhoopsdaad van een generaal: ‘Het leger moet Polen redden.’” In De Tijd, December 18, 
1981, p. 7-10.
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necessities of life the Polish people so badly need. Therefore, Crijnen concludes, 
there was no real alternative to imposing martial law, and he underlines Jaruzelski’s 
promise, that the military rule will be only a temporary measure. 
Conclusion
The Polish crisis was difficult to interpret for the Dutch. Partly because of the 
fact that it was very difficult to obtain trustworthy information about what exactly 
was going on, but also because of the inextricable complexity because of the links 
with global developments between East and West. Whatever happened in Poland 
could only be understood in the light of the political power play between Brezhnev 
and the Polish government. Furthermore, the Soviet acts needed to be seen in rela-
tion to the hardening relationship with the United States. 
There was also another reason for confusion: the entangling use of terms Left 
and Right. Right wing political parties, people or media in the Netherlands wouldn’t 
automatically feel great enthusiasm for a proactive, fanatic union, mobilizing mil-
lions of people. But what if it protests against a Communist government, calling for 
freedom and democracy? The leftish parties faced a similar but opposite dilemma: 
of course they would support a union fighting for better workers rights and democ-
racy, but what if this weakened a government that was seen as a beacon of light, an 
example of a process of détente. Furthermore, for the more extreme left people in 
the Netherlands it was not so much the Soviet Union that caused the hardened re-
lationship between East and West, but the Cow boyish Reagan administration that 
was provoking increased tensions and an arms race. 
The confusion and complexity explain the silence of political parties, the con-
tracting media coverage and the scanty official statements of the Dutch government 
as regards to the Polish crisis. Despite the inability of the Dutch to make up their 
minds, there was a clear consensus about the need for human aid. Maybe as com-
pensation for the lack of courageous political support, the Dutch did send money, 
equipment, clothes and food in great quantities.
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Lee Trepanier
The U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment’s 
Perception of  Poland (1980–1981)
With the declassification of secret material after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and 
the Soviet Union, scholars are able to determine how accurate were the perceptions of 
foreign policy-makers to the reality which they were analyzing. This chapter will explore 
the accuracy of the perceptions of the American foreign policy establishment – the 
White House, the State Department, and the intelligent services – specifically the events 
in Poland from the birth of Solidarity to the declaration of martial law (1980-1981). It 
also will explore the role that the U.S. played after the imposition of martial law in Polish 
domestic politics (1986-1989). What we will discover is that in two of the three cases 
analyzed here, the American foreign policy establishment’s perceptions comported with 
the reality of events in Poland as well as those of its counterparts in the Warsaw Pact.
The two cases where the American foreign policy establishment accurately un-
derstood events in Poland was the first and second planned Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Poland (December 1980 and March 1981). In both of these cases, the United States 
recognized its need to balance its support for Solidarity against the cost of antago-
nizing the Soviet Union. What we find are neutral statements that the Polish crisis 
must be resolved internally while economic incentives and punishments are offered 
to the Warsaw Pact not to invade Poland.
The case where the American foreign policy establishment misjudged events in 
Poland was the declaration of martial law by the Polish communist government. 
Although this alternative was analyzed earlier, this option became less and less cred-
ible in the minds of American policy-makers as the threat of foreign intervention 
appeared to continue unabated. It also did not help that there were other distrac-
tions in the American foreign policy establishment at this time, such as the new 
administration in power.
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The lessons, both right and wrong, were put into practice in the years 1986-1989 
when the Polish communist government began to collapse. What we find is that the 
United States was able to use its diplomatic powers to achieve the domestic results it 
wants in a foreign country. Whether we can draw any general conclusions from this 
particular case is explored in the concluding section of this chapter.
The First Planned Warsaw Pact Invasion  
(December 1980)
By 1980 the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union was de-
stroyed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Widely blamed for mishandling 
relations with the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration was specifically criticized 
for its failure to induce the Soviets to accept a deep armament cuts and treat Soviet 
citizens in accordance with human rights. With its diplomats held hostage in Iran, 
the Carter administration was humiliated by foreign events and powers and therefore 
perceived by the world as incompetent. By contrast, the Soviet Union appeared to be 
ascendant, with its invasion in Afghanistan in defiance of widespread international 
public opinion and its successful reorganization of the Warsaw Pact where the armed 
forces of its allied states were integrated and subordinate to Soviet command. 
However, all was not well in the Warsaw Pact, with the emergence of Solidarity 
in August 1980 as the first independent labor union in this alliance. Although there 
were labor strikes throughout the 1970s, Solidarity was the first successful one, with 
the Polish government eventually agreeing to the workers’ demands known as the 
Gdańsk Agreement. The emergence of this mass movement was a challenge to So-
viet’s interest in Eastern Europe. The fact of a workers’ rebellion trying to hold the 
avowedly working-class government to its promises of socialism, such as self-rule, 
was an embarrassment not only to the Polish communist government but to all the 
communist governments of the Warsaw Pact. The popularity of the Solidarity re-
vealed the bankruptcy of the regime, which leaders acknowledged as much when 
it allowed Solidarity to register as a legitimate political organization and thereby 
challenged the principle of the communist party’s monopoly on power.
The initial Soviet reaction to the Solidarity movement was a call for reservists, 
increased combat readiness of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces, and sending 
warships to Polish ports. Later a special commission was established which was 
headed by senior party ideologist Mikhail A. Suslov and included KGB Chief Yurii 
V. Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, and Defense Minister Dmitrii 
F. Ustinov.1 The commission agreed that “we cannot afford to lose Poland,” but re-
1  “Dokumenty ‘Komissii Suslova’: Sobytiya v Polshe v 1981 g.” Novaya I noveishaya istoriya, 1994, 1, August 25, 
1980, p. 84-105. Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Jachranka.
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mained uncertain about how to accomplish this task.2 The Soviet allies of East Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia advocated for administrative rather than political means 
to resolve the unrest in Poland, even if this were to lead to bloodshed.3 The Polish 
communist party also agreed with its allies, having created a secret committee, led 
by Defense Minister General Jaruzelski, on August 24 to prepare for martial law.4
Brezhnev pressed his Polish counterpart, Stanislaw Kania, to take administra-
tive action against Solidarity. Knowing that resistance to Soviet military interven-
tion would be ruinous for both himself and his country, Kania attempted to per-
suade Brezhnev to postpone the annual Warsaw Pact’s Soyuz maneuvers until next 
year but was unsuccessful. The Soyuz maneuvers were set on December 8 with its 
completion on December 21. However, Brezhnev did accept a proposal that the 
communist party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact meet on December 5 to discuss the Pol-
ish situation.5 At the same time, plans for an invasion of Poland by the Warsaw Pact 
military were drawn up.
Unlike Czechoslovakia, when the invaders had attempted to discredit the Prague 
government, the Soviets made no demands on Kania prior to the planned inva-
sion. From their perspective, the Soviets would rather have a loyal and weak leader 
rather than a subversive and unpredictable one; consequently, the Soviets tried to 
strengthen Kania’s hand. The plan for the invasion of Poland was revealed to Polish 
Deputy Chief of Staff General Tadeusz Hupalowski when he visited Soviet Chief 
of Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov in Moscow on December 1. Under the pretext 
of the Soyuz maneuvers, fifteen Soviet divisions with one East German division and 
one Czechoslovakian division would be deployed in the cities and industrial centers 
to create the political solution to the Solidarity problem.6 
The Polish leadership was in a state of shock at this news, with Jarzuelski locking 
himself in his office and remaining completely inaccessible even to his closest entou-
rage.7 Later Jarzuelski tried to negotiate the removal of East German troops but was 
unsuccessful. However, he was able to convince Moscow that two Polish divisions 
would cooperate by actively supporting the German and Czechoslovakian units in 
order to prevent resistance to the invading forces. After military preparations had 
been completed, the Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander Marshal Viktor G. Ku-
2  Soviet Politburo session, October 29, 1980, copy National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
Washington DC.
3  Kubina, Michael and Mafred Wilke, eds., ‘Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen!’: Die SED contra Polen 1980/81, 
Geheimakten der SED-Führung über die Unterdrückkung der polnischen Demokratiebewegung (Berlin Akademie, 
1994), p. 101-114, 122.
4  Ryszard J. Kukliński, ‘Wojna z narodem widziana od środka’ Kultura (Paris), 475, April 4, 1987, p. 3-57.
5  Initially they were to meet December 1, but Brezhnev postponed it to December 5. Anatolii I. Gribkov and Stani-
slaw Kania, November 9, 1997, Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Jachranka.
6  Jaruzelski, Wojciech. Mein Leben für Polen: Erinnerugen (Munich: Piper 1993), p. 234-35.
7  Kukliński “Wojna” p. 23.
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likov asked Jaruzelski on December 3 to permit the allied forces to move into Po-
land at zero hour on December 8.8 Although Jaruzelski later claims in his memoirs 
that he denied permission requested by Kulikov, it more likely, given the absence of 
credible evidence, that he had asked postponement and received no answer. Kania 
himself tried to arrange a meeting with Brezhenv before the December 5 meeting, 
but the Soviet leader was not available.9
In his presentation at the December 5 meeting, Kania assured his colleagues that 
the Polish Communist Party would recover and route the opposition by political 
means. Although the East German and Bulgarian party leaders were not impressed, 
the Soviet representatives were: Brezhnev omitted any reference to an armed inter-
vention in the summit’s concluding statements.10 After the summit, Kania was able 
to persuade Brezhnev that “if there were an intervention there would be a national 
uprising. Even if angels entered Poland, they would be treated as bloodthirsty vam-
pires and the socialist ideas would be swimming in blood.”11 Brezhnev replied, “OK, 
we will not go in although if complications occur, we would. But without you, we 
won’t go in.”12 
During this time the U.S. government had been informed about what was trans-
piring from its satellite surveillance and from other intelligent sources and sought 
to support a resolution that did not involve a foreign intervention of Poland. For 
example, the U.S. State Department’s first public statements described the 1980 
Gdańsk strike as one between “the Polish people and the Polish authorities” to be 
worked out by themselves. It was considered that U.S. statements on behalf of “rebel 
workers” in the past had been counterproductive; and the United States should re-
frain from showing a “red flag – or a trigger – to the Soviets.”13 These statements 
were accompanied by a strong protest against the Soviet jamming of Western broad-
casts as a violation of the Helsinki Accord.
Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski also had interpreted 
events as a planned invasion and sought to deter it by public disclosure of the mili-
tary build-up around Poland to deny the invaders the advantage of surprise. He also 
sent dispatches to Moscow that cautioned about the costs of such an invasion.14 
This message, composed by Brzeinski, was sent to Brezhnev via. the White House 
8  Jaruzelski, Mein Leben, p. 236.
9  Witalij Swietłow, “Bez względu na cenę,” Gazeta Wyborcza, December 11, 1992.
10  Minutes of Warsaw Pact Summit Meeting,  December 5, 1980, in Kubina and Wilke, 140-195; Minutes of 
Soviet Politburo session, December 11, 1980, copy NSA.
11  Jane Perlez, “Poland ’80-’81: Players Do a Surprising Postmoderm,” International Herald Tribune, November 
12, 1997.
12  Kania, Stanisław Zatrzymać konfrontację (Warsaw, BGW, 1991), p. 91.
13  Cynkin, Thomas. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (Bassingstroke: St. Martin’s Press 1988), 42.
14  Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1985), p. 463-469.
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hot line on December 3, to which president only added “best wishes” with his sig-
nature.15 
Finally, Brzezinski “urged the President to underline American interests in these 
[Polish] developments through Presidential Letters” to Western European leaders 
in order for “a common Western policy would emerge.” It would also indirectly ex-
press the United States’ concern about a possible Soviet invasion.16 Carter wrote to 
the French, German, and British leaders that “events in Poland are of such impor-
tance that I should very much like to have your personal assessment of them, and 
also to share mine with you.” The outcome “could precipitate far-reaching conse-
quences for East-West relations and even for the future of the Soviet bloc itself.” He 
was sympathetic to the Solidarity, but the West should avoid any interference which 
“could be seized upon by the Soviets as a pretext for intervention.”17 
The result was a December 12 statement by NATO foreign ministers which pro-
claimed the desirability of avoiding both Soviet and Western interference in Polish 
affairs. Unfortunately, this statement was preceded by a commentary by Admiral 
Robert H. Falls, the chairman of the alliance’s military committee, that seem to 
discredit this statement. Giving higher priority to Western than to Soviet restraint, 
Falls told reporters that NATO “is a defensive alliance which does not include Po-
land. And so it is terribly important that whatever the alliance does it does not exac-
erbate the situation and adversely impact on the intentions of the Soviet Union.”18
From the CIA perspective, the “militant workers” of Solidarity were perceived as 
the fundamental problem. Tough talk would be needed “to bring the militant strike 
leader around to the view that the dangers inherent in the situation have come to 
outweigh the gains they seek… The most effective means of pressure would almost 
certainly by saber-rattling from Moscow.”19 However, the CIA also recognized that 
Moscow had never been enthusiastic about the option of military intervention, 
for the Soviet “military preparation was undertaken in anticipation of a political 
decision which would determine whether military forces would be moved into 
Poland.”20 The CIA speculated that either the Soviet Union would approve com-
promises short of independent trade unions in the hope of removing them once the 
crisis was past, or the Soviet Union would allow the Polish government to use force 
itself and then intervene if the Polish government were unable to achieve success. 
15  Carter to Brezhnev, December 3, 1980, in Orbis, Winter 1988, p. 32-48.
16  Brzezinski, Power and Principal, p. 464.
17  State Department Telegram, “Presidential Letter (August 27, 1980)” and “(September 1, 1980).”
18  Communiqué by the North Atlantic Council, December 12, 1980, Texts of Final Communiqués Issued by Mi-
nisterial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group, 
1975-1980 (Brussels, NATO Information Service, no. date), pp.153-157; quoted in Washington Post, December 
10, 1980, A35.
19  NIB Special Analysis, (August 28, 1980).
20  “Poland’s Prospects over the Next Six Months,” National Intelligence Estimate, 12:6-81, January 27, 1981.
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Such a cost would be acceptable if this prevented the Polish regime from collaps-
ing.21 
President Reagan’s Secretary of State-designated, General Alexander M. Haig, 
Jr., made public statements that balanced the costs of a Soviet invasion on U.S.-
Soviet relations with the rewards of restraint. Once in power, the Republican ad-
ministration continued the Carter’s administration’s policy of helping reschedule 
Poland’s debt to western creditors on the premise that a political rather than mili-
tary solution would be found to resolve the Polish crisis.22 Such a proposal was con-
genial to Moscow, for the Soviet government, which also sent economic assistance 
to Poland, wanted Poland to resolve its own political crisis rather than resort to 
military intervention. Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union believed 
that Poland would adapt its political behavior to economic incentives.
In spite of these attempts, the White House’s warnings and actions had no dis-
cernable effects on Moscow, whose leaders had written off the Carter Administra-
tion as a lame-duck president and did not seem to care whether the invasion would 
strain relations with Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan.  If anything seemed to have 
an effect on Moscow’s decision to invade, it appears Kania’s presentation at the 
December 5 summit had an influence on the course of developments rather than 
anything the United States did or could do. Thus, the invasion that was to start 
on December 8 did not take place: the Soyuz maneuvers, which were conducted 
outside of Polish territory, were extended past the December 21 deadline with no 
objections from either the Polish government or military. 
However, invasion was not called off: it was only postponed. Unlike Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, Poland was a case where military power did not 
translated into a political advantage. Having begun their own preparations for an 
administrative solution, the Polish military became indispensable for obtaining So-
viet objectives.
The Second Planned Warsaw Pact Invasion  
(March 1981)
At a closed meeting among the Warsaw Pact’s supreme command and defense 
ministers on January 13, 1981, an internal solution to the Solidarity problem seemed 
more probable and was entrusted to Jaruzelski. In mid-February Soviet reconnais-
sance groups began arriving in Poland to assess the situation of the willingness of the 
Polish military to cooperate, which an internal solution depended.23 
21  Ibid.
22  Cynkin, Soviet and American Signaling, p. 84.
23  Kukliński, “Wojna,” p. 31.
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The Soviet estimate of the Polish communist party’s to resolve the Solidarity 
problem was skeptical. Gromyko suspected that “our Polish friends, regardless of 
our recommendations, do not want to adopt emergency measures”; and Ustinov 
had the impression that “there has not yet been any real turnaround in the Polish 
situation.” Therefore, he insisted:
…we need to constantly keep pressure on the Polish leadership and 
constantly keep checking on them. We intend to hold maneuvers in Po-
land in March. It seems  to me that we should somehow bolster these 
exercises to make it clear that we have  forces ready to act.24
Jaruzelski was better than Kania at persuading Moscow that he was willing to 
impose emergency measures on the pretext of the looming threat of a military inva-
sion. He received Moscow’s backing for assuming the premiership on February 10, 
1981. Jaruzelski called for a 90-day truce with Solidarity, although he did not do 
anything to promote communication with them but rather used the state propagan-
da services to assert that “only Poland as a socialist state, joined the alliance with the 
Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact, can remain an independent 
and free country, a country within secure borders.”25
Jaruzelski soon took steps to accelerate the plans for martial law.26 It is not clear 
whether Jaruzelski had been encouraged by the commentary on the change of gov-
ernment in Warsaw by State Department spokesman William Dyess, who suggested 
that an intervention by Polish forces to “establish order” in their own country would 
be regarded by the United States as a “Polish matter.” Washington’s subsequent clar-
ification that such an intervention would be “a matter of very great concern to us” 
did not discourage Jaruzelski from moving ahead with plans of martial law.27 On 
February 20 the finished plans were submitted for approval to Jaruzelski, who two 
weeks later informed Soviet premier Nikolai Tikhonov.28
The Soviet leaders showed no signs of concern about the possible consequenc-
es for their relations with the new Reagan administration. In spite of Reagan’s 
anti-communist rhetoric, Soviet leaders believed Reagan would be another Re-
publican who would conduct foreign affairs according to realpolitik rather than 
the ideological beliefs of democracy and human rights.29 The combined military 
24  Minutes of the Soviet Politburo session, January 22, 1981, copy, NSA.
25  Michta, Andrew A. Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute 2009), p. 101.
26  Kukliński, “Wojna,” p. 28-29.
27  Cynkin, Soviet and American Signaling, 90; New York Times, February 11, 1981.
28  Kukliński, “Wojna,” p. 29-30.
29  Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washing-
ton DC: Brooking Institution 1994), p. 57-74.
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maneuvers of Soyuz and Druzhba were scheduled on March 16 and to be com-
pleted by March 25. 
The U.S. government again made it public that Soviet-led forces were about to 
enter Poland, and U.S. officials anticipated they would move there during the week-
end of March 28.30 The U.S. also had been alerted by an unnamed source that Jaru-
zelski was to declare a state of emergency with “very discreet… external support” and 
crush Solidarity by using the Polish army and police.31 Thus, the CIA had correctly 
assessed the situation as follows: 
Moscow will seek to enlist the backing of the Polish leadership and 
to co-opt the Polish General Staff. They would probably hope that the 
Polish security forces would take the lead in domestic repression, leav-
ing the Soviet forces to concentrate on maintaining order and crushing 
armed resistance. They would also try to maximize the ambiguities of 
their move into Poland by utilizing such pretexts as “exercises” in order to 
minimize the possibility of full-scale military resistance by the Poles and 
in an attempt to lessen the international costs. We do not believe that the 
Polish military would present armed opposition organized under central 
authority.32
A U.S. Alert Memorandum concluded: “The Soviets are now capable of inter-
vention with a force of 12 to 20 divisions with little further warning. Whether the 
Soviets believe such a force is adequate is known only to them.”33 President Reagan 
sent a message to Brezhnev to warn him against the extension of Soyuz maneuvers.34 
But Reagan also offered Poland an economic package if force were not used: 1) 
$200 million, in addition to the $670 million, loan guarantees for the fiscal year; 2) 
sale of dairy products at concessionary prices, plus $70 million in surplus butter and 
dried milk; 3) an emergency donation of wheat under “food for peace” legislation; 
and 4) rescheduling some $80 million in debt repayments due by June 30.35
Solidarity responded to Warsaw Pact exercises by organizing a four-hour warn-
ing strike which brought the country to a standstill and threatened to follow it four 
days later with a general strike of indefinite duration. Although the Soviet leaders 
30  The New York Times, March 27, 1981; Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five 
Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996), p. 230.
31  U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Weekend 28-29 March Ominous for Poland,” March 27, 1981.
32 “Poland’s Prospects over the Next Six Months,” p. 13-14.
33  CIACO NID Alert Memorandum, April 3, 1981.
34  Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling, p. 111.
35  Ibid., p. 106-07.
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wanted martial law declared, the Polish Minister of Defense refused.36 Warsaw Pact 
party leaders met on March 29-30 to authorize an agreement with Solidarity to 
avert a strike, because nobody was certain whether the Polish military would assist 
in the Warsaw Pact or organize a rebellion against them.37 Kania and Jaruzelski in 
fact pleaded this very case against foreign intervention. The Warsaw Pact thus had 
no choice other than rely on the Polish Communist Party and military to resolve 
the Solidarity problem without foreign intervention.
Martial Law and Communist Collapse
Once Moscow had abandoned the military option, the Polish leaders were given 
choices whether they would use force to resolve the Solidarity situation. Jaruzelski 
assumed the top party position on October 18, 1981. The October maneuvers of 
the Warsaw Pact were conducted in Poland and made no mention of an outside 
intervention. 
When martial law was declared on December 13, 1981, the U.S. government, 
unlike previous times, had misjudged the situation. Blinded by the possibility of 
a Warsaw Pact invasion, the U.S. government no longer considered the alternative of 
martial law declared locally. Nor did it help that is National Security Adviser, Rich-
ard Allen, was distracted with accusations of graft. The result was that the United 
States was caught flat-footed when martial law was declared.
Likewise, Moscow was taken by surprise. “No one knows what will really happen 
in the next few days,” Soviet ambassador to Warsaw Boris I. Aristov was quoted as 
having reported at the 10 December Politburo meeting. “There was a conversation 
about ‘Operation X.’ First there was talk that it would happen the night of the 11th 
to 12th, then the night of the 12th to the 13th. And now they are already saying it will 
only be about the 20th.”38
When martial law was declared, there was anger in the White House. Richard 
Pipes recalled: “the six or seven weeks following the crackdown were extremely 
tense and busy in the White House. In my two years in Washington they were the 
most intense and harrowing.” Reagan “did not conceal his outrage at what was 
happening in Poland.” Convinced that appeasement in the 1930s had led to the 
Second World War, he was determined to respond to Soviet aggression before it 
was too late.”39 
36  Kukliński, “Wojna,” p. 33-34.
37  Minutes of Soviet Politburo session, April 2, 1981 and April 9,1981, NSA.
38  Minutes of Soviet Politburo session, December 10, 1981.
39  Richard Pipes, “American-Soviet Relations and the Polish Question.” In Sisyphus and Poland. Reflection on Mar-
tial Law, J. Black and J. Strong, eds. (Winnipeg, 1986), p. 127.
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Writing a personal letter to Jaruzelski to protest the declaration of martial law, 
Reagan announced American sanctions on December 23, 1981 that ended food 
and consumer purchases, cancelled export credit insurance, and terminated civil 
aviation landing rights in the United States and fishing permissions in U.S. waters. 
However, humanitarian aid would continue. Reagan then extended sanctions to 
the Soviet Union, which was seen as the principal agent of martial law. These 
included cancellation of export license for gas pipeline equipment, embargoes 
on certain technologies, and the postponement of a new long-term grain agree-
ment.40
It was not until mid-1986 when the United States began to lift sanctions in di-
rect proportion to the domestic political liberalization in Poland. Specifically the 
United States demanded 1) an end to martial law, with a later extension to respect-
ing human rights; 2) the release of political prisoners; and 3) the resumption of 
a dialogue with Solidarity.41 In return, in the words of one diplomat, “The U.S. gov-
ernment would respond to a genuine amnesty [for political prisoners] by signing 
an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation. If the amnesty was a full 
one, and went so far as including Bujak for example, the U.S. would lift its embargo 
on credit for Poland. In the final phase, Poland could regain the most-favored-na-
tion trading status.”42
After Minister of the Interior Czyrek declared that he was willing to negotiate 
with Solidarity on August 26, 1988, the Round Table Talks were established with 
35% of the seats for contest in the Sejm, all the seats contested in the Senate, and 
with the understanding that Jaruzelski would be elected president. The U.S. Em-
bassy was following these developments closely and had contacts both within the 
Polish government and Solidarity. When elections were called, U.S. Ambassador 
John R. Davis Jr. had no doubt about the outcome, as he had reported to Washing-
ton: “The elections in June are, for the regime, an unpredictable danger and, for the 
opposition, an enormous opportunity. The authorities, having staked a great deal, 
are hoping for some modest success. But they are more likely to meet total defeat 
and great embarrassment.” The notion that the Polish Communist would succeed 
because of its superior organizational abilities would have little impact, since Soli-
darity had changed the nature of the regime. As far as Solidarity’s inexperience and 
disorganization, these obstacles, in Davis’ opinion, were being overcome.43
After the election, with Solidarity’s overwhelming success, there was a question 
about the presidency which was to be given to Jaruzelski. During this period, Czyrek 
40  P. Marantz, “Economic Sanctions in the Polish Crisis.” In Sisyphus and Poland. Reflection on Martial Law, 
J. Black and J. Strong, eds. (Winnipeg, 1986), p. 114-15.
41  John R. Davis, Jr. in Paczkowski, A. ed. Polska 1986-1989 (Warsaw: 1997), p. 43-45.
42  AAN 237/XIA/1442: reports on July 10 and 29, 1986 (L. Pastusiak and B. Sujka).
43  NSA, “Election ’89: The Year of Solidarity” (April 19, 1989), p. 1-2.
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called the American Deputy Head of Mission to express concern about “rumors” 
that the United States was supporting maneuvers to block a Jaruzelski’s presidency. 
Although Czyrek was unable to name the source of these rumors, he stated that if 
Jaruzelski would not be president, then “the process underway could lead either to 
chaos or rigid dictatorship… Poland’s fate is at stake.” He asked the United States “to 
exert influence on Solidarity to provide enough votes to ensure [ Jaruzelski’s] elec-
tion.44 It was known that both the Polish military and militia would “feel personally 
threatened if Jaruzelski were not President and would move to overturn the Round 
Table and election results.”45 In short, the United States was asked to intervene in 
order to prevent a coup in Polish politics.
The United States played an active role in advising Solidarity of how to elect 
Jaruzelski to the presidency. Perhaps the turning point was President Bush’s visit 
to Poland in July 1990 when he met with the main political actors, including Jaru-
zelski.46 In fact, Bush pushed Jaruzelski to run for the presidency for the stability 
of Poland.47 Perceived by some as an endorsement, Jaruzelski did run for the presi-
dency and won by one ballot. However, Jaruzelski resigned after he had appointed 
Mazowiecki as Poland’s first non-communist prime minister since 1948.  
Conclusion
What lessons, if any, can we conclude from this case? It is clear that the Ameri-
can foreign policy establishment accurately understood the concerns and factors 
that played into the planned Warsaw Pact invasion of Poland in both December 
1980 and March 1981. What it failed to do was to consider seriously the alterna-
tive of martial law declared locally. Nevertheless, the lessons of Poland served the 
United States well in supporting Poland’s transition towards liberal democracy and 
a free-market economy.
The singular factor that seemed to play a critical role in the United States for 
misjudging the declaration of martial law was an unwillingness to consider all op-
tions with equal gravity. It is this factor that led to the U.S. misjudging Jaruzelski’s 
intentions about martial law. In fairness, the Soviets also were surprised. Nonethe-
less, this does not excuse the misjudgment. If the American foreign policy estab-
lishment wants to continue to perceive events accurately, they need to remedy this 
deficiency. 
44  NSA, “Politburo member warns that US has been ‘dragged into the war’ over election of Jaruzelski as President” 
( June 16, 1989), p. 1-3.
45  Ibid., p. 5-9.
46  Beschloss, Michael and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels (Boston, 1993), p. 85-89.
47  Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft.  A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 117.
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Overall the American foreign policy establishment’s perceptions of Poland com-
ported with the reality of events. These perceptions helped shaped America’s role in 
Polish domestic affairs during its transition from communism to liberal democracy. 
As more secret material becomes declassified, the more we will be able to discern 
whether our policy-makers are correct in their judgments; and if not, how we can 
help in improving their evaluations of events.
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Jaclyn Stanke
The United States and the Solidarity Movement 
of  1980–81: A Popular Perspective from 
American Political Cartoons
Purpose and Methodology
The purpose of this essay is to examine the emergence of the Solidarity move-
ment and the Polish crisis of 1980-81 in order to gain insight into the American 
popular perspective on these events, as well as to consider how ordinary Americans 
may have perceived the overall nature of the Cold War and its participants during 
the last major freeze in U.S.–Soviet relations. This work will not focus on official 
government statements or policy. Rather, it will take a look at the unofficial Amer-
ican reaction to the events occurring behind the Iron Curtain and will do so by 
studying nationally syndicated editorial cartoons that appeared in American news-
papers at the time. In particular, this study relies upon the editorial cartoon work of 
four individuals: Don Wright, Tony Auth, Jeff MacNelly, and Dwane Powell.1
1 The political cartoons studied were first obtained from the Raleigh News and Observer (North Carolina). The 
newspaper employed its own editorial cartoonist, but frequently printed cartoons dealing with international affairs 
from various syndicates (not unlike the way newspapers purchase nationally syndicated columns). Because many of 
the editorial cartoons used for this study were syndicated, the original date of appearance in the Raleigh newspaper 
will be provided in the notes with the originating paper given in parentheses (thus indicating the original cartoon-
ist). At the time of the Polish crisis, Wright worked for the Miami News, where he had been employed since 1963. 
When the News closed its doors in 1988, he moved to the Palm Beach Post (Florida). Wright received the Pulitzer 
Prize for editorial cartooning in 1966 and 1980. During the period under study, Jeff MacNelly worked for the 
Richmond News-Leader (Virginia). He did so from 1970 to 1982, before moving to the Chicago Tribune where he 
worked until his death in 2000. During his career, MacNelly was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for editorial cartoon-
ing three times – in 1970, 1982, and 1985 – a rare feat. He was also the creator of the comic strip, Shoe. Tony Auth 
began working for the Philadelphia Inquirer in 1971 and continues to do so today. He won the Pulitzer for editorial 
cartooning in 1976. Dwane Powell worked for the Raleigh News and Observer from 1975 until his retirement in 
2009. For the most part, he lampooned North Carolina politics, although he did not ignore international politics.
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An exploration of a popular perspective is relevant for several reasons. First, 
policy is not made in a vacuum. Policymakers operate within a particular context 
and culture. Thus, it is important to identify what that cultural milieu is. Secondly, 
by identifying the popular views present within a culture, we can gain a better un-
derstanding of what ordinary individuals at the time considered important. As for 
period of the Cold War under study here, we can hopefully discern how Americans 
viewed the Cold War and its participants, as well as how they interpreted the events 
taking place around them. Finally, we can perhaps determine how and where popu-
lar views supported and upheld official policy, or if and where they opposed and 
dissented from it.
Findings: The Polish Crisis of  1980–81  
in American Political Cartoons
To a great extent, American editorial cartoons offer quick insight into popular 
perspectives on the events of the 1980s. Though naturally playing off the news of 
the day, they also revolve around particular themes and reveal certain conceptions 
of the Cold War held by their creators and their audience. The cartoons exam-
ined below are presented in a somewhat chronological order as to how events 
unfolded. Thus, they first consider the emergence of Solidarity and the reforms 
obtained. The nature of the actual reforms is not fully explored in the editorial 
cartoons (indeed that would be difficult to do in single panel images). Rather, 
the cartoons tend to delve into what the existence of Solidarity and the reforms 
meant for Poland, other eastern bloc nations, and the Soviet Union. In many re-
spects, the focus on their meaning provides us with a conception of how Ameri-
cans viewed the Cold War at this time, or at the very least these events. American 
cartoonists welcomed the changes acquired by Solidarity’s actions and celebrated 
the Polish people in their quest for a more open and free society. However, they 
also identified the threat such changes presented to the Soviet Union, its empire 
in Eastern Europe, and the whole system of socialism. In other words, the actions 
of Solidarity and the reforms represented an infection that could spread to other 
nations behind the Iron Curtain and possibly undermine socialism. Given that, 
even before martial law was declared in December 1981, the tone of the cartoons 
seemed to expect that some kind of reversal or crackdown would occur. Finally, 
when considered in their entirety, a pervasive subtext seemed to run consistently 
throughout the cartoons, in effect revealing what appeared to be two primary 
components that undergirded the American popular perspective: first, an ideo-
logical conception of the Cold War, and secondly the acceptance of it as a perma-
nent feature of international relations.
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When Solidarity formed, struck, and demanded political, economic and social 
reforms, editorial cartoons in American papers reflected this reality. A cartoon from 
Don Wright in late summer 1980 was simple in its presentation. Six satellite states, 
each under the picture of a hammer and sickle (representative of communism), are 
listed in two rows. The very last state identified is Poland, but in place of the ham-
mer, there is a sign saying, “Strike.” Indeed, the cartoon gets at the fact that Solidar-
ity was leading the Polish people in strikes, but it also suggests a bit more – the Pol-
ish people, unlike other eastern bloc peoples, were striking out against communism. 
While the cartoon recognizes the Poles’ willingness to stand apart, the image also 
conveys a view of communism as monolithic. All the states represented in the car-
toon appear the same (hammer and sickle), suggesting that socialism has removed 
their distinctiveness from them (but again, Poland is breaking that mold). Further-
more, the image suggests the Soviet Union’s complete dominance over the satellite 
states (again highlighting the significance of the Poles’ actions). However, the car-
toon’s view of communism is rather simplistic and does not present a completely ac-
curate picture of Soviet bloc relations given the fact that among the six states listed 
as firmly within the communist camp are Yugoslavia and Romania.2 The former 
broke from the Stalinist hold in 1948, and the latter had the most independent 
foreign policy of all Eastern bloc nations by this point. 
A Jeff MacNelly cartoon from April 1981 is also telling in what it has to say about an 
American viewpoint on the events taking place in Poland. Like Wright’s image, MacNel-
ly’s cartoon illustrates Poland’s willingness to stand apart from the other satellite states 
and its refusal to toe the line. However, the image is darker and the message it conveys is 
more sinister. In this cartoon, four prisoners representing the satellite states of Hungary, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are chained together at the neck. They are 
not just prisoners, but prisoners forced to do hard labor as indicated by the presence 
of their shovels (and perhaps suggestive of Soviet gulags which forced hard labor upon 
political prisoners, especially during Stalinist times). The prisoner representing Poland, 
however, is nonchalantly slacking off and has somehow managed to use the chain linking 
the prisoners together as a hammock. This image suggests more than just how brave the 
Poles are in standing up to their oppressors. It also suggests that the Soviet system is il-
legitimate and must govern by coercion rather than consent. In the cartoon, the enslaved 
prisoners are all under the watchful eye of an armed Soviet commandant making it clear 
to the reader that the satellite states have not chosen to be part of the communist bloc, 
but are held in place by force or the threat of it.3 The presence of the armed commandant 
reinforces this conception, but also suggests another common theme found in many car-
toons and editorials from the period: the expectation that at some point a crackdown 
may reverse any changes obtained thus far.
2 Raleigh News and Observer, September 5, 1980 (originally from the Miami News).
3 Raleigh News and Observer, April 17, 1981 (originally from the Richmond News-Leader).
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While the boldness and defiance of the Poles as they stood up to the communist 
system emerged as a common theme in American political cartoons, perhaps more 
interesting were the representations of what the strikes and protests signified. Tony 
Auth’s cartoon from August 1980 reveals the strikes’ size and strength, and pos-
sibly the danger they pose to the Polish government and Soviet system, as commu-
nist leaders, hiding behind curtains and peering out a window at the large striking 
crowds, ask the question: “Say, just how many divisions does the Pope have?” The 
editorial plays off the oft-quoted statement made by Joseph Stalin in the early Cold 
War as he questioned what his former wartime allies could really do about Soviet 
control in Poland (following complaints made by the Pope to the allies regarding 
Poland’s situation). It also acknowledges the impact the new Polish pope, John Paul 
II, perhaps had in encouraging the Poles to stand up to the authorities in 1980. 
(Now that we know the outcome of the events from the 1980s, several historians 
have in fact attributed the rise of Solidarity and even the beginning of the end of 
communism in Eastern Europe to the Pope’s visit to his homeland in 1979. Given 
that, it would appear that Auth’s cartoon was spot-on in its analysis.) Also of note in 
this image is the portrait of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, on the wall behind 
the curtains. Although the use of Brezhnev’s image was particularly prominent in 
later pieces, already here it is suggestive of the idea that policy regarding Solidarity 
was not made by Polish communist party leaders, but if anything always done under 
the watchful eye of the Soviets, the ones who were really in control.4
Sunshine serves a symbolic purpose in several cartoons. Most likely, the sunshine is 
indicative of the hope that life is becoming better and more open in Poland as a result 
of Solidarity’s strikes and protests. Indeed, an Auth cartoon from August 1981, depicts 
Poland as a chained inmate escaping the dark prison of communism (as represented 
by the hammer and sickle on the guard tower) for the sun, a field of flowers, and but-
terflies. Of note, the prisoner seems to be escaping rather leisurely and without much 
fear of being caught at this point. This editorial, however, raises the question of what 
the changes in Poland mean for the Soviet bloc. Is Poland finding a way to escape the 
iron fist of communism (and is apparently ungrateful for everything the communists 
have done for the nation as the guard shouts out, “Thankless ingrate!”; the perplexed 
face on the prisoner to this comment, wondering what Poles have to be thankful for 
under communism, also reveals the cartoonist’s own views on the matter).5 In another 
Auth cartoon from April 1981 (see Figure 1), a darkened room is shown. Several win-
dows, each labeled with the name of a satellite state, are fully closed. The only window 
open, and letting forth the bright sunlight, is Poland’s. It does not stop there, though, 
for in the corner, trying to stay out of the sunlight pouring in are three unidentified 
individuals who look like communist leaders (one looks somewhat like Brezhnev). 
4 Raleigh News and Observer, August 30, 1980 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer).
5 Raleigh News and Observer, June 17, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). 
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Sunshine in this case seems to suggest that what is happening in Poland could spread 
to other satellite states (and indeed the three individuals cowering in the dark corner 
of the room seem to fear this as they try to shield their eyes from the light).6 The full 
consequences of this happening are not explored in the cartoon, but the theme of 
infection is present here and in several other cartoons.
Figure 1 
Used with permission of Philadelphia Inquirer Copyright ©2010. All rights reserved.
It is definitely present in Figure 2. This cartoon, also by the Philadelphia In-
quirer’s Auth, is explicit about the determination of communist leaders, especially 
Soviet leaders, to prevent the changes occurring in Poland from spreading, as well as 
their willingness to employ harsh methods if necessary. Here Brezhnev is seen try-
ing to kill off the Polish spring (reminiscent of the Prague Spring of 1968 as well as 
its eventual crushing, events that were referenced repeatedly at the time). However, 
the roots of resistance are too deep. The Polish flower is able to sprout up again and 
below the surface the roots of this rebellion are still reaching out towards other 
satellites states.7 Present here alongside the theme of infection, is another that often 
appears in the cartoons from the period – the notion that the human spirit and 
desire for freedom is enduring and though it may be beaten down and crushed, it 
cannot be killed. 
6 Raleigh News and Observer, April 11, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). 
7 Raleigh News and Observer, September 14, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). 
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Figure 2 
Used with permission of Philadelphia Inquirer Copyright ©2010. All rights reserved.
As noted, many of the political cartoons from this time highlight the possibility 
of Poland’s reforms inspiring and infecting other bloc nations. In this regard, the 
cartoons expressed a perception, quite accurate as it turns out, that leaders of com-
munist states feared this possibility. However, by pointing this fear out, the cartoons 
also revealed something about American views on the matter. In particular, they 
highlighted once again the belief that the communist regimes were in fact illegiti-
mate and that if given the opportunity, the peoples living under them would choose 
something else. That said, while many of the editorial cartoons seemed to express 
sympathy for the Poles in their quest for freedom, very few at this point suggested 
a complete undermining of the system as a real possibility. Rather, they ultimately 
reflected a hope that change could occur behind the Iron Curtain, allowing for 
a more open and humane society, but one that was still communist. In other words, 
the system would remain and the Cold War would continue. Indeed, it is notewor-
thy that none of the cartoons either expect or call upon the United States to take 
any action to help the Poles or any of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain at this 
point. It is unclear why no such calls made their way into the cartoons. Nonetheless, 
their absence reinforces the notion that many Americans believed that while the 
Cold War was in part an ideological conflict about human liberty, it would none-
theless continue for some time. 
Tony Auth’s cartoon from August 1980 was different in this regard as it seemed 
to suggest another option. In this editorial, Polish miners have successfully dug under 
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what appears to be the Berlin Wall. On that wall is a Pravda news posting, “Polish re-
forms undermine socialism.” This editorial differs from other cartoons in that it proj-
ects a message of socialism actually coming undone in Eastern Europe, but even here 
it is cautious. The words say one thing, but the image somewhat contradicts it for it 
simply shows Poles escaping from socialism but not directly undermining or destroy-
ing it via strikes, revolts, or revolution.8 That said, the image nevertheless reinforces 
the conception of the socialist system in Eastern Europe as illegitimate and ultimately 
unaccepted in the hearts of the people behind the Iron Curtain. And indeed, when 
socialism in Eastern Europe unraveled in 1989, it did occur rather peacefully with 
people voting the communists out of power or in the case of the German Democratic 
Republic by voting with their feet as the East Germans took advantage of opening 
borders and left permanently when given the chance. In this respect, then, Auth’s piece 
is somewhat prescient in identifying how things would play out.
To many political observers in the United States, including American political 
cartoonists, General Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law in Poland did not come 
as a surprise. As noted already, the theme of coercion and the need to rule by force 
and not consent was already well established in the image of what communism and 
the Soviet Union stood for. However, while the crackdown was not unexpected, 
it was not welcomed either. By this point, many experts and other analysts had al-
ready pinpointed the problems the Soviet Union would face if it chose to quell the 
mounting rebellion in Poland with the insertion of its own troops or those from 
the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, while it was also not completely unexpected that the 
crackdown of December 1981 came from the hands of Polish communists, many 
editorialists and cartoonists still suggested that the true force behind the clamp-
down was the Soviet Union. 
Shortly after the declaration of martial law, a Wright editorial cartoon from the 
Miami News depicted two Poles walking on a sidewalk with a tank on the street be-
hind them. As the two men walk along, one makes the sarcastic remark, “Well, if we’re 
going to be subjected to repressive totalitarian reprisals, at least they’re Polish repres-
sive, totalitarian reprisals!”9 On the one hand, the sarcasm suggests it makes no dif-
ference who is behind the clampdown, it is still totalitarianism at work. On the other 
hand, it suggests that given a choice between the lesser of two evils, the use of Polish 
or Soviet force, they will take the former. In both cases, though, the fact that the So-
viet Union was ultimately responsible for the decision to declare martial law is pres-
ent. Another cartoon from the period was more direct in assigning blame (see Figure 
3). Playing off the popular Star Wars movie series current at the time, a movie poster 
portrays Brezhnev as Darth Vader, an evil overlord of a rebellious intergalactic empire 
who succumbed to “the dark force” in his younger days. The poster is not advertising 
8 Raleigh News and Observer, August 13, 1980 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). 
9 Raleigh News and Observer, December 21, 1981 (originally from the Miami News).
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something fictional and points this out: “The Empire Strikes Back or Don’t you wish 
this were just a movie? Starring Leonid Brezhnev and a cast of thousands.”10 Dwane 
Powell, the Raleigh News and Observer’s political cartoonist commented in a like man-
ner on who was behind the imposition of martial law. In his image, Powell depicts 
Brezhnev as a little boy and Poland his toy balloon. However, the Polish balloon looks 
like an iron ball tethered to its master by a chain link unable to float freely.11
Figure 3 
Used with permission of Philadelphia Inquirer Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved.
Additional editorial cartoons in the wake of martial law emphasized yet again 
the nature of socialism and the Soviet system of rule over Eastern Europe. A car-
toon from Auth entitled “Workers’ Paradise” (see Figure 4) offered a biting critique, 
depicting the nation of Poland as a police state and not a place where the rights of 
workers thrive (suggesting again, the theme that socialism as it existed in Eastern 
Europe was not a choice made willingly, but imposed from the outside; moreover, 
the cartoon took an ideological jab at how socialism really existed in the world as 
opposed to how Marx had envisioned a workers’ state in his writings). A map of Po-
land is shown, but its borders are marked by barbed wire and armed guards. Huddled 
together inside, though solidly as if in defiance and indeed solidarity, are the Polish 
people under the Solidarity banner.12 A Christmas cartoon from December 1981 is 
10 Raleigh News and Observer, December 30, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). 
11 Raleigh News and Observer, December 22, 1981.
12 Raleigh News and Observer, December 23, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). 
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more somber, showing a simple nativity scene, possibly playing off Poland’s strong 
Catholicism and faith (in defiance of atheistic communism), surrounded by armed 
forces from all sides, including soldiers ready to fire, tanks pointed at the manger, 
and helicopters flying above with their spotlights aimed on the scene. Despite the 
menacing attention, those in the manger simply ignore it and go about their busi-
ness, suggesting that their faith, peace, and message of hope and human dignity will 
endure long after those currently threatening them will.13 
Figure 4 
Used with permission of Philadelphia Inquirer Copyright ©2010. All rights reserved.
13 Raleigh News and Observer, December 26, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer). There in fact seem to be 
several editorial cartoons from the 1980s that take up a Christian theme and feature either the nativity or the Star of 
Bethlehem, something I explored briefly in the conference paper from which this piece was born. See my paper, “The 
United States, the Solidarity Movement, and the Final Years of the Cold War,” presented at the International Seminar 
on “The Solidarity Movement and International Perspectives on the Last Decade of the Cold War,” at Andrzej Frycz 
Modrzewski University (Krakow, Poland), March 15-17, 2010. For example, a Wright cartoon from December 1989, 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, depicted a family (labeled East Europe) peering through the rubble of the now broken 
Wall and looking up in amazement at the Star of Bethlehem, suggesting the bright hope that now awaits them as well 
as the endurance of the human spirit. See Raleigh News and Observer, December 25, 1989 (originally from the Palm 
Beach Post). Given the fact that editorial cartoons respond to events as they happen and indeed events relevant to this 
and the original study occurred around Christmas, such images are not too surprising. However, it is of interest that 
the meaning of the Cold War in these images was linked to Christian themes of hope, human dignity, the struggle of 
human liberty against forces of dark, again reinforcing the notion that not only was the Cold War a struggle about 
liberty versus tyranny, but that there was indeed something to the American perception of what so-called godless 
communism stood for. Moreover, these views made their way into such innocuous items as political cartoons.
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In the aftermath of martial law being declared, cartoons also took stabs at the 
policies of Western Europe. These pieces frequently reflected divisions within the 
Atlantic alliance over how to respond to the crackdown in Poland – should there be 
a tough response to punish the Soviet Union or should the West remain supportive 
of Solidarity but not intervene directly in what was perhaps an “internal” matter 
within the socialist family. A cartoon by Wright depicted the United States as a lead 
tank, attempting to marshal its allies in a strong and decisive response to martial 
law. The U.S. makes the strident remark: “Enslaving Poland, eh?!! Here we come 
you dirty Russians!” However, the other tanks (each labeled with a letter spelling 
out NATO) are shown driving off in the opposite direction. The cartoon suggests 
the United States’ desire to present a strong and unified stand against Soviet ac-
tions, while West European nations wish to avoid any confrontation with the Soviet 
Union.14 The Raleigh News and Observer’s Powell similarly commented on Western 
Europe’s desire to maintain friendly relations with the Soviets and keep détente alive 
despite recent events. In this cartoon, a large Soviet bear is drawn. His rumbling 
stomach, alongside the bones tossed to the ground around him, indicate the fine 
meal upon which he has just gorged himself. Indeed, his words indicate as much: 
“Nice of you to (belch) realize that Poland and Afghanistan are internal problems.” 
The comment is made to Western Europe, who is portrayed as a silly buffoon soft on 
communism and ignorant of the true nature of the Soviet threat.15 Taken together, 
these images portray possibly contrasting conceptions of the Cold War. The United 
States seems to be treating the current events of the Cold War in Europe as part of 
a larger ideological battle between East and West, while West Europeans perceive 
it more as a traditional, geopolitical struggle which can be moderated. Moreover, 
the fact that the West European allies are depicted as skittish or buffoons suggests 
a view that they are wrong-headed in the matter, hence reinforcing the American 
conception of the Cold War as an ideological battle between good and evil.
The events surrounding Poland and the Solidarity movement garnered quite 
a bit of attention in American political cartoons throughout 1980-81. Within these 
editorials, certain themes regarding the nature of communist rule played themselves 
out. In particular, as noted, one gets a real sense of the Cold War being portrayed as 
an ideological battle between the forces of liberty on one side and that of tyranny 
on the other. Also of note, is the fact that the staunch anti-communist American 
president, Ronald Reagan, rarely appears in political cartoons regarding America’s 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. If he does, his arms buildup is pilloried as 
stealing from domestic social programs or he is viewed as following a double-stan-
dard. As to the latter, one political cartoon from February 1981 shows a street sign 
pointing out that Poland is to the east, to which an armed Brezhnev is rushing. The 
14 Raleigh News and Observer, January 17, 1982 (originally from the Miami News).
15 Raleigh News and Observer, January 7, 1982.
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same sign indicates El Salvador to the west. We then see an armed Reagan charging 
there, in the opposite direction of Brezhnev.16 An even better example following 
Poland’s martial law is the image shown in Figure 5. Reagan is lighting a candle for 
Poland in one window, and in another is Brezhnev lighting one for Guatemala, Ar-
gentina, Chile, and El Salvador (all areas of American intervention in Latin Amer-
ica during the Cold War).17 The cartoon is suggestive of Reagan’s (and America’s) 
double-standard as well as the idea that perhaps the superpowers are no different 
from each other. Given the cartoons examined thus far, the tone and subject of these 
cartoons are somewhat surprising. These items suggest a much more cynical view of 
the Cold War, indeed one that emphasizes its geopolitical nature while downplay-
ing any ideological tinge. In this respect, the Cold War is nothing more than a tra-
ditional battle between powers for spheres of influence and control. This contradic-
tory depiction of the Cold War as a geopolitical struggle raises questions about the 
nature of the American popular perception of the global Cold War (and perhaps 
even the nuclear arms race), but it still does not go against the predominant view 
found in many cartoons of the time depicting the struggle behind the Iron Curtain 
in Eastern Europe as one about human liberty. In other words, this struggle was still 
viewed through an ideological lens.
Figure 5 
Used with permission of Philadelphia Inquirer Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved.
16 Raleigh News and Observer, February 9, 1981 (originally from the Philadelphia Inquirer).
17 Raleigh News and Observer, January 9, 1982 (originally from Philadelphia Inquirer). 
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Conclusion
Political cartoons offer quick glimpses into popular perspectives of events taking 
place in the world. At times, they can also give us an idea of what the cultural milieu 
in which policymakers operated was like. In this case, nationally syndicated political 
cartoons from American newspapers that focused on the Polish crisis of 1980-81 
provided that glimpse. From these cartoons emerged a certain perspective on how 
some Americans viewed the Cold War and its participants. Overall, what stood out 
was that even after 30 years on, many within the United States perceived the Cold 
War as an ideological struggle between human liberty and tyranny (or at least as 
far as Eastern Europe was concerned). Moreover, the Soviet Union was seen as an 
oppressor that had imposed its system falsely upon the peoples of Eastern Europe 
following the Second World War (the view of the United States’ role in the Cold 
War was less clear since it was not necessarily the subject of the cartoons examined). 
The communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain, including Poland’s, were illegiti-
mate and had to rule by coercion and not consent. Nevertheless, the Polish crisis of 
1980-81 demonstrated that the human quest for liberty could not be extinguished. 
It would continually spring forth. Indeed, an accepted proposition within many 
of the cartoons was this natural desire for liberty. Despite the presence of this un-
derlying supposition within many of the cartoons, they also presented a seemingly 
contradictory theme that the Cold War would continue. The cartoonists, like many 
policymakers in Washington, expected the reforms taking place in Poland to be 
quashed. While the quest for human liberty would continue, countervailing forces 
of tyrannical rule would attempt to thwart those seeking it. Indeed, there seemed to 
be an expectation that the United States either would not or could not do anything 
to help those behind the Iron Curtain. 
Looking back at the political cartoons from 1980-81 is rather enlightening in 
that they seem spot on in “predicting” how communism eventually came undone in 
Eastern Europe and perhaps even how the Cold War ended. Though the cartoons 
did not predict the actual events of 1989, they do seem to touch on what perhaps 
propelled the revolutions that shook Eastern Europe that year. It seems that at their 
core, the Revolutions of 1989 erupted because the peoples behind the Iron Curtain 
had not given up on securing their own liberty (naturally, other factors created the 
conditions for that to happen, most notably the fact that the Soviet Union refused 
to use force to quell any changes as it had in the past).
The political cartoons examined here are perhaps more helpful in discerning 
American popular views about the Cold War and its participants than in demon-
strating how popular views shaped United States’ policymaking during the events of 
1980-81. Still, the ideological perspective put forth in many of the cartoons suggests 
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that the overall political culture in the United States supported a certain worldview 
concerning the nature of the Cold War with respect to Eastern Europe. Given that, 
it seems that policymakers in Washington operated within a cultural milieu that 
reinforced their policy decisions. What also stands out about the relationship be-
tween Washington policymakers and political cartoons from the time is how accu-
rate the information conveyed in the political cartoons was in many cases (especially 
regarding the desire for change behind the Iron Curtain, the communists’ fear such 
changes could spread and undermine their rule, and that there ultimately would be 
a crackdown directed from the Kremlin). In other words, even though American 
policymakers did not know exactly what was happening in Warsaw or Moscow, they 
communicated fairly openly with their public. This information then made its way 
into American newspapers. Because it was not a question of U.S. policy toward Po-
land and Eastern Europe, but rather communist policy, political cartoonists seemed 
to express a popular American perspective or worldview regarding the Cold War 
that in the end was either in sync or at least supportive of American policy as far as 
Poland and Eastern Europe were concerned during the events of 1980-81.
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Appendix A
Minister of  Interior Report, January 11, 1981
 Excerpts from the report of the Warsaw meeting between the Ministry of Inte-
rior Representative and Minister Milewski on January 11, 1981 (Source: Archive of 
the Ministry of the Interior, Fond 1, Record 10a, File 750).
 
TOP SECRET! 
R E P O R T 
From Colonel Georgi Stoev Marinov, MoI Representative in Poland 
RE: Meeting with the Minister of the Interior of Poland Comrade Milewski 
COMRADE CHIEF, 
On 9 January 1981, a meeting was held with the representatives of the Ministries 
of Interior from socialist countries (USSR, CSSR, Hungary, GDR and Cuba) and 
Comrade Milewski. 
[…] 
Comrade Milewski made an overview of the situation in Poland in December 
1980, outlining the following details: 
1. Strikes will continue in December. About 8, 500 men went on strike. Com-
pared to past months, the number of people on strike was considerably smaller, but 
as Comrade Milewski pointed out, this should not be interpreted as a kind of vic-
tory. 
This, in fact, is a tactical approach on behalf of “Solidarity,” COR and the adver-
sary elements, focused on the preparatory work for a new, second stage of the strike 
movement. Elaboration of new tactics and program to struggle against the authori-
ties and the Polish Labor Party. (Comrade Milewski said they were temporarily on 
holidays.) 
2. Currently, the Independent trade unions “Solidarity” are carrying out con-
stituent and election meetings. MoI authorities have information available that 
now the more qualified and respectful people are elected in the leadership, not as it 
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used to be - undisciplined, anarchistic and hooligan elements. Members and former 
members of the Polish Labor Party are elected in the leadership of some labor orga-
nizations of “Solidarity,” sometimes even as leaders. 
3. The month of December was dense with political events. “Solidarity” and the 
church organized celebrations for the 10th anniversary of the events in Gdansk. As 
Comrade Milewski stated, this event was not a victory for the Polish Labor Party 
and the authorities: it was a political success for the church and for “Solidarity.”
4. The enemy, the opposition and the adversary criminal elements are now con-
solidating in the mass media (the press, radio, television, etc.) 
[…] 
5. The agreement signed in Gdansk envisages a 5-day working week. 
[…] 
6. Regarding the issue of registration of “Peasants’ Solidarity,” the Party expressed 
its disagreement openly because “Peasants’ Solidarity” attacked the leadership of 
the regional committees of the Party and was making constant requests in harm of 
the socialist sector. 
[…] 
7. In December, there were attacks against MoI authorities, the prosecutor’s of-
fice and the court. “Solidarity” leadership made a request to rent some of the MoI 
buildings for some purposes (later they gave up). They also claimed that two region-
al chiefs be substituted because they owned summer cottages and other property, 
but later they “quietly” gave up. 
8. According to Comrade’s Milewski’s words, a supplementary pool of former 
Security officers and patriotic Polish citizens of 46, 000 men was formed to fight 
the opposition and the adversary criminal elements. Special groups were formed in 
the railway stations and the mass media (people with special, operative and political 
training) supported by State Security and police. 
Similar groups will be formed in other sectors as well and their activities will 
grow in future. The authorities will rely on them in case of emergency. 
There is precise information that in the 9 regions of the country (Warsaw, 
Gdansk, Sczecin, Poznan, Wroclaw, Krakow, Lodz, Torun and Lublin) that the 
situation is critical. The enemy has established a solid basis for struggle and resis-
tance against the authorities and the government. These are important cities and 
industrial centers. In addition, in 12 other regions, yet not so explicitly, one can feel 
the influence and organized resistance of the opposition. In other words, in almost 
50% of the regions in the country, the enemy has dug themselves in well, which 
complicates the situation and creates difficulties to the Party and the government, 
and surprises could emerge any moment now. 
Comrade Milewski pointed out that they were regrouping their forces, enforc-
ing the threatened regions, taking additional administrative and other measures. 
[…] 
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We have received from the fraternity security services, Comrade Milewski stat-
ed, information about the preparation and transfer of diversion groups. Although 
there is no evidence, he said, we have taken measures to fight them. 
9. The leadership of the Party is still on the position to refrain from using force 
and use only political means. MoI authorities are getting ready for a confrontation, 
but no time has been specified to declare it yet. The party is trying to apply (and 
exhaust) all other options and only if necessary to undertake an open clash. 
Comrade Milewski declared that 3-4 days ago he had a meeting with Comrade 
Kanya. He had meetings with the department directors. They have received an or-
der to work out a perspective plan to restrict and gradually to liquidate the work of 
the enemy forces, which will be approved by the Politburo of the Central Commit-
tee of the Polish Party. 
The Party is still weak, its restructuring and renovation are not tangible yet. 
A progressive step is the care for the Party cadre. 
[…] 
10. Finally, Comrade Milewski elaborated on the issue of the existing differences 
between the Episcopate of the Catholic Church and COR, differences on the ideas 
of how to lead the struggle and on the priority in the leadership. These growing dif-
ferences are favorable for us, he stated, since they cause a real decrease of the coun-
teracting forces and create the possibility for active work on our behalf. 
Note: 
Comrade Milewski spoke anxiously about the situation in Poland. He repeated 
several times “I am sorry for giving you bad news, but I like calling things by their 
real names.” “The situation in our country is such that we are not aware of what 
we could expect tomorrow.” “The situation is so complex that it is changing by the 
hour.”
I could feel, if I am not mistaken, that he did not approve of the line of inactive 
intervention by MoI authorities in relation to the adversary criminal elements. He 
mentioned, even, that senior officials in the Ministry asked him why they did not 
act, why they were waiting. 
Permanent representative of MVR in Poland 
Colonel (Sign) 
[Translated by Greta Keremidchieva]
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Appendix B
Articles about Poland in Dutch Weeklies,  
January 1981–August 1982
Weekly January – December 1981 January – August 1982
De Groene Amsterdammer 19 articles (see note 1) 4 articles (see note 2)
Vrij Nederland 9 articles (see note 3) 3 articles (see note 4)
Haagse Post 6 articles (see note 5) –
De Tijd 8 articles (see note 6) 5 articles (note 7)
Elsevier 11 articles (see note 8) –
Note 1 (De Groene Amsterdammer) 
Bleich, A and M. van Herpen. “Breznjev, de vredesvorst.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, 
March 4, 1981, p. 4 + 8. 
Bleich, A. en S. Kooistra. “Michael Ellman over de Economische noodtoestand.” In De 
Groene Amsterdammer, July, 15, 1981, p. 11 + 18.
Dullemen, M. v. “De DDR en de Polanditis.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, December 16, 
1981, p. 4.
Heesen, B. “We krijgen een hete herfst.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, August 26, 1981, 
p. 14-15.
Herpen, M. van. “Een driehoeksverhouding met wanklanken.” In De Groene Amsterdam-
mer, February 11, 1981, p. 5; “Polen en Russen, twee eeuwen ‘broederlijke hulp.” In De 
Groene Amsterdammer, July, 15, 1981, p.15-16.
Koper, A. “Waar blijft die bestelauto?” In De Groene Amsterdammer, July, 15, 1981, p. 17.
Ree, E. v. and J. Versteeg. “Het gevaar van een versierde tweede weg.” In De Groene Amsterdam-
mer, December 30, 1981, p. 5.Versteeg, J. “Als de Polen de komende periode overleeft ziet het 
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er goed uit.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, March 4, 1981, p. 5.
Scheffer, P. “Een katholieke Pool is een anti-kommunistische Pool.” In De Groene Amster-
dammer January 14, 1981, p. 9; “Polen vervalt in herhalingen.” In De Groene Amsterdam-
mer,  March 4, 1981, p. 9; “Solidariteit met Polen.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, March 
25, 1981, p. 2; “We moeten voorkomen dat allerlei funktionarissen privileges in de wacht 
slepen.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, April 8, 1981, p. 5; “Een rekonstruktie van de week 
der spanning, Strajk.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, April 15, 1981. p. 9-10; “Het forum 
van Katowice mist zijn doel.” In: De Groene Amsterdammer, June 10, 1981, p. 5; “Polen en 
Tegenpolen.” In  De Groene Amsterdammer, July 15, 1981. p.  9-10; “Het geenpartijenstelsel 
van Jaruzelski.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, December 16, 1981, P. 3 + 5; “Polen.” In De 
Groene Amsterdammer, 30 December 1981, p. 2.
Wola, J. “Het dilemma van Solidariteit: Vakbond of volksbeweging.” In De Groene Amster-
dammer, July, 15, 1981, p. 14.
Note 2 (De Groene Amsterdammer) 
Ellman, M. “Sankties? Neen!” In De Groene Amsterdammer, January 20, 1982, p. 5.
Sauer, D. “Nog elke dag worden er mensen van hun bed gelicht.” In De Groene Amsterdam-
mer, January 6, 1982, p. 10-12.
Wassenaar, W. “We heben anderhalf jaar op de maan geleefd.” In De Groene Amsterdammer, 
February 3, 1982, p. 3-4.
Wolfe, A. “De derde weg na Polen?” In De Groene Amsterdammer, January 6, 1982, p. 13.
Note 3 (Vrij Nederland)
Cornelissen, I. “Men kan niet achter iedere Pool een Rus zetten.” In Vrij Nederland, June 
20, 1981, p. 17; “De Russen lijden nog aan de ziekte, de Chinezen zijn in therapie en de 
Polen doen er wat aan.” In Vrij Nederland, July, 11, 1981, p. 6; “Een nieuw gevaar in Polen: 
ultrarechts in de partij en in de pers.” In Vrij Nederland  July 25, 1981, p. 9; “Nog is Walesa 
niet verloren.” In Vrij Nederland, December 19, 1981, p. 1-2; “Lech Walesa, portret van een 
gevangen militant.” In Vrij Nederland, December 26, 1981, p. 9
Kolk, G. van der. “Het Pools nationalisme van KPN-leider Robert Leszek Moczulski.” In Vrij 
Nederland  August 1, 1981, p.10.; “Het apocalyptische nationalisme van de Poolse Kerk.” In 
Vrij Nederland, August 1, 1981; “Kor-lid Jan Lipski over arbeiderszelfbestuur, de navo en de 
terechte populariteit van Reagan.” In Vrij Nederland,  August 8, 1981, p. 6.
Malko, S. “God, het vaderland of de traditionele rodebietensoep: De Poolse kerk heeft voor 
elka wat wils.” In Vrij Nederland, February 21, 1981, p. 8.
Note 4 (Vrij Nederland)
Cornelissen, I. “Jaruzelski en de onbetrouwbaarheid van het Poolse leger.” In Vrij Nederland, 
January 9, 1982.
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Dorler, B. P. Koch and H. Nannen. “Alles of niets, dat is nu juist die typisch Poolse tragedie.” 
In Vrij Nederland,  January 30, 1982, p. 3.
Note 5 (Haagse Post)
Dijksman, D. “De keuze ligt tussen een beperkte of helemaal geen invloed.” In Haagse Post, 
October 10, 1981, p. 28-35. 
Krol, A. “De lange schaduw van Polen.” In Haagse Post, December 19, 1981, p. 38-40.
Schneider, J. “Wij moeten aanvaarden wat moelijk is.” In Haagse Post, October 10, 1981, 
p. 54-57.
Litinski, J. “Ik ben bevorderd tot een van de grootste vijanden van de USSR.” In Haagse Post, 
October 3, 1981, p. 34-35; “Vreemde tijden, een vreemd establishment.” In Haagse Post, 
December 19, 1981, p. 14-19.
Malko, S. “Polen in Nederland.” In Haagse Post, August 29, 1981, p. 24-30.
Note 6 (De Tijd)
Crijnen, T. “Polen krijgt een laatste kans en Moskou kijkt sceptisch toe.” In De Tijd, July 
24, 1981, p. 16-17; “Sovjet penetratie in Nederland.” In De Tijd, July 31, 1981, p. 5; “Neu-
tronenbom en kruisraket: de ramp komt dichterbij.” In De Tijd, August 14, 1981, p. 8-11; 
“Editorial, Polen.” In  De Tijd, September 18, 1981, p. 11; “Poolse kerk: van de nood een 
deugd.” In De Tijd, September 25, 1981, p. 7; “De wanhoopsdaad van een generaal: ‘Het 
leger moet Polen redden.’” In De Tijd, December 18 1981, p. 7-9; “Poolse kerk: distantie en 
verzet.” In De Tijd, December 25, 1981, p. 12-17.
Honnd, B. den.” De Russen komen niet naar Polen, hun voedselbonnen zijn nog niet ge-
drukt.” In De Tijd, December 18, 1981, p. 10-15.
Note 7 (De Tijd)
Crijnen, T. “De tragische misgreep van Wojciech Jaruzelski.” In De Tijd, January 8, 1982, 
p.8-12; “Kerk en militaire dictatuur zijn tot elkaar veroordeeld.” In Elsevier, January 29, 
1982, p. 14-16.
Kuiper, A. “Jaruzelski, held of schurk.” In De Tijd, January 15, 1982, p. 5.
Linden, F. van. “Crisis in Polen, als we het niet met Amerika eens zijn heet het een crisis in 
de Navo.” In De Tijd, February 5, 1982, p. 20-23.
Overgaauw, C. “Lente in Polen: De Poolse lente is voorbij.” In De Tijd, June 11, 1982, 
p. 26-33.
Note 8 (Elsevier)
Corver, “Poolse crisis verspreidt zich door heel Oost-Europa.” In Elsevier, October 31, 1981, 
p. 55-57.
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Huf, J. “Polen kreeg adempauze.”  In Elsevier, April 4, 1981, p. 39; “Kardinaal Wyszynski, 
inspirator van Polens vrijheidsdrang.” In Elsevier, May 30, 1981; “Moreel vacuüm in Polen.” 
In Elsevier, June 6, 1981, p. 34-35; “Brezjnews ultimatum aan Polen.” In Elsevier, June 13, 
1981, p. 31; “Polen blijft Sowjet-beer tarten.” In Elsevier,  June 20, 1981, p. 28-29; “Polen 
hoopt op wonder.” In Elsevier, October 24, 1981, p.  46-47.
Reistsma, O. “Een laffe overval in het holst van de nacht.” Iin Elsevier, December 19, 1981, 
p. 12-17.
Rijn, M. van. “Pressie op Polen.” In Elsevier, April 11, 1981, p. 30-31.
Rosmalen, D. van. “Poolse Winter.” In Elsevier, December 19, 1981, p. 57-59.
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